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Chapter One: Introduction. 
 
Nowadays for most organizations it is becoming more and more necessary to engage in 
mergers or acquisitions (M&As) in order to grow or to survive. This seems to be the 
common  belief,  notwithstanding  the  failure  of  many  M&As.  Research  indicates 
percentages  of  failure  ranging  from  56%  to  83  %  (Cartwright  &  Cooper,  1994; 
Tetenbaum, 1999; Epstein, 2004; Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Sirower, 2006; Rottig, 
2007).  This  wide  range  of  failure  percentages  is  at  least  in  part  a  result  of  unclear 
measurements of success. Who benefits (e.g., the target’s shareholders or those of the 
acquirer), and what is included in the measure of success? When is the M&A-outcome 
measured, what is the right time to measure and what is too early or too late? What were 
the motives for the M&A and are these captured by the measures of success employed? 
The last remark reminds us that there are different kinds of M&As. Throwing all M&As 
on one heap does not help us to obtain a better understanding of the factors leading to 
their success or failure.  
 
In order to get a glimpse of the complexity of the subject: mergers and acquisitions, this 
introductory chapter will give a brief overview of possible types of M&As, different 
motivations  for  M&As,  developmental  processes  of  M&As,  various  aspects  of  post-
M&A integration processes, like the speed of integration and the distinction between task 
and human integration, and steps in the M&A process, from the first decision through the 
whole integration process (Risberg, 2003). We will argue that in order to understand the 
factors leading to the ultimate success or failure of M&As, it is necessary to study the 
post-merger integration process over longer time periods than what has been done in 
most studies so far.  
 
When the focal issue is, change caused by an M&A and the experiences of the employees 
during this change, it will lead to observing the abstract total as well as the emotional 
integrated total. Thus observing the organizational culture as an abstract concept outside 
individuals and identity as a concept inside individuals, will lead us eventually to the   2 
problem statement in  which we concentrate us  on organizational  culture and identity 
changes in the integration period of a merger: 
 
How do organizational culture and identity factors influence employee responses in 
the post-merger integration processes? 
 
1.1 Differences between mergers and acquisitions 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are often discussed together (―M&As‖), but actually the two 
concepts  differ quite clearly.  A merger is  ―a statutory combination of  two (or more) 
corporations, either by the transfer of all assets to one surviving corporation or by the 
joining together of the companies into a single new enterprise‖ (Gertsen, Søderberg & 
Torp, 1998: 17). A merger is often assumed to represent a more cooperative agreement 
between  two  partners  acting  as  equals.  The  organizations  are  usually  more  closely 
matched in terms of size and other relevant aspects than in the case of acquisitions. But in 
practice this does not mean that power is equally shared (Cartwright & Cooper 1996, 
Gertsen et al., 1998). 
When  one  company  buys  another  company  this  is  called  an  acquisition.  The  power 
relationship  in  this  case seems  more clear-cut.  The buying company is the dominant 
party. Cartwright and Cooper (1996) even suggest that there are clear winners and losers 
in the sense that power is immediately surrendered by the acquired company to the new 
―parent‖. But also in this case the borderlines are not that clear; sometimes the acquired 
company can become the dominant partner (Gertsen et al., 1998). Most of the researchers 
tend to treat the terms ―merger‖ and ―acquisition‖ as synonyms. Cartwright and Cooper 
(1996) explain this by comparing the practice of a merger with that of a marriage, in 
which also one partner will often dominate the other in some way or another. 
 
Summarizing  the  above,  mergers  and  acquisitions  can  be  seen  as  two  concepts  with 
different  meanings,  but  in  spite  of  these  differences  M&As  share  a  wide  range  of 
problems, especially in the area of culture differences and identity issues, the two foci of   3 
this dissertation. Therefore researchers mostly analyze M&As as a single category, and 
they will in this dissertation also be treated as such. 
 
1.2 Growth of M&As 
 
M&As  are  becoming  increasingly  popular  (see,  e.g.,  Scherer,  2006).  In  2004  about 
30,000 M&As were completed worldwide (Cartwright & Schoenberg 2006). The extent 
to which all of these M&As can be called successful, however, is still in debate. King, 
Dalton, Daily and Covin (2004) on the basis of a meta-analysis of 93 empirical studies 
conclude  that  M&As  do  not  on  average  positively  contribute  to  the  acquiring  firm’s 
performance. But, on the other hand, M&As seem to be not necessarily more difficult to 
successfully execute than alternative strategies for business growth (King et al., 2004). 
Montgomery and Wilson  (1986) conclude that the majority of the mergers that were 
consummated in 1960 were still un-reversed by the end of 1982. So, if longevity is taken 
as an indicator of success, the picture seems to be rosier. Clearly success is difficult to 
define and to measure. Should the fact that a combination is still intact be taken as a good 
measure of success? Or do we rather have to look at the financial results? Or do we need 
to take the perspectives of employees into account? Examples of research looking at the 
employee  perspective  have  focused,  among  other  things,  on  culture  (Nahavandi  & 
Malekzadeh,  1988),  communication  (Schweiger  &  DeNisi,  1991),  career  implications 
(Walsh,  1989)  conflict  resolution  (Meyer  2006;  Mirvis,  1985),  psychological  and 
behavioral effects (Seo & Hill, 2005), and knowledge transfer (Ranft & Lord, 2002). 
 
Hogan  and  Overmeyer-Day  (1994)  give  an  overview  of  the  several  possibilities  to 
measure success: 
 
Objective measures:     ROI – return on investment 
ROA – return on assets 
Stock price fluctuation 
Change in market shares 
Employee turnover and absenteeism   4 
Subjective measures:    Job satisfaction 
        Commitment 
        Stress 
Employee Perceptions:  Career opportunities 
        Autonomy 
        Power 
        Job security 
 
The use of accounting data, as in the first two objective measures mentioned by Hogan 
and Overmeyer-Day (1994), can be criticized. These are historical data and therefore 
reflect past performance. That means that future earnings are not estimated. Furthermore 
control  groups  are  difficult  to  employ  and  accounting  figures  are  highly  aggregated, 
making it difficult to isolate effects (Montgomery & Wilson, 1986). Using stock price 
fluctuations therefore became more popular in the seventies. It appears to be that gains 
for the (shareholders of) acquired firms in this respect are higher than the gains for the 
acquiring firms (King et al., 2004; Montgomery & Wilson, 1986). Change in market 
share can be seen as an objective indicator of M&A success but there seems to be an 
inability  to  separate  the  effect  of  the  M&A  from  other  influences.  Turnover  and 
absenteeism  is  mostly  used  as  an  objective  measurement  of  human  resource-related 
outcomes.  But  these  phenomena  are  subject  to  fluctuations,  instabilities  and 
inconsistencies and it is questionable what an appropriate time following an M&A would 
be to collect the data (Hogan & Overmeyer-Day, 1994). 
 
Another form of measuring success is taking subjective measures, which can be done in 
the form  of measuring the experiences  of the employees.  These measures  of success 
focus for instance on satisfaction (Covin, Sightler, Kolenko & Tudor, 1996), commitment 
or stress (Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; Panchal & Cartwright, 2001; Buono & Nurick, 
1992;  Appelbaum,  Lefrancois,  Tonna  &  Shapiro,  2007).  Schweiger  and  Denisi  for 
instance  demonstrated  that  information  about  the  merger  reduced  the  anxiety  of  the 
employees (1991). The perception of the employees is often linked to the ―penultimate‖ 
(Hogan  &  Overmeyer-Day,  1994:  251)  outcomes,  meaning  the  outcomes  that  are   5 
believed  to  be  the  cause  of  the  ultimate  outcomes  of  the  merger.  Examples  are 
experiences  of  power  (Vaara,  Tienari,  Piekkari  &  Santti,  2005),  autonomy,  which  is 
mostly referred to as a loss of control or ―controlled empowerment‖ (Buono & Nurick, 
1992: 25), experiences of job security and perceptions of career opportunities in the new 
situation. Empirical explorations of the perceptions of employees mostly employ self-
reported surveys. The disadvantage is that the results may be affected by biases. The 
respondents  with  a  positive  frame  of  reference,  for  instance  as  a  result  of  new  job 
opportunities, may evaluate the merger more positive, also in other dimensions (Hogan & 
Overmeyer-Day, 1994). 
 
Most of the research mentioned above resulted in mixed messages regarding success, but 
in spite of these mixed messages firms are still massively engaging in M&A activities. 




What motivates firms to continue to engage in M&As, in spite of the many failures? This 
question is subject to much speculation. It seems that there are publicly stated motives 
and more hidden motives. Angwin (2001: 34) phrases it as follows: ― … motives interact 
and are complex rather than singular and yet, publicly, they are aimed at achieving the 
rational outcomes of improved performance and increased shareholder value‖.   
Publicly stated motives for M&As are: establishing a presence in a new geographic area 
(mainly for cross-border deals), gaining critical size, acquiring technology and know-
how, building market  share, and more generally  strengthening the business  (Angwin, 
2001). The main reason according to Marks and Mirvis (2001) is speed: ―the union will 
provide  for  attainment  of  strategic  goals  more  quickly  and  inexpensively  than  if  the 
company acted on its own‖. Furthermore, these authors emphasize that:  ―combinations 
also  are  able  to  gain  flexibility,  leverage  competencies,  share  resources  and  create 
opportunities that otherwise would be inconceivable‖ (Marks & Mirvis, 2001: 80). 
Organizations engaging in M&As anticipate some form of value creation. There seems to 
be a potential to cut costs and to improve efficiency. And this potential, even if it is   6 
extremely uncertain, draws many organizations into M&As (Tetenbaum, 1999). But there 
can also be hidden motives like the pursuit of power by managers, or even potential 
personal  financial  benefits.  Cartwright  and  Cooper  (1996:  21)  mention  the  ―fear  of 
obsolescence‖, meaning that in order to restore their self-confidence; senior executives 
have to engage in an acquisition or merger. Sidestepping these more hidden motives, and 
focusing on value creation as the more common motive, there are several possible kinds 
of M&As, characterized by different types of value creation 
 
1.4 Kinds of M&As 
 
Some researchers use the Federal Trade Commission’s Statistical Report on Mergers and 
Acquisitions (1975) as a reference to describe five categories of relationships between the 
acquiring and acquired firms (Montgomery & Wilson, 1986; Risberg, 2003): 
 
1. Horizontal.  The companies produce the same or closely related products. 
2. Vertical.  The companies have a buyer-seller relationship. 
3. Product extension.  The firms are functionally related in production and/or distribution 
but sell products that do not directly compete with one another. 
4. Market extension.  The companies manufacture the same products, but sell them in 
different geographic markets. 
5. Unrelated.  There is no relation between the companies. 
The F.T.C. describes the categories above as mutually exclusive. 
 
Cartwright and Cooper (1996) use slightly different categories: 
1. Horizontal 
2. Vertical 
3. Concentric  Firms are in a different but related field. The acquiring company 
wishes to expand. 
4. Conglomerate  The companies are completely unrelated. 
   7 
During  the  sixties  and  seventies  the  combinations  tended  to  be  of  the  conglomerate, 
unrelated type, later the bulk of M&As shifted to combinations of more similar firms. 
This is important, because it indicates that M&A success became more heavily dependent 
on the realization of human synergy because integration in this combination type will 
likely entail a fusion of all the human resources of the companies (Cartwright & Cooper, 
1996). Gertsen et al. (1998) refer to this as a shift of the predominant strategic goal from 
diversification to achieving synergy and advantages of large-scale operations. The more 
recent  combinations  therefore  require  more  integration  of  departments  of  the 
organizations involved, such as finance, marketing, and personnel. Cultural integration is 
consequently also more important within these M&As (Gertsen et al., 1998). 
 
There  is  some  evidence  that  unrelated  mergers  are  less  successful.  Porter  (1987) 
examined four strategies to diversify, and successful diversifiers made a low percentage 
of unrelated acquisitions (Di Georgio, 2002). But a study of 434 large acquisitions by 
U.S. firms only confirmed that unrelated acquisitions were resold at a slightly higher, but 
statistically insignificant, rate than related acquisitions (Montgomery & Wilson, 1986). 
This same study also showed a majority of unreversed mergers over a period of twenty 
years, as discussed earlier.  
This brings us back to the debate of M&A success. But despite the doubts regarding the 
success  of  many  M&As,  many  organizations  still  decide  to  merge  or  engage  in  an 
acquisition. This decision is part of an elaborate process that can be described in several 
phases. 
 
1.5 Developmental processes 
 
Many researchers refer to the total merger process as a process in several stages. The first 
phase is seen as the negotiation period. This stage is referred to as the ―pre-acquisition 
stage‖,  the  ―anticipatory  stage‖,  ―pre-merger  stage‖,  ―pre-combination  phase‖  or 
―negotiation stage‖ (Appelbaum, Gandell, Yortis, Proper & Jobin, 2000; Fugate, Kinicki 
&  Scheck,  2002;  Marks  &  Mirvis,  2001;  Angwin,  2001).  In  this  period  there  is  a 
tendency to let ―hard‖ criteria prevail. Therefore several researchers stress the importance   8 
of  due  diligence  (Marks  &  Mirvis,  2001;  Tetenbaum,  1999;  Angwin,  2001).  Due 
diligence is seen as an objective and independent examination of the acquisition target. 
The areas that are customarily examined are: industry, competitive environment, history 
and  development,  management  and  personnel,  financial  performance,  assets  values, 
accounts and accounting policies, and information systems. The purpose of due diligence 
is to uncover issues like inaccurate inventory assessment, puffed-up financial accounts, 
weak cash flows, and so forth. In cross-border deals several additional issues may play a 
role. This may involve issues like: exchange rates, complexities of assessing economic 
and  political  framework,  tax  complications,  language  and  assessing  different  national 
accounting systems. Therefore organizations tend to work with professional advisors in 
the due diligence process (Angwin, 2001). 
There are several perspectives on the timing of due diligence. Some see it as a process 
taking place after an agreement has  been made between the two parties (Tetenbaum, 
1999).  Others  regard  it  part  of  the  pre-acquisition  process  (Angwin,  2001;  Marks  & 
Mirvis, 2001). There is even some disagreement about the concept of ―due diligence‖ 
itself. Whereas many authors see it as an examination of the ―other‖ company, Marks and 
Mirvis (2001: 84) stress the importance of measuring the capacity of both companies:  
―Proper due diligence ascertains first the extent to which the candidate’s system has the 
capacity  to  meet  its  own  current  and  future  business  needs,  and  then  considers  the 
compatibility  between  the  two  sides’  systems  right  now  and  following  anticipated 
growth.‖  In  this  premerger  stage  the  importance  of  the  national-  and  organizational 
cultural differences will also become visible, and these are stressed to be important issues 
to analyze in the due diligence process (Angwin, 2001). 
 
The  demarcation  of  the  second  stage  differs  between  researchers,  some  see  it  as  the 
merger itself, and label it with terms like: ―combination phase‖ (Marks & Mirvis, 2001), 
―during merger‖ (Appelbaum et al., 2000), and ―integration‖ (DiGeorgio, 2003). Others 
subdivide the second phase in stages like ―initial‖ and ―final change stage‖. (Fugate et al., 
2002).  
   9 
The last stage is seen as the period where the merger is final. The combination of the two 
companies is complete. The new organization can be seen as one entity. This period is 
referred  to  as  the  ―post-merger  stage‖  (Appelbaum  et  al.,  2000),  ―post-combination 
phase‖ (Marks & Mirvis, 2001) or ―aftershock stage‖ (Fugate et al., 2002). 
 
The labeling of the stages depends partly on the focus of the researcher. Most attention is 
often paid to the top managers who are negotiating the deal, but the ―victims‖ of the 
M&A decisions, the employees, also live through several periods. Sometimes these are 
compared  to  a  mourning  process.  When  people  grieve  they  go  through  a  process  of 
denial, anger, bargaining and acceptance. And this same process can be seen as being 
experienced by many managers and other employees of firms going through an M&A 
process (Appelbaum et al., 2000, Cartwright & Cooper 1996). 
One could also question whether M&A processes can really be meaningfully subdivided 
in phases. The process could also be more seamlessly ongoing, and it could very well be 
different for different departments, so that the phases will not be as clear as they might 
seem to be. It is also possible that the process is iterative, with periods of renegotiations 
occurring also during the integration process. Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 98) refer to 
these renegotiations as: ―new supplemental agreements that are typically established to 
resolve only the contested issues‖. In sum the distinction of different phases can be seen 
as useful demarcations in as far as they are linked to different types of activities taking 
place in the M&A process, but it can also give an illusion of clarity. The phases an M&A 
process  will  go  through  also  depend  on  the  level  of  integration  that  the  merging 
companies try to accomplish. We will now turn to this issue. 
 
1.6 Integration types 
 
When  two  companies  merge  the  goal  will  be  most  of  the  time  to  integrate  the  two 
companies  into  a  single  unit.  Shrivastava  (1986)  regards  managing  this  integration 
effectively as the primary problem of an M&A. He stresses the fact that integration can 
be done by combining the accounting systems as well as physical assets like product 
lines, product systems and technology. But the most critical type of integration is seen by   10 
Shrivastava to be the cultural integration, which he refers to as part of the managerial and 
sociocultural integration, defining it as: ― [a] complex combination of issues related to the 
selection  or  transfer  of  managers,  the  changes  in  organizational  structure,  the 
development of a consistent corporate culture and a frame of reference to guide strategic 
decision-making,  the  gaining  of  commitment  and  motivation  from  personnel  and  the 
establishment of new leadership‖ (1986: 70). The integration of two organizations during 
an M&A involves the process of collaboration of the two merging companies. This can 
express  itself  on  several  fields  and  it  can  be  typified  in  several  manners. 
Increasing attention is being paid to the process perspective on M&As, which focuses on 
the guidance of the post-acquisition integration process. Other approaches are: the capital 
market school, the strategic management school, and the organizational behavior school 
(Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanason, 2000). In the post-combination integration process 
mostly  culture  clashes  and  conflict  resolution  are  highlighted  (Larsson  &  Finkelstein 
1999). The process perspective field explores several types of integration. 
 
The type of integration depends on the agreed upon level of autonomy of the merging 
companies, and especially that of the acquired company. But whereas  ―agreed upon‖ 
seems to refer to decisions made by top management, integration issues also have to do 
with  the  degree  of  merger  acceptance  of  the  employees,  as  well  as  their  need  of 
independence.    11 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) combine the need for organizational autonomy with the 
need for strategic interdependence to distinguish four different approaches to integration. 
 







                   Need for Strategic Interdependence 
  Low   High 
      High                       Preservation  Symbiosis 
      Low             Holding  Absorption 
 
In  preservation  M&As  the  acquired  operations  are  managed  at  ―arm’s  length‖.  This 
involves financial/risk sharing and general management capability transfer (Haspeslagh 
& Jemison 1991: 148).  
In symbiotic M&As the two organizations first coexist and then become gradually more 
interdependent. Symbiotic acquisitions need boundary preservation as well as boundary 
permeability. The need to preserve autonomy can be gradually lifted but this can only be 
done  by  the  acquired  company  to  the  extent  that  it  changes  its  own  organizational 
practices to adapt to the new situation. 
The  holding  situation  exists  when  the  acquired  firm  has  no  intention  of  integrating 
through  anything  except  financial  transfers,  risk-sharing  or  general  management 
capability.  
The  absorption  M&As  imply  a  full  consolidation  over  time  of  the  operations, 
organization, and culture of both organizations. 
 
Haspeslag and Jemison do not include the perception by the acquired company in their 
categorization, but they do bring up the notion that integration does not have to mean 
―make them look like us‖ (observation by Risberg, 1999). This means that the need for   12 
organizational autonomy is not as clear-cut as it seems. It can be argued that autonomy 
removal is a necessary part of the acculturation process or an obstacle that slows this 
process  down.  According  to  Larsson  and  Lubatkin  (2001)  autonomy  removal  is  not 
always an impediment to achieving acculturation. What they consider necessary in that 
case is that the removal is coupled to a high level of informal control so that this form of 
informal communication can lead to a jointly determined culture.  
 
The type of integration is often linked to the adaptation process of acculturation, which 
refers to the blending of the organizational cultures. The four possibilities that are often 
mentioned are: 
 
Assimilation:     The non-dominant group gives up its identity 
 
Integration:  The  non-dominant  group  maintains  its  own  culture  but  also 
becomes an integral part of the dominant culture 
 
Rejection:    The non-dominant group withdraws from the dominant group 
 
Deculturation:   The non-dominant group loses its own culture and does not adapt 
to the culture of the other organization. 
(Gertsen et al., 1998) 
 
 
Nahavandi  and Malekzadeh (1988) combine different levels of acculturation with the 
perception  of  attractiveness  of  the  other  party  and  the  value  the  members  of  the 
organization place on their own culture and by modifying the matrix of Berry (1983) 
suggest four possibilities:  
   13 
 
Table 1.2: Source: Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) 
 
 
How much do members of the acquired firm 
value preservation of their own culture? 
  Very much  Not at all 




Integration  Assimilation 
Not  at  all 
attractive 
Separation  Deculturation 
 
When members of the acquired firm want to remain independent and autonomous this 
may lead to integration. It involves interaction and adaptation and mutual contributions 
by both groups but does not mean that either of the groups loses their cultural identity. 
This process can only occur if the acquirer allows such independence.  
Assimilation will occur when members of the acquired organization willingly adopt the 
identity and culture of the acquiring firm. This means that they will relinquish their own 
culture.  
Separation can be the result of refusal to become assimilated with the acquirer in any 
form or at any level. It means that there will be minimal cultural exchange between the 
two firms. Each will function independently. 
When members of the acquired firm do not value their own culture but do not want to be 
assimilated into the acquiring firm either, this can lead to deculturation. The result will be 
a disintegration of the acquired company as a cultural entity. 
 
This  acculturative  model  of  Nahavandi  and  Malekzadeh  (1988)  provided  several 
hypotheses that involved the success of a merger by linking it to the varying degrees of 
relatedness. For example they presume that an unrelated acquisition can turn out to be 
successful if the separation mode is adopted.   14 
Marks  and Mirvis (2001) suggest  different  kinds of end states,  and link these to  the 
degree of change in both companies. Their possibilities are as follows: 
 
 




Degree of change in 
the acquired 
company 
  Degree of change in the acquiring company 
Low    High 
High  Absorption    Transformation 
    Best of Both   
Low  Preservation    Reverse Takeover 
 
Absorption  is  an  equivalent  of  the  assimilation  state  of  Malekzadeh  and  Nahavandi 
(1988)  and  Gertsen  et  al.  (1998)  and  the  absorption  state  of  Haspeslag  and  Jemison 
(1991).  The parent company absorbs the acquired company and generally brings in new 
management.  
Transformation  is  a  sharp  break  from  the  past.  It  is  a  fundamental  change  of  both 
companies. Marks and Mirvis (2001) describe this kind of post-combination change as a 
process of reinventing the company.  
The ―best of both‖ seems to be a good option in the sense that the achieving of synergies 
is optimal, but according to Marks and Mirvis (2001) this can also be ―the bloodiest 
option‖ (pg. 86). It means: ―crunching functions together‖ (pg.86), and that often leads to 
a reduction in the number of jobs.  
Preservation is found in diversified firms that promote cultural pluralism. The acquired 
firm retains most of its ways of doing business. It can be compared with the separation 
state of Nahavandi and Malezadeh (1988).    15 
The reverse takeover is according to Marks and Mirvis (2001) an unusual type but it does 
occur. It is when the acquired company takes the lead in the cultural change. It mostly 
involves the absorption of a parallel unit of the acquiring company by the acquired firm.  
 
The  models  discussed  above  seek  to  clarify  the  process  of  the  blending  of  merging 
organizations and one can argue that the higher the degree of integration sought, the more 
difficult it becomes to achieve success (DiGeorgio, 2002). But of course these models 
simplify the complexity of what really happens. That is probably the reason why so many 
different categorizations exist. The perspective assumed is either that of the acquiring 
company, that of the employees of the acquired company, or of both organizations. And 
the issues that are deemed to be relevant are: the degree of autonomy, the perception of 
the other company, the value of the other company, and the value of the former company 
(both as perceived by employees). Another integration-related issue that is not reflected 
in  the  categorizations  but  sometimes  believed  to  be  crucial  is  that  of  the  speed  of 
integration. 
 
1.7 Speed of integration 
 
A possible fear of the acquiring company is that the acquisition process will slow the 
whole company down. This fear is aggravated by a feeling of uncertainty: ―There is 
always something uncertain about precisely what has been bought – who they are, what 
they do, whether they really know how to run their business. Corporate staffers pounce 
on the target to get their hands on things in a hurry‖ (Marks & Mirvis, 2001: 87). In many 
mergers there seems to be a productivity drop of 25 to 50 %. This productivity drop can 
be caused by several reactions of employees, like preoccupation with self-interest and 
distraction  from  work.  These  reactions  are  the  result  of  a  psychological  shock.  This 
whole  process  is  referred  to  as  ―post-merger  drift‖.  Integration-related  tasks  might 
distract  management  attention  away  from  the  firm’s  business  and  delay  important 
decisions  (Ranft  &  Lord,  2002,  Tetenbaum,  1999).  According  to  Tetenbaum  (1999), 
people expect change and when this does not occur, employees become preoccupied with 
security issues.    16 
The dangers mentioned above seem to provide a good argument for a speedy postmerger 
integration.  This  is  reinforced  by  other  arguments.  For  instance,  the  enthusiasm  of 
stakeholders  tends  to  be  at  it  highest  shortly  after  the  completion  of  the  merger. 
Proceeding quickly with the integration could then capitalize on this early enthusiasm. 
Another argument would be that spending less time in a sub-optimal condition means less 
instability and fewer costly readjustments. It also means less exposure to uncertainties of 
the external environment. If a company is ―at war with itself‖ (Angwin, 2004: 420) it can 
be  severely  hampered  to  respond  effectively  to  pressures  (for  instance  political  or 
competitive) from the environment.  But a recent study of a population of 232 corporate 
acquisitions which took place in the UK between April 1991 and March 1994 did not 
provide  strong  support  for  the  importance  of  speed  during  the  first  100  days  after  a 
merger (Angwin, 2004). There only seemed to be an association between the ―volume of 
changes‖ (p. 426) (meaning the number of successful changes made in several areas of 
the company) made in the first 100 days and the perceptions of acquisition success in the 
third and particularly the fourth year of life. This means that with the passing of time the 
views of the top executives on the causes of acquisition success will change, possibly 
because  their  views  become  less  clouded  by  the  hectic  events.  But  Angwin  (2004) 
stresses in this respect the impossibility to rule out hindsight and survivor bias. This 
suggests  that  speed  can  not  be  seen  as  such  an  unambiguous  concept  as  might  be 
expected at first sight. It apparently depends on the expectations of the top executives of 
success in the first years.  
 
In  line  with  the  above  reasoning,  DiGeorgio  (2002)  argues  that  a  higher  degree  of 
integration will lead to a more difficult path towards success. ―Pushing too quickly for 
integration,  particularly  on  issues  either  very  difficult  to  do  or  not  that  important  to 
business results, can have negative consequences‖ (DiGeorgio, 2002: 144). Knowledge 
transfer in particular can be seen as one of the more complex operations in this respect.  
A few studies have investigated this topic (Lubatkin, Florin & Lane, 2001; Ranft & Lord, 
2002)  and  stress  the  difficulty  of  protecting  the  technologies  and  capabilities  of  the 
acquired firm by means of autonomy on one hand and the need of transferring it to the 
acquiring firm on the other.   17 
 
Looking at speed from the knowledge transfer perspective, one can argue for a slow and 
cautious acquisition. The knowledge-based resources are usually embedded in a socially 
complex  structure  and  there  is  a  risk  that  this  structure  might  be  altered  during  the 
acquisition integration. It could potentially damage or destroy the resources. For example, 
the  knowledge-based  resources  could  be  contained  in  specific  employees  and  their 
relationships, and as a result of a speedy acquisition these employees might leave. Ranft 
and  Lord  (2002)  therefore  provide  a  rationale  for  a  slow  acquisition  process.  Slow 
acquirers are able to engage in a period of learning and are able to integrate in this period 
the acquired firm’s knowledge (Ranft & Lord, 2002). 
 
Another line of reasoning would be to link speed to certain characteristics of the M&A. 
Homburg and Bucerius (2006) for instance argue that speed can have detrimental and 
beneficial effects depending on the level of relatedness of the merging firms. In their 
study based on a sample of horizontal M&As in Central Europe during the 1996 – 1999 
period,  they  found  that  speed  has  a  strong  influence  on  success  when  the  internal 
relatedness is high and the external relatedness is low. They explained the high internal 
relatedness  in  terms  of  the  social  identity  theory  meaning  that  people  will  seek 
membership in groups whose members are similar to themselves and members of their 
original  group.  This  means  that  when  the  groups  are  more  similar  the  speed  of  the 
integration process can be increased. The low external relatedness (which refers to the 
firms’  target  markets  and  their  market  positioning)  was  explained  by  Homburg  and 
Bucerius (2006) in connection with customer uncertainty. If the external relatedness is 
low the range of possible implications is broader for the customer thereby increasing his 
uncertainty.  A  higher  speed  will  then  reduce  this  uncertainty  sooner  (Homburg  & 
Bucerius, 2006). 
 
All in all, the necessity of a speedy integration process seems to be a contested issue.  It is 
possible  to  move  too  fast  and  destroy  the  knowledge  assets  that  are  crucial  for  a 
successful merger, but it is also possible to move too slow and loose a beneficial market 
position. The overall rule seems to be that an M&A between larger companies (or with a   18 
large company as the target) will need more time for the integration process. If this is 
true, it also has implications for the study of these M&As. To gain insight in the whole 
period  of  integration  will  necessarily  mean  engaging  in  an  extensive  longitudinal 
research.  
 
Several researchers have acknowledged the M&A process factor in their research. Apart 
from  the  different  stages  discussed  earlier  and  the  speed  of  integration  issue,  the 
distinction between task integration and human integration deserves to be discussed. 
 
1.8 Distinguishing task integration and human integration 
 
Most researchers recognize the distinction between the technical-operational side of a 
merger  and  the  human  side  of  a  merger.  The  technical-operational  side  focuses  on 
creating synergies which means creating a new firm that is more than the sum of its parts. 
It involves actual net benefits (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), strategic fit or relatedness 
(Datta, 1991), which is defined by Jemison and Sitkin (1986: 146) as ―the degree to 
which the target firm augments or complements the parent’s strategy and thus makes 
identifiable contributions to the financial and nonfinancial goals of the parent‖. A rational 
decision-making process using the complementarities of both firms is assumed to create 
these synergies (Bierly & Gallagher, 2007). The human side focuses on the behavior of 
the employees (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Cartwright & Cooper, 1994; Schweiger & 
Denisi,  1991)  and  the  managers  (Marks  &  Mirvis,  2000;  Marks  &  Mirvis,  2001; 
Shrivastava, 1986; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). 
Birkinshaw et al. (2000) in their discussion of task and human integration issues, point at 
the connection between the two processes. Birkinshaw et al. define task integration as: 
―the identification and realization of operational synergies‖ and human integration as: 
―the  creation  of  positive  attitudes  towards  the  integration  among  employees  on  both 
sides‖.  The  concept  of  ―identification‖  might  create  confusion,  because  it  involves 
communication, sharing information and commitment to the idea of synergies, which 
seems strongly related to the human dimension. On the other hand ―creating a positive 
attitude‖ seems a too narrow description of the concept human integration. It would be   19 
clearer to define task integration as the procedures and structure that shape operational 
synergies and human integration as the communication and attitudes of the employees 
concerning synergies. 
Despite the unclear definitions, the value of the research of Birkinshaw et al. (2000) is 
particularly  apparent  in  their  analysis  of  sequences  of  events  during  postmerger 
integration processes. The human integration process in the cases they studied appeared 
to facilitate the effectiveness of the task integration process. This means that if a task 
integration  process  is  executed  before  a  human  integration  process  has  begun  the 
likelihood that problems will occur is high. Another interesting finding in their research is 
that according to the researchers an obsessive concern with the employee satisfaction 
may  be  misplaced.  They  stress  that  human  integration  is  only  a  means  in  achieving 
synergies and not an end in itself. An argument in this respect was that the employees 
seemed  to  have  a  ―zone  of  indifference‖,  that  prevented  a  high  turnover  even  in  an 
unwanted acquisition. 
 
In  this  dissertation  the  focus  is  on  the  human  integration  process,  therefore  a  more 
elaborate discussion of this concept will be in the following section. 
 
1.9 Human integration 
 
The  importance  of  this  aspect  of  the  merger  is  underestimated  in  many  M&As.  The 
creation of value through strategic fit is the dominant goal of M&As, but failure of many 
M&As caused researchers to start analyzing the ―human side‖ of mergers significantly 
deeper than before. However, the process proved to be extremely complex, and difficult 
to conceptualize. We will discuss this subject more in-depth in the next chapter from the 
perspective of organizational identity and culture, and here only briefly indicate a few 
different directions taken in the study of human integration in M&As. 
 
Some scholars focus on the expectations of the employees of an organization involved in 
a merger. Dackert, Jackson, Brenner & Johansson (2003) found in their study that usually 
the larger organization was expected to dominate, because of its larger size and also   20 
because its director generally became the director of the merged organization. Because of 
these expectations employees of the smaller organization felt more threatened. Hubbard 
and Purcell (2001) identified seven factors that are influential in shaping the expectations 
of  employees.  These  seven  factors  are:  quality  of  communication,  believability  of 
information,  trust  in  management  action,  credibility  of  leadership,  fairness  of  action, 
consistency of action and communication, and logic of management action or behaviour. 
The focus of the above study was on the acquired company. 
 
Other researchers have concentrated on stress effects. They mainly refer to the stress that 
the employees feel after the announcement of the merger. The announcement is followed 
by a period of change and therefore a feeling of insecurity will develop. During this 
period the employees experience uncertainty with regard to the new situation. Feelings of 
fear and anxiety can be dominant (Tetenbaum, 1999). Very, Lubatkin and Calori (1996) 
refer to this phenomenon as a ―disruptive tension‖ that is felt because employees are 
required to interact with the other organization, or they even have to adopt its culture. 
This acculturative stress seems to be more apparent in cross-national than in domestic 
mergers.  On  the  other  hand,  Very  et  al.  (1996)  also  found  that  sometimes  national 
cultural  differences  elicit  attraction,  rather  than  stress.  A  few  empirical  studies  have 
examined the difference in stress levels between the acquired and the acquiring company. 
The main  result seems  to  be that the employees  of acquired company  were stronger 
affected. However a study of sales force employees conducted in Britain by Panchal and 
Cartwright (2001) found the contrary. The employees of the acquired firm had the most 
positive reactions. According to Panchal and Cartwright this divergent response might be 
explained from a cultural and identity perspective (Panchal & Cartwright, 2001). We will 
return to the issues of culture and identity in the pages to follow. 
 
Marks  and  Mirvis  (2001)  focus  on  the  importance  of  transparency.  Announcing  the 
desired final stage will clear the air and avoid misperceptions and fantasies. They argue 
that the worst mistake a buyer can make is ―to talk merger and act acquisition‖ (Marks & 
Mirvis, 2001: 86). Although transparency seems important, the kind of clarity to be given 
to employees is not clear, nor how to achieve this.    21 
 
Another  example  of  concepts  researchers  have  focused  on  is  the  commitment  of  the 
employees towards the new combination after the M&A announcement. Commitment 
was found to be related to perceived success of the organization, job security, tenure and 
perceived  communication  regarding  the  merger  (Schraeder,  2001).  The  strongest 
relationship of commitment is with the perceived success of the organization (Fairfield-
Sonn,  Ogilvie  &  DelVecchio,  2002).  Here,  too,  clarity  and  information  seem  to  be 
important. But according to Fairfield-Sonn et al. (2002) this depends on the situation. In 
their  study  the  type  of  union  mattered.  Commitment  related  negatively  to  a  hostile 
environment  (hostile  acquisition).  Surprisingly,  however,  in  their  study  role-related 
variables had no impact on commitment. This means that an increase in workload and 
sometimes increasing task fuzziness did not have an influence on the commitment of the 
employees (Fairfield-Sonn et al., 2002). 
 
Satisfaction with the merger has not been subject of extensive research. One study of 
Covin et al. (1996) regarding this subject had an interesting result. The authors studied a 
division  of a large manufacturing company  and in  particular the extent to  which the 
employees had adjusted to the M&A that had taken place two years prior to their study. 
They concluded that the employees of the acquired firm had significantly lower merger 
satisfaction scores than employees of the acquiring firm, despite the relatively high career 
future  expectations  with  the  acquiring  firm.  Furthermore  they  found  that  non-union 
employees were significantly more satisfied than employees who were union members. 
On the other hand they found that employees who showed characteristics associated with 
greater  job  mobility  held  more  favorable  attitudes  toward  the  merger.  (Covin  et  al., 
1996). 
 
The  study  of  impediments  to  integration  could  be  seen  as  the  key  to  a  better 
understanding of the process of human integration. Vaara (2003) concentrated on the 
irrational  features  that  may  impede  the  post-acquisition  process.  One  of  these  was 
ambiguity.  The  negotiators  and  planners  of  an  M&A  are  a  different  group  in  the 
organization than the unit managers. That the middle managers have another perspective   22 
can be seen as a ―normal state of affairs‖, but it may be an impediment to integration. 
Another  impediment  could  be  that  power  struggles  between  various  groups  in  the 
organization may give issues a political dimension (Vaara, 2003). Jemison and Sitkin 
(1986) argued in a review study that four important impediments to integration capture 
the process aspects of M&As: activity segmentation (technological complexity of the 
activities concerning an acquisition may lead to task segmentation and this may lead to a 
disproportionate attention on the strategic fit), escalating momentum (meaning that forces 
within an organization accumulate to complete the process quickly, which can result in 
premature  solutions),  expectational  ambiguity  (meaning  that  ambiguity  during  the 
negotiation phase can become dysfunctional in the integration phase), and management 
system  misapplication  (meaning  that  the  acquiring  firm  imposes  its  approaches  and 
practices on the acquired firm, even where this is counterproductive). Jemison and Sitkin 
(1986) concluded that the attention of M&As should be directed to the process itself and 
that the knowledge of the impediments may affect the ability of managers and scholars to 
understand how to achieve the benefits (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986).  
 
The  examples  of  research  above  illustrate  the  extensiveness  of  the  field  of  human 
integration. Focusing on a single element of the field enables researchers to analyze the 
chosen  concept  in  depth.  However,  a  true  understanding  of  the  processes  of  human 
integration in M&As requires a more holistic approach. Two broad concepts that have 
several tangents with the concepts discussed in the examples above are organizational 
culture and identity. In Chapter Two we will discuss the ways in which organizational 
culture and identity influence M&A human integration processes, as well as each other. 
Here we will briefly indicate what in this dissertation is understood to be identity and 
organizational culture, and why these concepts are seen as important for M&A human 
integration processes. 
 
Identity is in this dissertation approached from a social identity perspective. Identity can 
be  seen  as  consisting  of  three  levels:  Individual,  interpersonal  and  social  (Sluss  & 
Ashforth, 2007). The individual level looks upon the self as a unique being that separates 
itself from its environment. A distinctive issue is self-esteem and this is derived from   23 
interpersonal comparisons of traits, abilities and performance. The basic motivation at 
this  level  is  self-interest.  The  individual  is  seen  as  independent  and  autonomous. 
The next level is interpersonal. The main concentration is on role-related relationships 
like  supervisor-subordinate  or  co-worker—co-worker.  The  individual  at  this  level  is 
therefore interdependent. The basic motivation is the dyad’s welfare. Self-esteem is at 
this  level  based  on  the  fulfillment  of  the  role-relationship  obligations. 
The third level is the core of the social identity theory and the main focus of this thesis. 
At this level the individual is seen as having characteristics that are also characteristics 
from the group that the individual belongs to. This means that self-esteem is based on 
intergroup comparisons and the welfare of the group is seen as the basic motivation of the 
individual (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007). 
Researchers often treat identity and identification as synonyms for one’s sense of self 
(Sluss & Ashforth, 2007). But there is value in making a distinction. Identity can be 
defined  as  something  that  is  distinctive,  central  and  enduring  (Dutton,  Dukerich  & 
Harquail, 1994) and identification can be defined as the degree or the extent to which an 
individual  defines  himself  as  having  the  same  attributes  as  this  identity.  (Ravasi  & 
Rekom, 2003; Dutton et al., 1994; Ashforth and Mael, 1989), which means that identity 
is seen as a relatively stable state and identification as a force. Identification can be seen 
as a perceptual cognitive construct, meaning that it is not associated with behavior or an 
affective state but with personally experiencing the success and failures of the group 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989) and is typified as a property of individuals (Ravasi & Rekom, 
2003). The problem with the use of these concepts is that identity or social identity is 
often mentioned by researchers in the beginning of their argument in order to provide the 
boundaries  of  the  concept  and  then  the  argumentation  often  transforms  without 
explanation  to  identification  or  social  identification  because  this  is  what  is  actually 
measured. 
Another problem is that a single term (organizational identity) is often used with different 
meanings. It is sometimes seen from a macro perspective and then it focuses on the entity 
per se, independent from individuals (Hatch & Schulz, 1997; Dutton et al., 1994; Ravasi 
& Schulz, 2006; Zaheer, Schomaker & Genc, 2003), and sometimes it is seen as a part of 
the self and is then described as the occurrence of the organization providing an answer   24 
to the question ―Who am  I?‖  (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg, Terry & White, 1995; 
Bartels, Douwes, de Jong & Pruyn, 2006; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, Monden 
& de Lima, 2002). Arguing from the social identity theory it stands more to reason to 
treat organizational identity as a specific form of social identity and therefore a part of the 
self  because  identity  as  a  concept  focuses  on  the  awareness  and  experience  of  the 
individual.  
 
Organizational culture is often interpreted as ―how we do things‖ (Zaheer et al., 2003). It 
can be seen as both the everyday understandings of the members and the more general 
features of the organization (Parker, 2000). Most of the time organizational culture is 
referred  to  as  ―shared  values  and  beliefs‖  (Peters  &  Waterman,  1982;  Schein,  1996; 
Hatch  &  Schulz, 2002), but  several  perspectives  on organizational  culture have been 
developed in  the last  30  years  (Smircich, 1983;  Martin, 1992;  Trice  &  Beyer, 1984; 
Hofstede,  1994;  Saffold,  1988;  Sackmann,  1992).  In  the  next  chapter  this  will  be 
explained more elaborately as well as the consequences the various perspectives have for 
research approaches. 
Social and organizational identification and organizational culture are closely related and 
sometimes it is even hard to make a distinction between the two processes of shaping and 
forming a culture and shaping and forming an identity. Both processes are influenced by 
organizational and environmental changes. A merger is clearly a disruptive element that 
will change the organizational processes and the stable forms of the concepts mentioned 
above.  Buono,  Bowditch  &  Lewis  (1985)  refer  to  this  phenomenon  as  a  ―cultural 
collision‖ meaning that a different organizational world can disrupt the entire workings of 
the old firms and will create a shock for the members of both firms. By observing the 
integration process over several years the ―shock‖ and its ―after effects‖ can be observed 
and measured. 
 
This thesis explores the merger integration process of two international airlines from the 
perspective of organizational culture and identity.    25 
 
The problem statement guiding this thesis will be: 
 
How do organizational culture and identity factors influence employee responses in 
the post-merger integration processes? 
 
 
In order to get a closer insight in the connection between the processes the following 
questions will be answered in the next chapters: 
 
 
  How do post-merger integration processes impact on perceptions of culture, and 
how do these perceptions influence employee responses?  
 
  How do post-merger integration processes impact on the social identification, 




The answers to the above questions are sought in an analysis of the data of a longitudinal 
study in which two international airlines where closely observed during their integration 
process  after  a  merger.  The  important  characteristic  of  longitudinal  research  is  the 
capacity  to  observe  changes  and  developments  across  an  extended  period  of  time 
(Saunders,  Lewis  &  Thornhill,  2004;  Sekaran,  2003).  In  this  case  we  looked  for 
developments and experiences over a time period of three-and-a-half years. The studies 
of  human  integration  processes  in  M&As  that  have  been  done  so  far  have  seldom 
observed activities so extensively during such a long time period.  
Two research teams participated in this case study. One research team mainly focussed 
on  the  acquiring  company,  Air  France,  and  the  other  team  focussed  mainly  on  the 
acquired  company,  KLM.  The  acquired  airline  KLM  is  the  main  focus  of  this 
dissertation. This focus has been chosen because the acquired company most of the time   26 
has a more difficult struggle with changing its identity than the acquiring company, and 
because a vast amount of the interviews have been done by the author of this dissertation. 
Doing this meant spending a lot of time in the company, which offered the opportunity to 
experience the culture and atmosphere of the organization. 
The main observations were performed in several departments of the organization. 
 
These departments were: 
 
1.  Corporate staff at headquarters 
2.  Engineering & Maintenance 
3.  Cabin Crew 
4.  Check-in staff and personnel at the hub (Schiphol) 
5.  Sales  staff  at  outstations  in  Europe:  Spain,  England,  Germany,  Switzerland, 
Sweden and Italy 
6.  Cockpit Crew 
7.  Cargo 
 
The study has been executed over a period of three-and-a-half years. It consisted of 6 
rounds of data collection. Each data collection round entailed a number of interviews and 
a survey with written questionnaires. Besides these interviews and questionnaires there 
were  several  meetings  with  Vice  Presidents  and  Executive  Vice  Presidents  in  which 
preliminary  conclusions from  the data collected were presented and discussed. These 
meetings  frequently  provided  additional  data.  For  this  study  part  of  both  the  data 
collected from the questionnaires and from the interviews will be analyzed.  
It is always difficult to generalize on the basis of a single case study. But a case study 
gives a rich understanding of the processes that are being enacted. In general a case study 
strategy provides answers to questions that refer to the ―why?‖ of a phenomenon as well 
as the ―what?‖ and ―how?‖ question (Saunders et al., 2007), and by using the method of 
triangulation  (more  than  one  data  collection  technique)  the  data  can  give  us  enough 
construct validation. Furthermore, as the level of analysis of this thesis is the individual 
employee responding to a merger event, our single case contains a very large number of   27 
measurement units. Moreover, as will be discussed in the next chapters, the individual 
employees interviewed and surveyed can be categorized according to the extent and type 
of postmerger integration of their department, so that the single merger case nevertheless 





This  dissertation  will  start  with  discussing  the  research  on  social  identity  and 
organizational  culture  in  postmerger  integration  processes  (Chapter  Two).  The  case 
studied, the general approach followed in the research, the methods of data collection 
employed, and the strategy followed in analyzing the data will be discussed in Chapter 
Three.  Subsequently  the  data  from  the  case  studied  will  be  analyzed  from  the  two 
perspectives, social identity and organizational culture (Chapters Four and Five). The 
findings of these two chapters are subsequently discussed in Chapter Six, in which the 
overall conclusions are formulated, limitations of the study discussed, and suggestions for 
further research are made.   28 





When entering an organization the first impressions we get are the image of the building, 
the entrance hall and the specific manner of welcoming behaviour of the receptionist. We 
encounter  so  to  speak  the  atmosphere  of  the  organization.  This  is  part  of  the 
organizational culture. We see a small example of the ―way things are done around here‖ 
(Deal & Kennedy, 1982). If we extend our interaction with members of the organization 
we will experience that these particular ways of doing things, or organizational practices, 
are more than just conventions, they reflect deeply-held convictions about what is the 
right and the wrong way to handle certain situations, which in turn are linked to beliefs 
concerning the organization itself, the environment in which it operates, and what makes 
the organization successful in its environment (Schein, 1992). Analyzing this particular 
manner  of  handling  situations  within  an  organization  gives  us  an  insight  in  the 
organization  as  a  whole  and  enables  us  to  compare  one  organization  with  another. 
Researchers  as  observers  from  the outside can  study organizational  practices  and the 
shared meanings of the organizational members that give rise to them.  
In this dissertation organizational culture as well as the social identity of the members of 
an organization during the integration period following an acquisition will be analyzed. 
The identity that organizational members ascribe to themselves molds and gives direction 
to the organizational culture. On the other side of the coin, the organizational culture also 
shapes the feeling of identity of its members. This mutual influence can be seen in many 
examples. 
In this chapter it will become clear that both organizational culture and social identity are 
molded and shaped during substantial changes within organizations, of which integration 
processes  of  M&As  are  an  example.  It  will  also  become  clear  that  both  culture  and 
identity are relatively unstable. Organizational cultures will always change over time. 
Social identity will change even more easily in the sense that an individual can choose   29 
which group he wants to identify with and it could be argued that modifying this choice is 
less difficult than modifying the organizational culture. He can for instance shift from one 
group to another, or choose to identify with more than one group simultaneously.   
In order to get a full understanding of the process of how organizational culture and 
social identity can also mutually influence each other, the concepts will first be discussed 
separately and the research that has been done on these subjects will be briefly reported. 
After that we will focus on the research that has linked organizational culture or social 
identity to the context that is central to this thesis, M&As. Finally we will hypothesize 
how  organizational  culture  and  social  identity  both  influence  the  employees,  again 
specifically in the context of M&As. 
 
2.2 Identity and social identity 
 
Identity gives an answer to the question: ―who am I?‖ and for other entities: ―who are 
they?‖ In this sense identity separates groups and individuals from each other. Identity as 
a concept refers to distinctiveness (in what way is the group or the individual different 
from  other  groups/individuals?)  and  ―oneness‖  (what  are  the  characteristics  that  the 
members of a group share?) (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 2000). 
The identity of an individual is formed during  his upbringing. The behaviour of role 
models like parents, teachers, and siblings will be copied and then internalized, and these 
influences taken together form the identity of the individual. Personal identity theories 
focus on ―individual schemas and knowledge structures that underpin the self-concepts of 
individuals‖  (Ravasi  &  Van  Rekom,  2003:  3).  As  these  schemas  and  knowledge 
structures endure over time, individual identity can than be seen as a ―sense of sameness 
over  time‖  (Albert  &  Whetten,  1985:  272).  Identity  is  thus  formed  through  social 
interactions,  which  become  generalized  in  our  minds  and  form  our  self-schemata.  In 
routine situations individuals use these schemas as scripts, meaning that they influence 
behaviour in a very direct way, without much deliberation. In new situations individuals 
construct and adjust these scripts. Thus ―people construct and enact specific identities 
based  on  their  needs  for  self-definition  and  with  reference  to  specific  audiences  and   30 
specific  situations‖  (Scott  &  Lane,  2000:  4).  It  means  that  identity  formation  is  an 
ongoing process during the lifetime of every human being. 
A specific form of identity is the social identity. Social identity does not refer to what 
makes someone unique as an individual, but to what the individual shares with members 
of specific groups. It is formed every time a person joins a group. As a group member, he 
will identify himself with the group, meaning that membership of the group is seen by the 
individual as a defining characteristic of himself. This process of identifying oneself with 
the group depends on factors like the importance of the group for the individual, the 
status of the individual within the group, and the status of the individual as a member of 
the  group  outside  of  the  group.  This  process  of  identification  with  groups  and  its 
behavioral consequences are studied by social identity theory. 
 
Social  identity  theory  is  based  on  the  idea  that  one’s  identity  is  formed  by  a  self-
definition  process.  The  self-concept  that  is  formed  consists  according  to  the  social 
identity theory of the personal identity, which encompasses personal characteristics like 
abilities,  psychological  traits  and  physical  appearances,  and  the  social  identity  which 
consists of salient group classifications. Being part of a group means that certain aspects 
of those groups are taken to be aspects of oneself. For instance being a member of a chess 
players’ club means that the member will be able to say: ―I am a chess player‖ or being a 
member of a religious  group means  that the member can for instance say:   ―I  am  a 
Catholic‖.  When you perceive yourself as a member of a group you will perceive the fate 
of  the  group  as  your  own.  (Ashforth  &  Mael,  1989).  Social  identification  is  the 
internalization of the values and norms of the group, which become a part of the self 
concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A work organization is one particular type of social 
entity with which a person can identify. When a work organization is psychologically 
accepted as part of the self this is a form of self-categorization. Psychological acceptance 
of an organization as a source of identity has not only cognitive, but  also emotional 
consequences (Hogg & Terry, 2000). 
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Social  identity  theory  specifies  three  processes  in  the  social  interaction  between  and 
within groups: 
1.  Social categorization --- People organize information by categorizing in 
groups. By doing so they can concentrate on the collective properties 
that are seen as relevant and neglect certain variations. 
2.  Social comparison --- We compare ourselves with other groups in the 
form of general features that distinguish us from these other groups. This 
helps us to define our group relative to others. 
3.  Social identification --- This is the process that makes us see ourselves as 
a representative of a group. It means that certain group norms are used as 
a guideline for our behaviour (Ellemers, Gilder & Haslam, 2004). 
 
The essence of the third process, social identification, is that people define themselves as 
members of social categories or groups. The characteristics of a group or category will be 
seen as a part of the self. As identification with a particular group becomes stronger 
people see themselves more and more as part of the group and as a representative of the 
group.  This  ongoing  process  of  social  identification  will  affect  their  thoughts  and 
behaviour. The group gives the members a sense of security and identity.  
The in-group is seen as the group to which we belong and the out-group as the group or 
groups outside our own group with whom we compare ourselves in a specific situation. 
Social identity theory assumes that individuals strive to maintain a positive self-image 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989), therefore individuals are attracted to groups that positively 
influence the perception of self, e.g., high status groups. In making comparisons group 
members will favor the in-group, and they will maintain positive stereotypes of in-group 
members, and more negative stereotypes of out-group members (Terry, Carey & Callan, 
2001). 
 
An important aspect in the self-categorization process is the development of a concept of 
the perceived self as a prototype of the in-group, or of the other as a prototype of the out-
group. A prototype is ―the cognitive representation of features that describe and prescribe 
attributes of the group‖ (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Prototypes are not a clear set of attributes   32 
in  the  minds  of  the  members.  Often  exemplary  members  play  an  important  role  in 
forming images of prototypes process. Defining oneself and others in in- and out-groups 
is not done on the basis of observed individual characteristics but on the basis of ascribed 
stereotypical  characteristics,  a  process  of  depersonalization.  Group  members  are  no 
longer individuals but seen as prototypes (Hogg & Terry, 2000). 
It is also argued in the theory that identification can appear in different strengths. Kreiner 
and Ashforth (2004) created an expanded model applied to organizational identification. 
They distinguished four forms  of identification:  strong identification, disidentification 
(when an individual defines himself as not having the same attributes that he believes to 
define  the  organization)  ambivalent  identification  (to  simultaneously  identify  and 
disidentify with one’s organization) and neutral identification (the explicit absence of 
both identification and disidentification). They found in their research that these different 
forms of identification were related to several organizational outcomes. Disidentification 
for  instance  was  positively  associated  with  intrarole  conflict,  and  ambivalent 
identification was positively associated with both organizational identity incongruence 
and intrarole conflict (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). 
 
Because people strive to maintain a positive self-image and tend to see themselves in 
terms of group membership they will aspire to belong to a group with a higher status, 
which is a group that compares favorably with other groups. Both laboratory experiments 
and field studies show that when people belong to a high-status group they show pride 
and identify strongly (Haslam, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Van Knippenberg, Van 
Knippenberg,  Monden  &  de  Lima,  2002,).  Thus  individuals  make  intergroup 
comparisons and through these comparisons enhance their self-esteem and self-efficacy 
(Salk & Shenkar, 2001).   33 
When people belong to a low-status group they develop strategies to improve their social 
identity: 
 
-  The  may  engage  in  individual  mobility.  This  means  that  they  will 
disengage from their group and seek membership of a higher status group. 
-  They  may  develop  social  creativity,  which  is  a  response  of  making 
intergroup comparisons on dimensions different from those that determine 
the status. 
-  Finally, they may engage in social competition, meaning that they try to 
reverse the status ranking (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Haslam, 2001; Ashforth 
& Mael, 1989).  
 
Social identity theories focus on the process of forming an identity that we derive from 
the group that we belong to or that we aspire to belong to. An important category of 
groups in this respect, are work organizations. As adult individuals spend a substantial 
part  of  their  time  in  work  situations,  we  can  expect  work  organizations  to  play  an 
important role in social identification. The reference groups in these cases could be whole 
organizations, such as companies, but also a department or a part of a department of that 
organization,  or  a  professional  group  (possibly  cutting  through  intra-  or  inter-
organizational boundaries). 
Organizational  identification  can  be  seen  as  a  specific  form  of  social  identification 
(Ashforth  &  Mael,  1989).  It  is  ―the  cognitive/perceptual  awareness  that  the  self 
constitutes part of the organization‖ (Ellemers et al., 2004). The concept of organizational 
identification should be distinguished from  the concept  of commitment. Commitment 
refers  to  affective  ties  between  the  individual  and  the  group  (Ellemers  et  al.,  2004), 
identification has to do with how a person conceptualizes himself. That means that the 
self is linked to the perception of organizational characteristics, including organizational 
goals and objectives. However, employees work in a particular unit or department, which 
can  mean  that  they  identify  with  the  goals  of  the  department  or  unit,  which  not 
necessarily align with the organizational goals (Ellemers et al., 2004). 
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Relevance of social identity to M&As 
 
A merger can be seen as a re-categorization. Two social groups become one social group. 
The  merged  group  is  new.  It  incorporates  the  old  groups.  From  a  social  identity 
perspective a merger will mean a change of identity, or at least a challenge to existing 
identities. The question is how this change will affect organizational identification. In 
identifying with an organization a sense of continuity seems to be an important main 
ingredient (Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). A merger can mean a loss of continuity. The 
old firms are disintegrated into the new firm. In this sense of continuity organizational 
dominance plays an important role. The members of the dominant organization perceive 
a stronger sense of continuity than the members  of the dominated organization (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002), as their organization incorporates the dominated organization. 
Defining a dominant organization in a merger may not always be as easy as it seems. 
However, several studies indicate that most mergers may to a certain extent be seen as 
takeovers  (Cartwright  &  Cooper,  1992;  Hogan  &  Overmeyer-Day,  1994;  Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002). One of the merging organizations is usually larger, richer or 
more powerful than the other, and both in the pre-merger and post-merger processes the 
role of organizational dominance often seems to be apparent. Out of more than 90.000 
European  mergers  and  acquisitions  performed  between  1985  and  2001  Zaheer, 
Schomaker & Genc, (2003) could classify only 45 as true mergers between equals. 
 
After an M&A the employees’ organizational identification will go through a process of 
change. The identification with the old firm is expected to change into identification with 
the new firm. This is a process that can take a considerable amount of time. It can even 
take  more  than  five  years  (Van  Raes,  Vanbeselaere,  Boen,  De  Witte  &  Oudermans, 
2008). Before this new identification emerges, it is likely that the employees go through a 
process in which the other firm (acquiring or acquired) is seen as the out-group. Seeing 
the other firm as an out-group may lead to several social responses. 
These social responses are amplified by a number of factors that the social identity theory 
(SIT)  suggests  increase  the  tendency  to  identify  with  a  group.  The  first  is  the 
distinctiveness of the group’s values and practices. This is related to the comparative   35 
group. In order to constitute a unique identity, the group has to separate itself from the 
other group by emphasizing the domain boundaries and the group’s impermeability. The 
second factor that enhances identification is the prestige of the group. Individuals like to 
identify with a winner and one of the arguments of the SIT is that through intergroup 
comparison social identification affects self-esteem. Thus, in order to improve their self-
esteem individuals want to be part of a higher status group and distinguish themselves as 
such. A third factor is the salience of the out-group, in the sense that awareness of the 
out-group will reinforce awareness of the in-group. (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  
For understanding the social responses it is important how the employees perceive their 
own status. If the employees regard themselves as being in a lower status group it will 
mean that the distinction will be negatively valued. When groups have a negative status 
they often develop defense mechanisms to turn the negative issues into positive ones. The 
three responses mentioned above are the most frequently mentioned basic strategies of 
self-enhancement.  The  first  strategy,  individual  mobility,  rests  on  a  belief  in  the 
permeability of the boundaries between the groups (the social mobility belief system). 
Employees  will  most  likely  pursue  individual  mobility  when  they  are  members  of  a 
relatively low status group and when the group boundaries are perceived to be permeable. 
The two other strategies (social creativity and social competition are related to the social 
change belief system. In this system changes are intended to improve the negative or 
maintain the positive side of one’s in-group. This implies a belief in the impermeability 
of groups. In this belief system employees are unable to better themselves by moving 
between groups. When they act according to the social creativity form they can do this in 
a number of ways: (a) finding a new dimension on which to compare in-group and out-
group, (b) changing the values assigned to the attributes of the in-group and (c) engaging 
in comparison with a different out-group.  
 
Social competition is often a typical reaction to the perceived insecurity of the relative 
status. Members of the in-group can perceive intergroup barriers or their relative status as 
being unfair and may act collectively to improve their position. This can be done by 
confronting the out-group or trying to change the circumstances themselves (for instance 
changing the rules  that  restrict the  ability to  improve, or set  up educational  courses)   36 
(Haslam, 2001). Research indicates that an individual’s identity may alternate between 
groups  (Ashforth,  Harrison  &  Corley,  2008)  or  may  have  dual  or  multiple  layers 
(Geartner,  Dovidio  &  Bachman,  1996;  Pratt  &  Foreman,  2000;  Jetten,  O’Brien  & 
Trindall, 2002; Van Leeuwen,Van Knippenberg & Ellemers, 2003; Van Knippenberg & 
Van Schie, 2000) and therefore competition may be reduced by creating a superordinate 
group ( Jetten et al., 2002; van Leeuwen et al., 2003; Geartner et al., 1996) In the case of 
a merger the superordinate group would be the ―new‖ organization. 
Social creativity and social competition can also be responses of the higher status group. 
Social creativity will display different forms like (1) showing favoritism towards the out-
group on irrelevant dimensions thereby mirroring the social creativity of the lower status 
group.  They  may  also  (2)  engage  in  behind-the-scenes  censorship  or  repression  and 
publicly deny this. When their superior status is threatened, the defense may (3) take a 
more sinister form like racism, sexism or national chauvinism, to justify and rationalize 
the superiority of the in-group and the inferiority of the out-group. 
Social competition will be more aggressively expressed by members of a high status 
group if they feel their relative advantage is under threat. There are more likely some 
forms of social conflicts and open hostility (Haslam, 2001). 
 
The identification process during the integration period of an M&A involves identifying 
with  the  ―new‖  firm.  This  is  a  huge  change  or  shift  and  researchers  emphasize  that 
managers should keep in mind that the process will run more easily if the gradualism is 
viewed as inevitable. Employees are more willingly to accept the change if it does not 
erode all the familiar perspectives (Chreim, 2002), if they can keep a sense of continuity 
(Van  Knippenberg  et  al.,  2002;  Van  Raes  et  al.,  2008).  And  even  if  this  process  is 
orchestrated to evolve gradually there is still room for the social responses mentioned 
above. Therefore in this thesis the assumption is made that these social responses will 
emerge in the transition period. Analyzing these responses can give us an estimate of the 
extent to which identification with the ―new‖ firm is problematic. We assume that some 
of the social identity responses are more inducive to identification with the new, merged 
firm than others.   37 
Following the social responses indicated by Haslam three propositions can be formulated: 
 
When the employees of the lower status firm engage in more competitive behavior, they 
will identify less with the new organization. (Competition) 
 
When employees of the lower status firm see more opportunities for social mobility in the 
new firm or the higher status firm they will identify more with the new organization. 
(Social mobility) 
 
When  the  employees  of  the  lower  status  firm  develop  new  perspectives  to  compare 
themselves  favorably  with  the  “other”  firm  they  will  identify  less  with  the  new 
organization. (Social creativity) 
 
It would seem most likely that the employees of the acquired firm see themselves as 
having a lower status. Most of the field researchers presume the larger size of the firm or 
bearer of the new company name to be the higher status firm. Terry et al. (2000) used this 
premise when they observed a merger between two airlines that had a history of a former 
acquisition which resulted in both airlines retaining the name of the former acquirer. 
However, the assumption that the acquired firm is perceived as the lower-status entity can 
not always be justified. The firms engaged in the merger may be of (nearly) equal size 
and performance, in which case it would be difficult to determine which one is high, and 
which one low status (Bartels, Douwes, de Jong & Pruyn, 2006; Van Dick, Wagner & 
Lemmer, 2004; Buono, Bowditch & Lewis, 1985; Fang, Fridh & Schulzberg, 2004). And 
even if one firm legally acquires the other, this does not automatically make it the higher-
status  firm,  but  most  of  the  time  the  acquiring  firm  will  be  seen  as  the  dominating 
organization. On the other hand, when an M&A is explicitly called a merger it can be 
assumed that it is  based on the fundamental  idea of equality and  yet in  the mergers 
studied by Terry, Carey & Callan (2001) and Van Knippenberg et al. (2002) they were 
interpreted as involving a high-status and a lower-status firm, or a dominating and a 
dominated  firm.  Moreover,  the  perception  of  status  differences  may  vary  between 
departments or occupations within the firms. Up till now much of the research has been   38 
based  on  laboratory  experiments,  in  which  the  high  and  low  status  groups  were 
distinguished by design. One purpose of the study this thesis reports on is to find out to 
what  extent  employee  responses  in  a  real-world  merger  match  those  of  laboratory 
experiments.  More  specifically  we  will  look  if,  and  under  what  conditions,  we  can 
identify  processes  of  social  mobility,  creativity  and  competition.  In  order  to  give  an 
answer to these questions we need to look at the actual social processes during an M&A.  
 
Social identity theory found its origin in an attempt to understand the psychological basis 
of intergroup discrimination. Tajfel & Turner, (1986) conducted a research to identify the 
minimal conditions that would lead members of one group to discriminate themselves 
from  another  group  in  favor  of  their  own  group.  However,  this  approach  remains 
relatively  silent  as  far  as  intra-group  characteristics  and  processes  are  concerned. 
Furthermore individuals do not identify with every group; identification may be expected 
to be also influenced by qualitative characteristics of the groups in question. The concept 
of organizational culture is of help here. Organizational culture refers, as we have seen, to 
the shared meanings, values and practices of the organization. These may form a source 
of attraction to the individual employee, and therefore influence identification and social 
responses to an M&A. Organizational culture will therefore be the second main focus of 
this thesis. 
 
2.3 Organizational culture 
 
The  concept  of  organizational  culture  was  first  introduced  by  Pettigrew  during  the 
seventies (Pettigrew, 1979), and in the next decennium it gained popularity when Peters 
and Waterman introduced their book ―In search of excellence‖ in which they linked a 
strong organizational culture to organizational success. They based their argument on 
research in over 40 companies (Peters & Waterman, 1982). In the decennia that followed, 
however, the idea that a strong organizational culture would be a recipe for success lost 
credibility. Different perspectives for looking at this concept evolved.   39 
Perspectives 
 
These perspectives can schematically be described from a dichotomous viewpoint. On 
one side of the pole we see a pragmatic view. Organizational culture is seen as something 
an organization ―has‖. Many times it is referred to as ―the way things are done around 
here‖ (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). This approach reduces organization culture to certain 
elements  that  can  be  influenced  by  managers.  As  to  the  contents  of  the  concept  of 
organizational  culture,  researchers  working  with  this  perspective  in  mind  typically 
assume  that  several  layers  can  be  distinguished.  The  most  observable,  but  also  most 
superficial layer is that of actual behaviours, or practices. Below that are the layers of 
shared beliefs, assumptions and values. The metaphor of the layers of an onion is often 
employed (Sanders &  Neuijen, 1988). At the core of the onion, the deepest layer of 
organizational  culture,  we  find  shared  values  (Peters  &  Waterman,  1982)  or  basic 
assumptions (Schein, 1992). The common factor in this approach is that the core of the 
organizational culture is not easy to detect because it is deeply rooted in the minds of 
employees and it is shared by most (if not all) of the members of the organization. From a 
contrasting  point  of  view  the  observable  layers  are  seen  as  manifestations  of 
―organizational climate‖. The concept of organizational culture would, in that view, be 
restricted to the deeper layers of underlying assumptions. An interesting aspect of this 
point of view is that qualitative research approaches seems to be able to tap the concept 
organizational culture, while quantitative research merely gauges organizational climate 
(Denison, 1996). 
Researchers employing the pragmatic perspective are from several disciplines, including 
psychologists, sociologists, economists and engineers. This viewpoint suggests a static 
concept of a culture that forms an enduring characteristic of a company. It can be seen as 
a system, which means that if one part of the culture changes the whole system changes; 
nevertheless influencing the culture is seen to be possible. It can be argued that leadership 
style,  strategy  formulation,  networks  and  management  teams  will  all  have  their 
reflections  on  the  organization  culture  (Buono  &  Bowditch,  1985;  Kavanagh  & 
Ashkanasy 2006; Salk & Brennan, 2000).   40 
This  pragmatic  view  analyses  differences  between  cultures,  and  researchers  have 
developed  several  approaches  for  this  task.  These  approaches  fall  into  two  distinct 
categories:  typology-based  approaches  and  dimension-based  approaches  (Ashkanasy, 
Broadfoot & Falkus, 2000). As an example of a typology-based approach, Handy (1981) 
describes four possible cultures: power, role, task and person. Deal and Kennedy also 
distinguish four types. These range from the ―tough guy culture‖ (people take a lot of 
risks) to the ―process culture‖ (low risks and slow feedback) (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). 
An example of a dimension-based approach is Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders   
(1990), who distinguish eight dimensions of organizational culture (see also Sanders & 
Neuijen,  1988).  The  dimension-based  approach  typically  aspires  to  quantitative 
measurement of what are assumed to be attributes or more or less stable properties of 
organizational cultures (Gertsen, Søderberg & Torp, 1998). 
 
At  the  other  pole  we  find  the  purist  perspective.  It  is  the  interpretative  or  symbolic 
anthropological  view  (Gertsen  et  al.,  1998).  In  this  view  a  culture  is  something  an 
organization ―is‖. This viewpoint acknowledges an ongoing process of interpretation by 
employees  of  the  symbolic  meanings  of  phenomena  within  the  organization.  These 
researchers mostly study the culture by looking at narratives, by participative observation 
and  by  in-depth  interviews.  This  approach  assumes  that  changing  an  organizational 
culture  is  difficult  and  certainly  not  a  process  only  initiated  and  controlled  by  the 
managers (O’Byrne & Angwin, 2003).  
 
The bipolar classification described above has been expanded in a three-perspective view 
by Martin (1992). In her view organizational cultures can be seen from an integrative, 
differentiation or fragmented view. The integration perspective is similar to the pragmatic 
view discussed above. The assumption is that there is consensus in the organization, and 
not  a  lot  of  ambiguity  regarding  the  organizational  culture.  The  differentiation 
perspective emphasizes the existence of subcultures and focuses on the consensus within 
each  subculture.  The  last  perspective,  ―fragmentation‖  focuses  on  ambiguity  as  the 
essence of organizational culture. The assumption is that there is no organization-wide or 
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is that of a jungle (Martin, 1992). As can be seen from the discussion of the different 
approaches the concept culture seems to be a comprehensive notion. This means that a 
researcher can either choose one of them or combine several perspectives. 
 
Research into organizational culture has often focused on either the fit between individual 
employees  and  the  organizational  culture  (person-culture  fit)  (O’Reilly,  1999; 
Vandenberge, 1999; Sarros, Gray, Densten, & Cooper, 2005; Robert & Wasti 2002), or 
the fit between the cultures of different organizational units or organizations (Barkdoll, 
1998;  Lubatkin,  Schweiger  & Weber, 1999). The focus  of this  thesis  will be on the 
influence of an M&A on the organisational culture of the two merging companies. Will 
the cultures of the two constituent organizations gradually become more alike (increasing 
fit)? Or will cultural differences persist, or even increase over time (stable, or decreasing 
fit)? We will study the integration process to identify factors that may lead to cultural 
convergence or divergence in the postmerger period.  
 
What do M&As mean for the organizational cultures of the companies?  
 
Organizations involved in M&As experience major changes. The employees’ perceptions 
and emotions may be expected to be influenced in various ways during this process. The 
perceived level of autonomy seems to be a determinant factor in this process.  This is 
reflected in the acculturation process, i.e., the culture change process in the post-merger 
integration  process.  The  mode  of  acculturation  can  differ  depending  on  the  level  of 
autonomy that has been agreed upon during the negotiation process. 
The  types  of  acculturation  are:  integration,  assimilation,  separation  and  deculturation 
(Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Integration means that there will be some synergies 
and  adaptation,  assimilation  means  the  acquired  firm  will  change  its  culture  into  the 
culture of the acquirer, separation means that both companies will keep their own culture, 
and deculturation means a loss of culture, a kind of apathy (see for a more elaborate 
explanation  Chapter  One).  According  to  Nahavandi  and  Malekzadeh  the  type  of 
acculturation process depends among other things on the perception of attractiveness of   42 
the  acquirer  and  the  perceived  value  of  the  own  culture  of  the  acquired  company 
(Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). 
A  lot  of  research  has  been  done  on  the  issue  of  cultural  fit  between  organizations 
involved in an M&A. The general assumption was that the chance of success of an M&A 
is higher if the cultures of the organizations involved are more compatible (Weber, 1996, 
Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Cartwright & Cooper, 1995). Weber and Pliskin (1996), for 
instance, concluded from their analyses of 69 M&As (40 of which involved banks) that 
cultural differences were negatively associated with merger effectiveness. Striving for 
synergy realization meant in those cases that culture clashes were encountered.  In a 
sample drawn from the Journal of mergers and acquisitions during the 1985 through 
1987 period cultural differences were found to have a negative effect on the commitment 
of top-management of the acquired firm to the acquiring firm. This lower commitment 
led to a negative attitude towards the new cooperation. The authors concluded that a lack 
of cultural  fit  may undermine the prospect  of  achieving synergy (Weber, Shenkar  & 
Raveh, 1996). 
 
Various  dimensions  have  been  developed  to  compare  types  of  cultures  relevant  for 
M&As. Cartwright and Cooper (1993), for instance, distinguish four types.  
The first type is the power culture (centralization of power, essentially autocratic). In this 
culture the employees experience the highest degree of constraint compared to the other 
three types. It is suppresses the challenges that the employees might take and it tends to 
function on implicit rules.  
The second type is the role culture (bureaucratic and hierarchical, emphasis on formal 
procedures). In this culture the emphasis is on role requirements. Rules and regulations 
prescribe in which way the work has to be conducted.  
The  third  type  is  the  task/achievement  culture  (emphasis  on  team  commitment, 
flexibility, and worker autonomy). This type of culture focuses on task requirements and 
therefore  the  flexibility  and  autonomy  of  the  employees  is  high,  and  individual 
employees receive support (emphasis on egalitarianism).    43 
The  fourth  type  of  culture  nurtures  the  personal  growth  and  development  of  the 
employees (the person/support culture). It is most often found in non-profit organizations 
and communities.  
Cartwright and Cooper (1995) argue that the more dissimilar the cultures of the merging 
organizations,  the  greater  the  expected  culture  shock  will  be.  But  in  fact  it  is  more 
complicated than that. The predicted culture match also depends on the action of  the 
acquiring firm. Cartwright and Cooper (1995) recognized three scenarios, which reflect 
the strategies distinguished by Haspeslag and Jemison (1991): Absorption, symbiosis and 
preservation (see Chapter One). The acquiring firm imposes its own culture, integrates 
the two cultures, or allows the acquired firm to be a separate and culturally different 
entity. Cartwright and Cooper (1995) assume that if the acquiring organization intends to 
change the culture of the acquired firm, cultural similarity is not a condition for success. 
This, however, seems to be questionable because imposing a totally different culture may 
be expected to be more difficult than imposing a similar culture. Either way, the strategy 
of imposing change in itself has been seen as one of the causes of ―post merger stress‖ 
(Panchal  &  Cartwright,  2001;  Buono  &  Nurick,  1992;  Marks  &  Mirvis,  1997; 
Appelbaum,  Lefrancois,  Tonna  &  Shapiro,  2007).  Marks  and  Mirvis  refer  to  this 
phenomenon  as  ―the  merger  syndrome‖,  which  is  a  result  of  the  combination  of 
uncertainty  and  the  likelihood  of  change.  It  ―produces  stress  and  ultimately  affects 
perceptions  and  judgments,  interpersonal  relationships  and  the  dynamics  of  the 
combination itself‖ (Marks & Mirvis, 1997: 22). Under influence of this ―post merger 
stress‖ I assume that there is a possibility that the perception of the other culture will take 
an exaggeratedly negative form (for instance by extensive stereotyping). The assumption 
in this thesis is that this therefore that the perceptions of the other firm’s culture, and thus 
perceptions of cultural fit, are likely to change over time, as the collaboration process 
with the other company evolves. 
 
Organizational culture is often measured as an independent variable and is then used to 
chart differences among cultures, locate clusters of similarities, or draw implications for 
the effectiveness of the organization (Smircich, 1983). In this line of reasoning culture is 
linked  to  strength  (Saffold,  1988),  rites  and  ceremonials  (Trice  &  Beyer,  1984),   44 
socialization (Wanous, Reichers & Malik, 1984), and integration of information systems 
(Weber & Pliskin, 1996). 
In  most  case  studies  however,  the  organizational  culture  is  measured  through  the 
perception of the groups or employees in the company. Cartwright and Cooper (1993), 
for  instance,  in  their  study  of  a  merger  of  two  U.K  building  societies  measured  the 
cultures as ―experienced‖ and ―assessed‖ by the managerial groups which were the focus 
of their research. 
Another example is a study of a merger of two Norwegian hospitals by Roald and Edgren 
(2001).  These  authors  measured  the  organizational  culture  by  using  the  way  the 
employees defined the behaving and thinking of the employees of the ―other‖ company  
But also studies based on larger samples use the perception of the respondents as their 
means to describe the organizational culture of their company. Very, Lubatkin, Calori 
and Veiga (1997) for instance developed a perceived cultural compatibility score based 
on  the  ―what  ought  to  be‖  responses,  the  ―what  was‖  responses  and  the  ―what  is‖ 
response. On the basis of these measures they described in their research the perceptions 
of the managers of 155 French and 191 British acquired firms of their values in relation 
to their company, before and after the merger (Very et al., 1997; Veiga, Lubatkin, Calori 
& Very, 2000).  
In line with the above-mentioned studies the research in this thesis uses the perceptions of 
the respondents to describe the differences between the organizational cultures of the 
merged companies.  
As was mentioned in Chapter One an M&A process can be seen as a succession of stages 
(Fugate, Kinicki & Scheck, 2002; Ring & Van Ven, 1994). During the first phase the 
employees  will  have  an  anticipatory  attitude  (Fugate  et  al.,  2002),  in  this  phase  the 
feelings of threat are the most eminent and consist of fear for lay-offs and reorganization. 
This means that this period will be confronting in a number of ways.  
First  of  all  there  is  the  threat  of  losing  one’s  job,  second  there  is  an  uncertainty 
concerning the future of the whole (original) organization, and the final confrontation is 
with the new colleagues that the employees will encounter. Working with new colleagues 
will mean that the differences of procedures and attitudes will become clear during this   45 
period and this will mean that the estimation of the differences between the two cultures 
will increase.  
During the next stage when the collaboration is at its full potential the anticipation is that 
the differences will gradually diminish because of the compromises that have to be made. 
Compromises will lead to a better understanding of the ―other culture‖ and the prognosis 
is that this will lead to a lower estimate of differences between the organizational cultures 
of the two companies in the perception of the employees. This results in the following 
proposition: 
 
In a merger the perceived cultural differences between the firms involved will in the 
postmerger period first increase, and then decrease. 
 
Within  the  proposition  mentioned  above  the  amount  of  interaction  with  ―the  other 
company‖ is crucial.  Different departments within the merging organizations will have 
different  degrees  of  involvement  with  their  counterparts  at  the  other  organization.  A 
comparison with the four types of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) can be made (see 
Chapter  One).  Their  classification  covered  the  entire  integration  process  of  the 
organization as a whole but departments can develop differently from each other and the 
four types, they have derived, might therefore be converted to phases in the process of 
integration.  Some  departments  can  be  seen  as  being  in  the  preservation  phase.  The 
autonomy in this phase is labeled as high and the strategic interdependence is labeled as 
low. Some departments can be seen as being in the symbiotic phase and some can be seen 
as being in either the holding or the absorption phase.  
The differences depend on the amount of autonomy of the departments and the amount of 
strategic interdependence. The prediction is that these different degrees of involvement 
will shape the perception of the culture of the ―other company‖. The prognosis is that 
high interaction will lead to changes in perception and low or no interaction will lead to 
little or no changes in the perception of the employees.    46 
This leads to the following propositions: 
 
In high interaction groups perceived cultural differences will first increase and later 
decrease. 
 
In low interaction groups perceived cultural differences will remain constant. 
 
 
Furthermore, this process of increasing and decreasing perceptions of cultural differences 
will not develop in the same way throughout the whole company but is likely to depend 
on  the  various  subcultures  and  the  contacts  between  these  subcultures.  Subcultures 
represent a culturally meaningful organizational unit. A researcher can decide a priori 
what he considers a meaningful unit. This could be a functional department, a subsidiary, 
a work group, a hierarchical level (for instance management versus workers) or groups 
descended from an earlier M&A. He can choose this unit by observing what is considered 
within the organization to be the most manifest differentiation into departments or units. 
If no within-organization differentiation is made, as in the case of some studies of M&As, 
an entire organization is seen as a single subculture (see also Hofstede, 1998).  
Another possibility is to make no assumptions in relation to the sub-units and analyze the 
emergence  of  units  that  will  occur  along  pre-conceptualized  dimensions.  (Sackmann, 
1992; Hofstede, 1998). But in trying to make this distinction within an organization it is 
necessary  to  use  these  pre-conceptualized  criteria  along  which  employees  can  be 
categorized into groupings, and this in itself is an a priori action.  
The  research  of  Sackmann  (1992)  is  an  example  of  this  kind  of  categorization.  She 
distinguished between four forms of cultural knowledge that she used, to observe the 
clustering of cultural groupings within three different sites of a medium conglomerate. 
She found that most of the groupings formed around the ―dictionary knowledge‖ that she 
defined as: ―the ―what‖ of situations, their content, such as what is considered a problem 
or what is considered a promotion in that organization‖ (Sackmann, 1992: 142). These 
sub-groupings were mostly based on the professional role perceptions of the employees. 
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It is safe to conclude that a distinction can be made between situations in which there is a 
dominant organizational culture, which is the culture that is shared by members of the 
entire firm, and situations characterized by the co-existence of a number of subcultures, 
with  their  own  meanings  and  sense-making  interpretations  (Martin  &  Siehl,  1983; 
Gregory, 1983; Wilkins 1983; Sackmann, 1992; Hofstede 1998; Smircich, 1983; Saffold, 
1998; Trice & Beyer, 1984). One culture is in this description dominant over the other 
(sub)cultures. Gregrory (1983) recognized in this respect two kinds of multiple cultures 
in organizational settings. The first possibility is the system of subcultures mentioned 
above and the second possibility is cultures that cross-cut through several organizations 
like for instance occupational cultures. 
 
Martin and Siehl (1983) subdivided the possible subcultures in three types: enhancing 
(the core values of the  dominant  culture are more fervently observed  and practiced), 
orthogonal (accepting the dominant culture but developing a separate set of values), and 
counter-cultures (taking an opposite position on values). Counter-cultures can ridicule the 
core  values  but  can  have  a  functional  existence  within  the  company  because  they 
articulate  boundaries  and  can  provide  a  safe  haven  for  developing  innovative 
possibilities. 
 
In this dissertation the subcultures are a priori determined on the basis of the various 
existing work units within the company. The reason for this is that these work units 
engage in very different types of activities, and that employees differ in terms of the 
average type and level of education and training. We expect therefore that the perceived 
differences of the cultures of both firms will also be different, resulting in the following 
proposition: 
 
The perceived cultural difference between two merging firms will differ between 
departments 
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It  would  seem  that  cultural  fit  is  almost  a  prerequisite  for  any  form  of  successful 
cooperation  between  two  companies.  But  there  is  also  evidence  that  more  different 
organizational cultures may actually lead to less conflict. Sometimes cultural differences 
elicit more attraction than stress (Very, Lubatkin & Calori, 1996). An explanation could 
be that confrontation with a totally different culture evokes curiosity and willingness to 
learn.  
 
The  most  divergent  cultural  combinations  are  arguably  those  in  which  both  the 
organizational and national culture of the companies involved in an M&A are radically 
different. In the next paragraph we will discuss the concept of national culture in the 
context of M&As. 
 
2.4 National culture 
 
National culture is often assumed to be more deeply rooted in an individual’s mind than 
organizational  culture.  Hofstede  (1980)  refers  to  national  culture  as  ―the  collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another‖  (Hofstede,  1980:  21).  Inhabitants  of  nations  have  common  experiences, 
institutions, themes and value orientations.  
A few major cross-cultural research projects have been carried out during the last thirty 
years. The first researcher who developed a method to compare national cultures was 
Hofstede. He studied data about the work-related values of IBM employees in over 50 
countries.  His  premise  was  that  the  respondents  were  ―similar  in  all  respects  except 
nationality‖  (1994:  13),  and  consequently  observed  differences  would  clearly  reflect 
national  differences.  Hofstede  used  four  dimensions  to  compare  the  countries  in  his 
sample.  
The  first  dimension  was  called  power  distance  and  referred  to  the  dependency  in 
relationships. Hofstede stated that in small power distance countries the dependence of 
subordinates on bosses is limited.  
The second dimension collectivism versus individualism referred to whether the interest 
of the group prevails or whether the interest of the individual is dominant.    49 
The third dimension femininity versus masculinity referred to concern for relationships 
and for the living environment on one side and on the other side concern for competition 
and assertiveness.  
The fourth dimension uncertainty avoidance has to do with how a society deals with 
uncertainty. Uncertainty avoidance means striving for a reduction of ambiguity and can 
be seen in creating structure in organizations and relationships and in  making events 
clearly interpretable and predictable. This dimension is linked to feelings of anxiety, as 
opposed to fear, which is linked to risks that are focused on certain objects. This leads, 
according to Hofstede, to the paradox that people can engage in risky behaviour because 
they want to reduce ambiguities.  
Later Hofstede identified a fifth dimension called long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation; this dimension relates to Confucius’ teachings. It indicates a preference for a 
stable society based on unequal relationships like father-son and ruler-subject. The junior 
partner has to give the senior respect and obedience and the senior partner has to give the 
junior protection and consideration. The values that describe this side of the dimension 
are: perseverance, ordering relationships by status and observing this order, thrift and 
having a sense of shame. The sort-term orientation is described by Hofstede as consisting 
of:  personal  steadiness  and  stability,  protecting  your  face,  respect  for  tradition  and 
reciprocation of greetings, favors and gifts (Hofstede, 1994).  
 
Another major cross-cultural research was conducted by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) and 
resulted in a theory of universal types of values. These authors derived seven universal 
and distinctive motivational domains of values.  
The first domain was called the enjoyment domain and was related to individual needs 
tied  to  physiological  needs  and  transformed  to  socially  recognized  values  such  as 
pleasure or happiness.  
The second domain was named the security domain and referred to safety, harmony and 
stability.  
The third domain was called achievement domain and focused on personal success linked 
to competence.  
The self-direction domain included independent thought and action.    50 
The restrictive-conformity domain referred to restraining actions that can harm others. 
The pro-social domain referred to active concern for the welfare of others.  
The seventh domain was the maturity domain and referred to wisdom, tolerance and faith 
in one’s convictions.  
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) also developed an eighth domain the social power domain 
(seen  as  position  of  authority  and  importance)  but  could  not  maintain  this  domain 
because it was difficult to connect to the Rokeach list of values on which the rest of the 
domains were based.  
In their study in 1987 they concluded that the above facets were ―sufficient to capture the 
major distinctions among values‖ (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987: 560), and in their study in 
1990 they concluded that ―the dynamic psychological and social processes that shape 
value systems are widely shared in Western societies‖ (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990: 889). 
The Hong Kong sample deviated from this pattern however, and this suggests that the 
motivational patterns are not universal after all (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1990). In 2007 Schwartz found a high consensus regarding what people consider 
moral values but a difference in applying them (either to their in-group or to all others) 
(Schwartz, 2007).  
 
A  third  major  cross-cultural  approach  has  been  performed  by  Granato,  Inglehart  and 
Leblang (1996). Their assumption was that economic development is linked to distinctive 
value  orientations.    These  value  orientations  are  reflected  in  two  dimensions:  the 
traditional  versus  the  secular-rational  orientations  and  survival  versus  self-expression 
values. Traditional orientation refers to preindustrial societies who have mostly a strong 
emphasis on religion, a male dominance in economic and political life and emphasis on 
family life.  
Secular-rational  orientation refers to  industrial societies that contrast  the preindustrial 
societies.  
Survival values emphasize issues like low interpersonal trust, intolerance of out-groups, 
and low support for gender equality; self expression values show opposite preferences on 
these topics.    51 
Granato et al. (1996) used the data from the World Values Surveys, which encompassed 
65  societies,  and  concluded  that  values  seem  to  be  path-dependent.  ―Economic 
development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, 
they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages‖ (Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000: 49).  In an earlier study (also based on The World Values Survey) Granato 
et al. typified these dimensions slightly differently (materialist/postmaterialist dimension 
and achievement motivation dimension) and concluded that the achievement motivation 
dimension is highly relevant to economic growth and that both cultural and economic 
arguments matter in the sense that one is not an substitute for the other (Granato et al., 
1996). 
 
The fourth major cross-cultural research project, the GLOBE study, was designed by 
House  and  consisted  of  questionnaire  responses  of  about  17000  managers  from  951 
organizations in 62 societies, results from focus group discussions, and interviews. The 
goal was to develop an integrated theory with the central proposition that ―the attributes 
and entities of a specified culture are predictive of organizational practices and leader 
attributes  and behaviours  that are most  frequently  enacted and most effective in  that 
culture‖ (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman,& Gupta, 2004: 17).  
Several co-investigators, who resided in the societies that were included in the list, were 
recruited to do the job. The questionnaires were developed to elicit values representing: 
What  should  be  and  values  representing;  What  is  or;  What  are.  The  GLOBE  study 
distinguishes the following nine dimensions: Uncertainty Avoidance (avoid uncertainty 
by reliance on norms, rituals and bureaucratic practices); Power Distance (the degree to 
which members of a society expect that power should be unequally shared);  Societal 
Collectivism ( the degree to which a society encourages or rewards collective distribution 
of  resources  and  collective  action);  In-group  Collectivism    (the  degree  to  which 
individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations of families); 
Gender  Egalitarianism  or  differentiation (the extent to  which a society  minimises or 
maximizes the gender role differences); Assertiveness (the degree to which individuals in 
societies  are  assertive,  highly  assertive  societies  have  a  ―can  do‖  attitude);  Future 
Orientation  (future  oriented  behaviour  as  planning,  investing  in  the  future,  etc.);   52 
Performance  Orientation  (the  extent  to  which  a  society  encourages  or  rewards 
individuals for performance improvements); and Human Orientation (the degree to which 
individuals  are  being  rewarded  for  being  fair,  friendly,  generous,  etc.).  The  first  six 
dimensions  were based  on Hofstede’s dimensions  and have been elaborated with  the 
orientations  of  Kluckhohn  and  Strodtbeck  and  McClelland’s  work  on  achievement 
(Javidan & House 2001; House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 2001).  
 
The major projects described above all focus on cultural differences between countries, 
using large samples consisting of questionnaire data. But the differences between the 
studies are substantial, and no study is without critics.  
Hofstede  for  instance  criticized  the  GLOBE  study  for  using  only  managers  as 
respondents and for not grasping the essence of organizational culture, because societal 
and organizational cultures were measured with the same instrument (and consequently 
were closely correlated in their sample) (Hofstede, 2006).  
Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges & Sully de Luque (2006) criticized Hofstede because 
they did not accept his ecological values assumption (this assumption means according to 
Javidan et al. that ―knowing the values of members of a culture is a sufficient way of 
knowing the culture‖ (2006: 899). These authors also take issue with the assumption that 
there is a linear relationship between values and practices. They refer to this as: ―the 
onion assumption‖ which means that ―knowing values in a culture tells us about what 
actually happens in that culture. (Javidan et al., 2006: 899).  
Hunt  (1981)  appreciated  Hofstede’s  dimensions  but  emphasized  the  importance  of  a 
relationship between values and motives. A cultural value as expressed in a mean score 
on a particular dimension in his perspective only something tells us something about 
probable behaviour if values and motives are related. 
 
An examination of the national culture research literature illustrates the diversity in this 
field, in the sense that the several dimensions reflect a different perspective and different 
reactions to the environment. Culture can be seen as ―a collective programming of the 
mind‖ (Hofstede, 1980: 21), as variables that are incorporated in an economic growth 
model  (Granato  et  al.,  1996),  as  values  that  represent  cognitively  three  universal   53 
requirements  (Schwartz  &  Bilsky,  1987),  or  as  ―shared  motives,  values,  beliefs, 
identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common 
experiences of members of collectives that are transmitted across generations‖ (House et 
al., 2004: 15). It seems impossible to decide a priori what particular approach would be 
the  most  satisfying  one.  The  choice  therefore  is  mostly  based  upon  a  face  value 
assessment  of  the  researcher.  The  differences  between  the  several  cultures  will  then 
consequently be observed from a specific angle. It can be compared to the choice of a 
categorisation  of  subcultures  a  priori,  which  is  often  done  by  observing  the  existing 
groups or departments that are clearly visible.  
 
Organizational culture can be seen as the culture within the organization. This means that 
the description that is mostly used to portray the culture of a society can be used as a 
description for the culture within the organization. House et al. argue in this line and 
consider culture at both the societal and organizational levels to include both common 
practices  and  shared  values  (House  et  al.,  2004).  Hofstede  describes  organizational 
culture as being at a different level than national culture, and emphasizes the difference, 
which he mostly attributes to the fact that the members have a certain influence in their 
decision to join an organization, are only involved during working hours, and can one day 
leave it again  (Hofstede,  1994). Some researchers make hardly a distinction  between 
organizational culture and national culture and define it as: ―a system of publicly and 
collectively accepted meanings operating for a given group at a given time‖ (Pettigrew, 
1979:  574)  or  ―shared  norms,  values  and  assumptions‖  (Schein,  1996:  229).  These 
definitions can be applied to organizations as well as large groups and nations. 
Organizational culture can also be viewed in a more metaphorical sense, referring to the 
perception of an organization as a whole. Organizations can thus be seen as machines or 
as organisms or as political arenas, for instance, and these metaphors which are often not 
consciously chosen shape the way of perceiving the organization. Organizational culture 
is within this view seen as a background factor in an organization. It is a part of the 
environment and seen as a determining and imprinting force. An adaptive view on the 
other hand will lead to emphasizing the organizational culture as an internal variable. 
Organizational culture is then seen as a result of human enactment. This line of reasoning   54 
using the premise that an organization is an organism is also applicable to the cultures of 
societies  and  has  been  observed  in  that  manner  by  anthropologists  as  the  system-
structural view or the functionalist paradigm (Smircich, 1983).  
Drawing  on  the  theoretical  insights  from  above  the  conclusion  can  be  made  that  a 
distinction between organizational culture and national culture is not an easy task. And 
even when a line is drawn between the two there is still a complex process of mutual 
influences. 
 
It will be clear that mergers across borders may encounter two different types of cultural 
differences: those between the organizational cultures of the firms concerned and those 
between the national cultures of these firms’ home countries. However, to see these two 
as completely separate phenomena would be unrealistic. Organizational culture may be 
assumed to be influenced by the national culture. A comparative study between German 
domestic and German-Korean acquisitions showed that indeed the national culture was 
reflected in the organizational cultures (Jöns, Froese & Pak, 2007). 
 
In spite of the growth of the number of cross-border acquisitions, the research in this field 
is limited. Most of the research links the dimensions of Hofstede to some key factors like 
performance or acculturative stress (Duncan & Mtar, 2006; Very et al., 1996; Jöns et al., 
2007; Lubatkin, Calori, Very & Veiga, 1998). Duncan and Mtar (2006) see cultural fit as 
a vital success factor for international acquisitions. This indicates that culturally distant 
mergers would have less chance of succeeding, but Morosini, Shane and Singh (1998), in 
contrast, concluded that mergers between companies from distant cultures can actually 
outperform mergers between culturally closer countries. Mergers with companies from 
culturally distant countries offer access to more diverse routines and repertoires. These 
routines and repertoires have the potential to enhance the combined firm’s performance 
over time. 
 
One can conclude from these results that the influence of national culture differences is 
not as clear as it may initially appear to be. Salk and Brannen (2000) concluded in a study 
of a management team of a German-Japanese international joint venture that the role of   55 
national culture was far less direct and deterministic than suggested in prior research. The 
groups that they analysed showed volition to accept and adapt to local emergent norms, 
rather than to act on national sub-group based preferences. But even though the influence 
of national cultural differences is not clear, when analysing the organizational cultures of 
two  merging  organizations  from  different  countries  it  is  important  to  be  aware  of  a 
possible  effect  of  national  culture,  over  and  above  that  of  organizational  culture 
differences.  
 
In this dissertation the core attention will be on the organizational cultures of the merging 
companies and the social identities of the employees. The influence of national culture on 
the organizational culture will not be measured separately but it is seen as potentially 
having an influence on the perspectives of the employees. Especially in the beginning of 
a merger or  an acquisition, employees  tend to  stereotype the employees of the other 
company in national terms.  
 
A complicating factor of studying a particular cross-national merger is the difficulty of 
empirically  disentangling  the  effects  of  cultural  differences  at  the  national  and  the 
organizational levels. In the case we studied, most of the respondents shared a national 
culture (Dutch) and an organizational culture (that of KLM). This makes it impossible to 
say  to  what  extent  perceived  differences  are  due  to  national  and  to  organizational 
cultures.  However,  KLM  also  has  non-Dutch  employees,  in  particular  in  foreign 
establishments.  This  offers  the  possibility  to  gauge  the  effect  of  national  cultural 
differences, as it can be expected that, if an employee of the acquired firm has a national 
cultural background that is more congruent with the national culture of the acquiring 
firm, he will perceive smaller differences between the firms. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
 
If the distance between the national culture of an acquired-firm employee and the home 
country culture of the acquiring firm is smaller, the perceived differences between the 
two organizational cultures will also be smaller 
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Hofstede’s dimensions  have been used in many studies in which the national culture 
and/or organizational cultures were compared with each other (for instance: Matsumoto, 
1989; Shackleton & Ali, 1990; Schimmack, 1996) and his manner of analysis has been 
discussed  and  reviewed  in  a  number  of  studies  (for  instance:  Leung  &  Bond,  1989; 
Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman, 2009; Stahl 
& Voigt, 2008). Even though it may not be an ideal manner of measuring national culture 
it is adequate enough to establish the cultural distance between the nationalities and the 
alternatives  so  far  have  not  been  as  widely  accepted  and  used  as  the  dimensions  of 
Hofstede  himself.  Therefore  the  dimensions  of  Hofstede  will  be  used  combined  in  a 
formula of Kogut and Singh (1988).  
 
As mentioned several times, the main foci of this study are organizational culture and 
social identity. In the next section we will discuss how these two concepts are related and 
mutually influence each other. 
 
2.5 The mutual influence of organizational culture and social identity 
 
As  mentioned  above  organizational  culture  can  be  seen  from  several  perspectives. 
Looking from the perspective of the whole company it can be seen as ―shared meanings‖ 
that form a guideline for the actions of the employees. The question then is what the 
impact  of  these  shared  meanings  is  on  the  feeling  of  identity  of  the  employees.  Do 
employees see all the members of the company as an in-group, and does awareness of a 
shared  culture  play  a  role  in  that?  Looking  from  a  more  fragmented  perspective  the 
shared meanings refer to subcultures within the organization, and the question from this 
perspective is: what is the impact of these subcultures on the identity of the employees?    57 
Organizational  culture  seen  as  “shared  meanings”  throughout  the  entire 
organization 
 
The research that concentrates on the perspective of the whole organization has focused 
mainly on the basic constructs: organizational culture and organizational identity and the 
relationship  between  them.  Organizational  identity  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of  social 
identity. In the SIT the emphasis is on the identification with a social group and the 
organization can be seen as a special form of a social group, that the employees want to 
identify  with  in  order  to  differentiate  from  other  social  groups  (organizations).  This 
means that employees define themselves in characteristics that are representative for their 
organization.  
Organizational  identification  has  been  described  as  a  process  of  self-categorization 
(Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 1994; Vora & Kostova, 2007) in the sense that individuals 
categorize themselves into groups.  It has been a struggle, within the research field, to see 
the concepts organizational identity and organizational culture as distinguishable, because 
most  of  the  time  they  seem  to  be  intertwined.  And  yet  one  can  identify  with  an 
organization without internalizing the culture and one can internalize the culture without 
identifying with the organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Zaheer et al. (2003: 185) 
simply  define  organizational  identity  as  ―who  we  are‖  and  organizational  culture  as: 
―how we do things around here‖, but these definitions don’t do justice to the complexity 
of the concepts and their mutual influences. Dutton et al. (1994: 243) use the concept 
collective  organizational  identity  and define it  as:  "the beliefs that members  share as 
distinctive,  central  and  enduring  about  their  organization‖.  In  their  perspective  an 
organization has cultural forms (rituals, ceremonies and stories) that, by encoding and 
reproducing,  objectify  and  communicate  to  organizational  members  the  collective 
organizational identity. In the definition of Dutton et al. the organizational culture is a 
―tool‖ to communicate the collective organizational identity.  
Next to collective organizational identity they use the concept perceived organizational 
identity which refers to the beliefs of an individual member of the organization. It is: ―…. 
a  member’s  beliefs  about  the  distinctive,  central  and  enduring  attributes  of  the 
organization‖. (Dutton et al., 1994: 244). The perceived organizational identity will affect   58 
the identification of a person with the organization (Dutton et al., 1994). Ashforth and 
Mael (1989) argue that the organizational identity (seen as shared understanding of the 
central,  distinctive  and  enduring  character  of  the  organization)  is  reflected  in  shared 
values and beliefs. This can be seen in the claim of uniqueness as a characteristic of 
organizational  culture.  The  managers  can  emphasize  a  distinctive  and  positive 
organizational  identity  (this  is  a  group-specific  claim)  and  this  attracts  recognition, 
support and loyalty from the employees.  
Ravasi  and  Schultz  (2006:  437)  suggest  two  possible  perspectives  of  organizational 
culture  in  relation  to  organizational  identity.  The  first  perspective  emphasizes 
organizational  culture  as  a  ―signifier‖  of  the  organizational  identity.  This  means  that 
shared  values  and  beliefs  ―help  organizational  members  to  substantiate  their  identity 
claims.‖  The  second  perspective  sees  both  organizational  culture  and  identity  as 
collectively shared interpretive schemes but the organizational culture is more tacit and 
autonomous and rooted in shared practices, whereas organizational identity is seen as 
relational  (which  means  that  it  needs  external  comparison)  and  as  consciously  self-
reflective. In the first perspective the organizational culture serves as a sense-giving tool 
and in the second perspective the organizational culture functions as a sense-making tool 
(Ravasi & Schultz, 2006).  
Hatch and Schulz (2002) refer to both concepts by making an analogy with Mead’s ―I‖ 
and ―me‖. The organizational ―me‖ (identity) is formed through the process of mirroring. 
That  is,  the  outsiders’  (others/external  stakeholders)  views  are  used  to  construct  a 
mirrored  image  of  the  organization.  These  images  are  then  used  to  reflect  upon  the 
organization. The result of this reflection is the gradually increasing awareness of the 
deeply held assumptions and values by the members of an organization, which is the 
culture of the organization. The organizational culture is seen as the ―I‖ of Mead. Hatch 
and Schulz defend this by conceptualizing organizational culture as operating beneath 
awareness,  residing in deep layers of meaning and a context for all meaning-making 
activities.  The  reflection  is  seen  as  the  process  that  embeds  identity  in  culture. 
Organizational  identity  has  another  link  with  organizational  culture  in  expressing  the 
cultural understandings to the outside of the organization. These expressions in their turn 
leave impressions on the ―others‖.    59 
The  whole  process  of  mirroring,  reflecting,  expressing  and  impressing  is  covered  by 
Hatch and Schulz (2002) in an organizational dynamic model. Hatch and Schultz’ model 
can be compared with that of Dutton et al. (1994). They translated the influence from the 
outside into the organization in ―construed external images‖ which refers to the question: 
―What do outsiders think of me because of my association with the organization?‖ This 
external  image  acts  as  a  mirror  and  is  tied  to  the  concept  ―corporate  image‖,  ―an 
impression that the organization makes to outsiders and insiders‖ (Dutton et al., 1994: 
249).  
The  dynamism  is  seen  in  the  continuously  social  constructing  of  the  organizational 
identity  through  the  interaction  of  all  organizational  stakeholders  who  interchange 
internal and external definitions of the organization. Hatch and Schultz (2002) expanded 
their  model  by  adding  possible  dysfunctions.  One  dysfunction  is  organizational 
narcissism,  this  is  seen  as  the  construction  of  an  identity  that  solely  refers  to  the 
organizational culture, thereby losing the mirroring and impressing process. The other 
dysfunction  is  hyper-adaptation,  which  is  seen  as  paying  too  much  attention  to  the 
external stakeholders, whereby the organization looses self-definition and reflection and 
ultimately its culture. Both dysfunctions are seen as mostly temporarily phenomena. 
 
The conclusion from the research discussed above is that the concepts of culture and 
identity seen from the organization as a whole are not easily distinguishable, and adding a 
new concept like ―collective organizational identity‖ even further complicates the knot. 
The  difference  that  is  most  clearly  expressed  is  connected  with  the  awareness  and 
visibility. The identity of an organization is more visible to the employees and outsiders 
than its culture. It is reasonable to assume the version of Hatch and Schultz in their 
distinction  that  organizational  culture  ―is  founded  on  a  broad-based  history  that  is 
realized  in  the  material  aspects‖.  Studies  of  organizational  identity  can  focus  on  the 
expression of these material aspects but the realization and interpretation of those aspects 
is situated in the field of organizational culture research (Hatch & Schultz, 1997: 358). 
This  means  that  the  organizational  culture  can  best  be  seen  as  a  ―shaper‖  of  the 
organizational identity. It builds and forms the identity of the organization both for the 
employees  and  for  other  stakeholders.  Organizational  theories  have  mostly  looked  at   60 
organizational culture as a phenomenon inside the organization. Organizational identity is 
more associated with  influences  from  the environment and can in  turn through these 
external images influence the culture. 
 
Organizational culture seen as different subcultures 
 
Large organizations can be seen as entities consisting of several parts. These departments 
and sub-departments can be more or less culturally diverse, depending on the criteria 
used to differentiate between them. The social identity can therefore be multilayered. 
According to Ashforth and Mael (1989: 22) ―the organizationally situated social identity 
may, in fact be comprised of more or less disparate and loosely coupled identities‖. 
This  appears  most  prominent  when  observing  employees  in  subsidiaries  of  large 
enterprises. Vora and Kostova (2007) conceptualized a model of dual identification by 
observing subsidiary managers in multinational enterprises. In their model they assume 
that identification with more than one entity is possible, but the cultural distance between 
entities can be an impediment for this phenomenon.  
These authors described the concept of dual identification by using two characteristics: 
relative magnitude (which refers to the relative strength of the sense of identification with 
each of the two entities) and form (which refers to the perceived sense of the degree of 
overlap between the identifications with each entity).  
They  proposed  that  when  the  entities  are  more  culturally  distant,  the  managers  will 
experience distinct organizational identifications with these entities. The result can also 
be  shifting  from  one  identity  to  another:  ―….managers  may  find  it  difficult  to 
simultaneously  identify  with  both  entities  and  will  likely  ―switch‖  between  their 
identifications‖ (Vora & Kostova, 2007: 338).  
This  switching  of  identity  can  also  occur  when  an  employee  changes  from  one 
department to another or from one work-unit to another. But then it can mean a slow 
elimination of the former group identity. More than one social identity occurring at the 
same time will result in a dual or multiple identities. 
Some researchers emphasize the dynamism of the social identity concept. Beech and 
Huxham (2003) for instance claim that identities are generally made up of a combination   61 
of social categories and that different categories may come to the foreground at any one 
time. This image suggests a continually shifting of identities but these authors also argue 
that identities sometimes become crystallized, and having more than one identity may 
cause  conflicts  between  them.  This  tends  to  be  resolved  by  cognitively  ordering, 
separating  or  buffering  the  identities  (Ashforth  &  Mael,  1989).  Van  Leeuwen  et  al. 
(2003) underline in this respect the sense of continuity. They found that the perceived 
continuation of the premerger group identity strengthened the identification with the post-
merger group. This sense of continuity may lead to embracing the post-merger group but 
this does not mean that the merger partner is seen as an integral part of this identity. 
Employees  can  identify  with  a  common  super  ordinate  group  and  simultaneously 
discriminate against other subgroups.  
 
The identification with a subgroup can be stronger than that with the whole organization. 
Van Knippenberg and Van Schie (2000) found evidence to support this statement. In a 
study in which they analyzed a division of a local Dutch government and a faculty of a 
university they found that the identification with the work-unit was stronger than the 
identification with the organization. This might result in employees being unwilling to 
transfer to another work-group thereby influencing the mobility within the organization. 
It could also elicit feelings of competition or even hostility between work-groups. 
 
The research mentioned above would implicate that within the social identity theory the 
more  stable  phenomenon  of  social  identity  can  form  an  impediment  when  two  large 
companies  merge.  However  given  the  multilayered  function  of  social  identity,  the 
melting of subcultures would be more easy, if the sense of continuity could be kept intact 
for a considerable time and if the perceptions of procedural, distributive and interactional 
justice would be considered. In order to achieve this one must interact intensively with 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter organizational culture and social identity have been described as relatively 
unstable phenomena. Social identity can be seen as even more flexible in the sense that 
an individual can choose to change his social identity in a relatively short period of time.  
The social identity is formed every time a person joins a group and is therefore based on 
what  an  individual  shares  with  the  members  of  specific  groups.  The  process  of 
identifying oneself with a group depends on several factors like the importance of the 
group for the individual, the status of the individual within the group, and the status of the 
individual as a member of the group outside of the group. The social identity theory 
studies this process of identification with groups and specifies three processes: Social 
categorization, social comparison and social identification.  
 
Social identity theory assumes that individuals strive to maintain a positive self-image 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989). In making comparisons between the group one belongs to (the 
in-group) and a comparable other group (the out-group) individuals will strive to form 
positive stereotypes of the in-group and negative ones of the out-group (Terry et al., 
2001).  The  social  identity  theory  predicts  that  individuals  belonging  to  lower  status 
groups will develop strategies to improve their social identity. These strategies have been 
identified as: mobility, competition and creativity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Haslam 2001; 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  
Creativity and competition are seen as responses to having a disbelief in social mobility 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Haslam 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Competition is usually 
seen as a negative response to organizational changes but it can also be seen as having 
some advantages, like crystallizing what identity matters most and possibly serving to 
motivate problem-focused behaviour and in addition serving to motivate positive deviant 
behaviour (Ashforth et al., 2008). Creativity is seen as a more positive response to having 
a disbelief in social mobility but it can focus too much on the in-group perspective and 
therefore result in forming an impediment in being able to build a super ordinate identity. 
The  three  responses  mentioned  above  will  be  the  main  focus  when  studying  social 
identity in the acquired firm in this case.   63 
During an M&A integration process one can argue about what would be considered the 
lower-status  firm  but  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  the  position  that  the  acquired 
organization is perceived by its members as such and within this study some interview 
fragments are presented to illustrate this viewpoint. 
 
As identification may be expected to be influenced by the qualitative characteristics of 
the group, analyzing the culture of the organization could give us more insight in this 
process. The shared meaning, values and practices of the organization can form a source 
of attraction to the individual employee. Therefore the concept of culture was studied in 
this chapter.  
Organizational culture can be described from a dichotomous viewpoint. On one side we 
see a pragmatic view which regards organizational culture as something an organization 
―has‖ and on the other side we see the purist perspective which views organizational 
culture as something an organization ―is‖ (Gertsen et al., 1988). 
With these perspectives in mind a lot of research has been done on the issue of cultural fit 
between organizations in which the overall assumption was that the chance of success of 
an M&A would be higher if the cultures of the organizations were compatible (Weber, 
1996; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Cartwright & Cooper, 1995). 
 
Regarding  the  ―post  merger  stress‖  notion  (Panchal  &  Cartwright,  2001;  Buono  & 
Nurick, 1992; Marks & Mirvis, 1997; Appelbaum et al., 2007) I assume that there is a 
possibility that the perception of the ―other‖ culture will take an exaggeratedly negative 
form and that therefore the perceptions of the other firm’s culture will likely change as 
the collaboration process between the employees evolves. Using the several stages that 
some  researchers  have  indicated  (Fugate  et  al.,  2002;  Ring  &  Van  Ven,  1994),  the 
prediction  is  that  this  change  would  first  be  negative  (perceived  cultural  differences 
become larger) and later positive (perceived cultural differences become smaller). 
 
Because  this  case  involves  two  companies  with  different  national  backgrounds  and 
because  several  employees  with  a  number  of  nationalities  are  employed  within  the 
acquired firm the national culture is also a relevant focus in this study. Even though a   64 
number of major cross-cultural research projects have been carried out during the last 
thirty years, Hofstede’s dimensions were chosen as a means to determine the perception 
of cultural distance because his dimensions were used and discussed in an overwhelming 
number of studies (for example: Matsumoto, 1989; Shackleton & Ali, 1990; Schimmack, 
1996; Leung & Bond 1989; Drogendijk & Slangen, 2006; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Stahl 
& Voigt, 2008). 
Finally organizational as well as national culture can be seen as ―shapers‖ of the social 
identity of the employees, and since culture is a multilayered concept this can cause a 
dual or multilayered identity. 
In the above chapter several propositions have been developed and in the overview below 
they are recapitulated.  
 
Table 2.1: Overview propositions 
Social Identity: 
When the employees of the lower status firm engage in more competitive behavior, they will identify 
less with the new organization. (Competition) 
When employees of the lower status firm see more opportunities for social mobility in the new firm or 
the higher status firm they will identify more with the new organization. (Social mobility) 
When  the  employees  of  the  lower  status  firm  develop  new  perspectives  to  compare  themselves 
favorably with the “other” firm they will identify less with the new organization. (Social creativity) 
Organizational culture: 
In a merger the perceived cultural differences between the firms involved will in the postmerger period 
first increase, and then decrease. 
In high interaction groups perceived cultural differences will first increase and later decrease. 
In low interaction groups perceived cultural differences will remain constant. 
The perceived cultural difference between two merging firms will differ between departments 
National culture: 
If the distance between the national culture of an acquired-firm employee and the home country culture 
of the acquiring firm is smaller, the perceived differences between the two organizational cultures will 
also be smaller   65 





As was mentioned in Chapter One there are a number of possibilities to observe changes 
within a company during a certain time period. We can analyze financial parameters like 
return  on  investment,  return  on  assets,  stock  price  fluctuation  or  changes  in  market 
shares. To observe and measure more subjective experiences of the employees we can 
gauge experiences like job satisfaction or commitment and observe events like turnover 
(Hogan & Overmeyer-Day, 1994). The option that was chosen for this dissertation was to 
measure the perception of the employees.  
Measuring perceptions differs from looking at objectively observable phenomena. For 
instance,  the  mobility  of  workers  across  organizational  boundaries  as  perceived  by 
employees may be different from the actual mobility as reflected in, e.g., the personnel 
administration. We can assume however that the perceptions of the employees are likely 
to influence their behavior even when they are not completely in accordance with the 
facts.  
 
This chapter will outline the methods of data collection, the operationalization of the 
variables, and the methods of analysis. First the sample will be described including the 
process  of  collecting  the  data,  then  the  variables  and  their  operationalization  will  be 
discussed and the chapter will be concluded with a description of the choices made for 
analyzing the data. 
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In this dissertation employee identification and organizational culture are studied in the 
integration  process  following  the  acquisition  of  KLM  by  Air  France.  Researchers 
recurrently came to the conclusion that the acquired organization is generally seen as the 
lower-status organization, and that employees of the lower-status organization often show 
more  dissatisfaction  and  resistance  to  a  merger  or  acquisition  than  employees  of  the 
higher-status  firm  (Terry,  Carey  &  Callan,  2001;  Hubbard  &  Purcell  2001;  Dackert, 
Jackson, Brenner & Johansson, 2003; Covin, Sightler, Kolenko & Tudor, 1996; Buono & 
Nurick, 1992). These findings led to the decision to focus on the acquired company, in 
this  study  this  is  KLM.  The  brief  description  that  follows  will  serve  as  background 
information. 
 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines was founded in 1919. In 1920 it received its first aircrafts 
(two Fokkers F11s). The first flight was in 1920 from Schiphol to London (on board were 
the first CEO Albert Plesman, an engineer and a journalist). During the first years KLM 
used Dutch-built aircrafts (Fokkers), but later it was decided to use American aircrafts 
(Douglas DCs). In the seventies KLM added 747 Boeings to its fleet, which marked the 
beginning of the ―wide-body‖ era. After the year 2000 Boeings 777 and Airbus aircrafts 
were bought. 
KLM had and has no domestic flights, and overall a small home market. This situation 
has strongly influenced KLM’s strategy. The only way to grow beyond the confines of 
the small home market was to attract passengers to travel to their final destination via hub 
airport Schiphol. This resulted in a ―shark strategy‖ to ―steal‖ customers from other flag 
carriers. As these competitors offer direct connections on many routes on which KLM 
competes  with  indirect  flights,  KLM  had  to  be  ―lean  and  mean‖.  This  characteristic 
resulted  in  comparatively  flexible  policies  with  regards  to  adding  and  dropping 
connections, and also extended to a pioneering role in cooperative strategies like joint 
ventures, the most important of which was the JV with Northwest (Jagersma, 2003). Over   67 
time, the Board of KLM became convinced that with the liberalization of the airline 
industry consolidation of the airline industry would become inevitable, and that KLM 
with its small home market needed to team up with one of the bigger players in Europe. 
 
Prelude to the Air France-KLM Merger 
In order to understand the significance of the merger with AF for KLM, it will be useful 
to look a bit more closely at the events that preceded this merger, in particular two failed 
mergers attempts (with Alitalia and with British Airways), as well as at some particular 
characteristics of the company and its environment at that time (this description is based 
on Jagersma, 2003). 
 
In 1997 Alitalia was looking for a new partner and initially tried collaboration with AF, 
but  the  route  structures  of  the  two  companies  showed  too  much  overlap  and  the 
difference in size between the two companies was also seen as an impediment. Many 
Italian politicians however preferred AF as a partner. KLM was considered to be more 
suited by the management of Alitalia because of its smaller size and because of a more 
complementary  route  structure.  KLM  considered  Alitalia  to  be  an  attractive  partner 
because it could provide access to the two hubs Milano and Rome, and because KLM 
would be able to maintain its own identity in the merger.  
 
In  1998  a  strategic  alliance  was  officially  announced  between  the  two  partners,  but 
almost  immediately  problems  became  apparent.  The  partnership  continued  to  be 
postponed due to the fact that a number of management positions could not be filled. 
Another  problem  was  that  the  local  government  of  Rome  was  not  pleased  with  the 
decision  to  transfer  10%  of  the  flights  to  Milano.  But  the  newly  modernized  hub 
Malpensa  of  Milano  appeared  to  be  the  main  problem.  The  infrastructure  was 
problematic and some environmental problems emerged. The policy was to transfer most 
of the flights from the airport Linate, which is a lot closer to the city of Milano, to the 
new  Malpensa  airport,  but  access  by  roads  and  railways  to  this  new  airport  was 
underdeveloped. The  government  of  Italy decided to  transfer the flights  to  Malpensa 
despite  of  these  problems,  upon  which  several  airlines  (Lufthansa,  AF,  SAS,  BA)   68 
protested by means of an official complaint to the European Committee. Alitalia tried to 
comply and decided that Linate would remain to function for 6 to 7 million passengers. 
The  Italian  government however decided to  force the flights  to  Malpensa. And even 
though KLM had invested a large amount of money in developing this particular airport 
because KLM needed a good second hub, it decided, although the alliance was meant to 
evolve to a more consolidated form (and even labeled an ―almost merger‖), because of 
the problems mentioned above and the deteriorating relationship with Alitalia.  
 
KLM was facing several problems at the end of 2000, one of which was the above failed 
alliance  that  required  time,  energy  and  money  to  be  dismantled.  Other  semi-related 
problems were: poor financial performance (in 1999 hardly any profit), a low stock price, 
a damaged external image, structural overcapacity due to the crisis in Asia, some pressure 
on the relationship with Northwest Airlines (NWA), a not very well functioning internet-
strategy  and  demoralized  employees.  Moreover,  financial  results  were  held  back  by 
fiercer competition, a strike at NWA, and an overall disappointing growth in the airline 
industry. 
In February 2000 the company faced a loss of 39 million guilders (results of the last three 
months  of  1999)  and  in  March  measures  were  taken  and  announced  as  ―Operation 
Baseline‖.  It  consisted  of  the  following  decisions:  layoff  of  2000  employees,  a 
diminishing  of  the  fleet  by  7  airplanes,  discontinuation  of  unprofitable  routes  and 
reduction  of  investments  in  computerization  and  other  overhead  costs.  These 
measurements would result in a retrenchment of 700 million guilders.  
 
In  the  spring  of  that  year  (2000)  it  became  clear  that  ―Operation  Baseline‖  was  not 
enough to get KLM back on track. KLM therefore turned towards British Airways (BA) 
for a possible partnership. BA had financial problems at that time, too. The market value 
of BA was five times that of KLM, however. One of the reasons for this, besides of KLM 
being a smaller company, could be that the Dutch airline had sold its participation share 
of 20% in North-West Airlines and its fleet was not as modern as it should be.  
The goal of BA was to expand and make their position stronger on their home market, 
and KLM might be of use, among other things because of it strong KLM UK subsidiary.   69 
The negotiations however were extremely problematic from the start. On the one hand 
KLM  aimed  for  a  share  of  30  %  in  the  merged  firm,  which  considering  the  value 
proportions mentioned above could have been ―a bridge to far‖, on the other hand the 
objective of BA to position KLM as subsidiary was not acceptable for KLM. Moreover 
the Open Sky agreement that KLM (or rather, the Dutch state) had settled with the United 
States  was  not  transferable  to  a  possible  merged  firm.  BA  had  a  very  restrictive 
agreement with the United States called the ―Bermuda ΙΙ pact‖. The CEO of KLM, Leo 
van Wijk, was determined not to dissolve the Open Sky agreement, but the United States 
by means of an official in the White House were very clear on the matter: ―The US will 
not allow British Airways to use a merger with KLM, the Dutch flag carrier, as a back 
door  to  achieve  greater  access  to  our  market‖  (Dorothy  Robyn,  senior  White  House 
official, quoted in Jagersma (2003: 286). In September of that year (2000) the Financial 
Times reported that BA had abandoned the deal with KLM. A Dutch newspaper provided 
this commentary: ―Because KLM needed BA more than vice versa they could hardly 
expect a lot of concessions from the British side‖ (NRC Handelsblad September 22
nd 
2000). 
The result was again damaging to the image of KLM and their management. The top-
management remained in function but several higher level managers resigned. This meant 
losing some ―high potentials‖ in the strategy, legal and communication departments of 
KLM (Jagersma, 2003).  
 
The year 2001 ended for KLM with a loss of 156 million euro
1. This was a difficult year 
for most airlines due to the effects of the attack on the WTC in New York on September 
11. But 2002 and 2003 did not show enough recovery. In February 2003 KLM announced 
to reduce capacity on a number of flights and on top of that the negative influ ence of the 
SARS epidemic reduced the possibilities even further. 
This led again to a search for a new partner and informal meetings with Air France were 
held. For both airlines the possibility of collaboration was interesting because Delta 
Airlines, the American partner of Air France and Alitalia in Sky Team, could cooperate 
with KLM partners Continental and Northwest, and Air France and KLM would also be a 
                                                 
1 The following description is based on the reports of several newspapers.   70 
good  combination  in  terms  of  complementary  route  networks.  KLM  would  gain  an 
important hub in Paris, which is considered a central destination in Europe as well as an 
intermediate stop for on many routes. For Air France gaining the hub Schiphol would be 
advantageous because it would mean that a third airport in Paris would not be necessary. 
The merger would also be a means to diminish the interest of the state of France in AF 
from 54% to a minority status. In a nutshell, The New York Times described the situation 
of the two airlines as follows: ―For Air France, the deal crowns a seven-year comeback 
from near-bankruptcy in the mid-1990's. For KLM, which has been struggling to reverse 
losses by imposing job cuts, a merger represents a quick injection of capital and a strong 
partner‖ (The New York Times, October 1 2003). 
 
However, during the negotiations between the two airlines some problems arose. Overall 
a large amount of criticism developed from the side of some labor unions, media and 
economic experts, and even the Dutch government hesitated because of the potential job-
loss.  The  cockpit  crew  for  instance  by  means  of  the  VNV  (Vereniging  Nederlandse 
Verkeersvliegers) demanded guarantees that no reduction of jobs and flights would occur. 
Flight  reductions  could  be  a  claim  from  the  European  Commission,  to  avoid  a  too 
dominant market position of Air France-KLM, and KLM cockpit crew feared that this 
would result in mainly reducing KLM flights. Loosing the Dutch identity was also a fear 
that was expressed by one of the representatives of KLM in a Dutch newspaper. The 
identity of KLM meant an overall feeling of pride and belongingness for the employees. 
Moreover, the identity question, in a more formal sense, could also have consequences 
for the landing rights in approximately 130 countries. In September an agreement was 
found concerning the landings rights, the position of Schiphol was guaranteed for number 
of  years,  and  on  30  September  2003  CEOs  Jean-Cyril  Spinetta  and  Leo  van  Wijk 
officially  announced  the  planned  merger  between  KLM  and  Air  France.  The  Dutch 
government agreed to have an interest in the new company of 14,2% and the French 
government would have an initial interest of 44%. One Dutch newspaper emphasized that 
although announced as a merger it actually was an acquisition (Het Parool, September 30 
2003). Several news sources emphasized that the new organization intended to keep the 
two brands as separate entities.   71 
The new firm was announced to be a holding with two separate operating companies who 
would be flying under their own colors and would have three core businesses: passengers, 
cargo and aircraft maintenance. Jean-Cyril Spinetta was announced as the chief executive 
and  Leo  van  Wijk  was  denoted  as  his  deputy,  while  remaining  head  of  KLM.  The 
announcement of the merger meant an agreement between the CEO’s, but for the merger 
to become a fact some issues still had to be solved. The first issue was approval by the 
European Commission that had to decide if the proposed merger was in line with EU 
competition rules. If the Air France-KLM combination would be regarded to become too 
dominant on certain routes, the Commission could stipulate that the new company would 
have to hand in a number of slots at certain airports. Not only the European Commission 
but  also  the  USA  competition  authorities  had  to  give  their  consent,  because  of  the 
collaboration with the US partners. Other issues for KLM were to come to an agreement 
with  the  works  council  and  the  labor  unions.  AF  on  the  other  hand  needed  the 
authorization of the supervisor from the French government, as well as the agreement of 
the labor unions. And both companies needed the approval of the shareholders, of course. 
October  the  8
th  a  Dutch  newspaper  reported  ―additional  demands‖  of  the  Dutch 
government. These demands were: additional agreements pertaining to Schiphol, a right 
to claim taxes on the profits of KLM and a position in the board of a governmental 
official (Utrechts Nieuwsblad). 
On October the 16
th a solution was found for the demands of the labor unions of KLM. It 
entailed  a  job  guarantee  of  5  years.  On  the  11
th  of  February  2004  the  European 
Commission gave its permission for the acquisition. Both airlines agreed on releasing 
some of their slots to give other airlines a fair chance to compete on specific routes (this 
pertained to slots in Amsterdam and Paris, but also in Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille and 
Bordeaux). Transatlantic flights  were released from Paris to  Detroit  and Amsterdam-
Atlanta  and  Amsterdam-New  York  meaning  that  the  operating  rights  were  made 
available for other airlines. The following day the American authorities also gave their 
consent. One Dutch newspaper argued about the submissive position of KLM in these 
bargains  and  mentioned  a  response  of  Van  Wijk  who  emphasized  opportunities  with 
Alitalia concerning the ―slots‖ for KLM which were already agreed upon between AF 
and Alitalia (Het Financieele Dagblad, February 12 2004).   72 
The new company Air France – KLM was officially formed on May 5, 2004. It became 
immediately evident that the word ―acquisition‖ was never used in the first phase of the 
integration process. Every manager and employee used either the word ―merger‖, or the 
even more careful terms ―combinatie‖ (in Dutch) or ―rapprochement‖ (in French). The 
decision of the two CEOs, Spinetta and Van Wijk, was to use a model in which the two 
airlines would continue to coexist for the first 5 years, an approach that can be compared 
to the ―preservation‖ and ―symbiosis‖ forms of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). Both 
brands  were  kept  intact  (this  was  also  a  guarantee  demanded  by  both  national 
governments) for a five-year period, and it was left undecided whether this would change 
in the subsequent period. The management of the acquisition was inspired by the model 
employed in the Renault-Nissan alliance. Hence, although formally a friendly acquisition, 
the management approach was to regard it as a  form of collaboration. The relatively 
independent position that KLM maintained after the acquisition was also reflected in the 
slogan  employed:  ―one  group,  two  airlines,  three  businesses‖  (with  the  businesses 
referring to Passengers, Cargo, and Engineering & Maintenance). The holding company 
Air France – KLM held all the shares in the two operating companies, AF and KLM. The 
administration  of  the  group  was  executed  by  the  Strategic  Management  Committee 
(SMC),  in  which  managers  from  both  organizations  were  equally  represented  (four 
members from each firm, with a decisive vote for the Chairman, AF CEO Spinetta). In 
October 2007 this committee was replaced by the Group Executive Committee (GEC), in 
which the rule of equal representation was no longer applied. This resulted in a larger 
number of French compared to Dutch members in the GEC (with one French member, 
Gagey, representing KLM). According to some observers this reflected a gradually more 
dominant position of Air France.  
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3.3 Description and circumstances of the research process 
 
Our research team started negotiating research access soon after the public announcement 
of the merger, and in the summer of 2004 a four-party agreement between Air France, 
KLM, EM Lyon and Tilburg University was finalized, granting us access to study the 
post-merger integration process. We observed the integration process from June 2004 
(first meeting with research team Tilburg/Lyon and KLM and AF representatives) till 




We conducted our research with a team in the Netherlands from Tilburg University (three 
members) and a team in France from EM Lyon (initially three, later four members). 
Working  with  multiple  researchers  can  have  two  advantages.  Firstly  it  enhances  the 
creative potential of the study, and secondly the convergence of observations amplifies 
confidence in the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Studying  behavior  within  work  settings  in  different  national  cultures  can  be  difficult 
because each researcher has his/her own cultural bias (Teagarden, Van Glinow, Bowen, 
Frayne, Nason, Huo, Milliman, Arias, Butler, Geringer, Kim, Lowe & Drost, 1995). A 
multicultural team can serve as a solution to this problem. Teagarden et al. (1995) argue 
that equivalency  is  the  goal  of research that concerns different  cultures.  For instance 
translations should be equivalent rather than identical and multicultural teams are better 
able  to  achieve  this  equivalence.  In  our  study  this  equivalence  was  obtained  by 
administering several meetings between the team members in which we discussed the 
items for the questionnaires and in addition the organizing of several meetings with both 
companies before the start of the questionnaire survey.  
Our research process can be divided in five stages: 1. Initial meetings between two key 
members of the teams  and key members  of the companies and decision to  start  this 
research. 2. Forming the teams. 3. Developing the research questions and the interview 
protocols. 4. Conducting the research.  5. Making sense of the findings.  These stages   74 
correspond largely with the stages of the Teagarden et al. (1995) framework. The stages, 
however,  were  not  entirely  sequential.  As  our  study  encompassed  several  rounds  of 
research, with feedback of results to the companies after every round, we had regular 
meetings with the entire research team to discuss and interpret the findings. The interview 
experiences were elaborately discussed and shared between the Dutch and the French 
members, leading most of the time to small changes in the interview protocol for the 
following round. In contrast, the questionnaires remained almost unaltered during the 
entire research process. 
 
Easterby-Smith and Malina (1999) concluded in their cross-cultural team research that 
political elements influenced the mutual perceptions of the researchers. National external 
funding (on both sides) resolved in pressure on both teams and each group attributed 
academic motives to itself and slightly less positive, practical and commercial motives to 
the other national research group. We had no external funding so this source of mutual 
negative  bias  was  absent.  We  did  notice  that  both  the  French  and  the  Dutch  team 
displayed  slightly  more  identification  with  their  own  research  object  (KLM  or  Air 
France), but we succeeded in obtaining a reasonable form of reflexivity. Reflexivity is 
obtained according to Easterby-Smith and Malina (1999) by using information from each 
other in order to develop insight into one’s own perception. In our case it meant that we 
were more able to recognize our own identification as a result of our interaction with the 
other  team  members,  and  to  avoid  these  identifications  unduly  influencing  the 
interpretation process. 
 
Striving  for  the  above-mentioned  equivalence  meant  not  only  using  the  same 
questionnaires and interview protocols, but also conducting the interviews in comparable 
departments. For the establishments outside the home country we selected sales offices in 
the same (European) countries, but sometimes these were not in the same city (e.g., in 
Italy the KLM office was in Milano, the Air France office in Rome). This dissertation 
concentrates on the KLM side of the acquisition. In the following section therefore the 
sample of KLM will be discussed more in-depth.   75 
3.4 The samples and the data collection process 
 
As was mentioned above the research was done during a period of about three and a half 
years and consisted of 6 rounds of data collection. Each half year a round of interviews 
was conducted and questionnaires were distributed. The only exception was the sixth and 
final round, which was conducted a full year after round five. The decision to postpone 
this final round was made in order to be better able to gauge the longer-term effects of the 
integration process. Every round of interviews was preceded by meetings with managers 
who acted as informants concerning what had happened within KLM and Air France 
since the previous round. Often these informants were EVP’s (Executive Vice Presidents, 
i.e., chief executives of departments). They not only elaborated on the state of affairs but 
also helped with the planning of the interviews and the planning of the distribution of the 
questionnaires in their department. 
 
In close consultation with the companies we selected a number of departments that: (a) 
varied in the extent to which they were influenced by the merger; (b) varied in the type of 
jobs  performed  and  the  educational  level  of  the  employees;  and  (c)  reflected  the 
specificities  of  the  airline  industry.  Our  sample  initially  consisted  of  the  following 
departments: 
 
  Engineering  and  Maintenance  (technical  jobs,  specific  to  the  industry, 
relatively low impact of the merger) 
  Cabin Crew (service jobs, specific to the industry, very low impact of the 
merger) 
  Ground Services at the hub (service jobs, specific to the industry, low impact 
of the merger) 
  European Sales Establishments (sales jobs, not very specific to the industry, 
strong  impact  of  the  merger;  we  studied  the  establishments  in  Stockholm, 
Zurich, Milano, Madrid, London and Frankfurt)  
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  Headquarter departments (various specialist jobs, not very industry-specific, 
strong  impact  of  the  merger;    we  studied  Network  Planning,  Information 
Services,  Corporate  Communication,  Pricing  and  Revenue  Management, 
Corporate Control, and HRM) 
 
During the study two additional departments were included in the study: Cockpit Crew 
(based on reactions of pilots when we were distributing questionnaires to the Cabin Crew, 
but not to them, in the Crew Center), and Cargo (based on a conversation with a Cargo 
manager on a plane to Amsterdam, after a meeting with Air France in Paris). Cockpit 
Crew was included from round 2 onwards, Cargo from round 3 onwards. 
 
  Cockpit Crew (highly specialized jobs, industry-specific, very low impact of 
the merger) 
  Cargo  (various  managerial  and  commercial  jobs,  not  very  specific  to  the 





Three methods were employed to distribute questionnaires. Where possible these were 
distributed via the internal mail system by contact persons within the departments (who 
were instructed by the chief executives of the departments). This procedure was followed 
for Engineering & Maintenance, European Sales establishments, Ground Services, Cargo, 
and most of the Headquarter Departments. In other cases we sent the questionnaires to 
the home addresses of randomly selected employees (the selection was done by us on the 
basis  of  full  lists  of  employees).  This  procedure  was  used  for  HRM,  Information 
Services, and in the final round also for Ground Services. Finally, for some departments 
(Cabin Crew, Cockpit Crew and Ground Personnel) we distributed the questionnaires 
personally, order to  make sure that we would have an adequate response from  these 
categories of personnel. We handed out the questionnaires in the Crew Center (Cabin and 
Cockpit crews) and in the lounge for Ground Services personnel, where the respondents   77 
had the opportunity to fill out the questionnaires. Many flight crew members preferred to 
take the questionnaire with them and fill it out during their flight, and we provided self-
addressed and stamped envelopes for that purpose.  
Because of this mix of distribution procedures it is impossible to calculate an overall 
response rate. For the subsamples that were sent to home addresses the response averaged 
around 25%. For the departments where the questionnaires were distributed internally the 
response varied between close to 100% (Corporate Control, first round) to around 20% 
(e.g., Corporate Communication, sixth round). For the questionnaires that were handed 
out  to  Cabin  Crew,  Cockpit  Crew  and  Ground  Services  agents  it  is  not  possible  to 
calculate a reliable response rate, because not all potential respondents contacted were 
willing to receive a questionnaire. Overall, we distributed about 300 questionnaires to 
both Cabin and Cockpit crew members in each round, and the number of responses for 
these categories varied between 36 and 99, suggesting a response rate between 12 and 33 
percent.  For  Ground  Services  the  response  was  comparable.  These  relatively  low 
response rates (taking the intensive approach into account) confirm what KLM managers 
predicted: these three categories of personnel are more difficult to engage in a study like 
ours than most others. 
 
The numbers of questionnaires we received from the different categories and over the 
various rounds are tabulated in Table 3.1 (the Headquarter Departments are aggregated 
into the single category Corporate Staff). 
 
Table 3.1: Survey Respondents 
  round 1  round 2  round 3  round 4  round 5  round 6 
Corporate Staff  140  135  131  144  119  104 
E&M   58  102    98    92   47   43 
Cabin Crew  36    62    76    57   44   62 
Ground Services at Hub  36    53    42    27   14   70 
European Sales establishments  37  108  100    91   65   69 
Cockpit Crew  ---    75    99    73   68   62 
Cargo  ---   ---    80    72   49   52 
Various / Unspecified  8    12      9    18   11    1 
             
Total  315  547  635  574  417  463 
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Interviews 
 
For the interviews we asked each sub-department two or three employees to interview, 
and for larger departments the number of interviewees varied from three to six. After the 
first round we increased the number of interviews because additional departments were 
included. Each round we visited three of the six European establishments. Table 2 shows 
the numbers of interviews conducted in the different the rounds. We also had regular 
face-to-face  and  telephone  meetings  with  managers  and  EVP’s  who  acted  as  general 
informants. In each round, we conducted a telephone interview with a representative from 
those  European  establishments  that  we  did  not  visit  in  person.  These  meetings  and 
telephone interviews are also tabulated in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Interviews 
   
          Interviews 
 
(Phone)meetings 
managers and EVP’s 
Round 1  30  12 
Round 2  35  13 
Round 3  43  12 
Round 4  43   8 
Round 5  40   8 
Round 6  56   5 
     
Total  247  58 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and offered the interviewees the possibility to tell 
their story in their own words. Most interviews were conducted by a single researcher; in 
some cases two researchers conducted the interview together. All regular interviews were 
with  individual  employees,  with  one  exception:  two  pilots  who  were  interviewed 
simultaneously. In many of the meetings with managers and EVP’s multiple informants 
were present. Almost all interviews were recorded and later transcribed verbatim. In the   79 
rare cases that we did not record (either because we did not get permission to do so, or 
because  of  a  technical  problem)  extensive  notes  were  made  and  an  interview  report 
written as soon as possible after the interview. The interviews were mostly conducted in a 
time space of an hour but sometimes lasted longer than that. 
 
The interviews started with asking the respondents to evaluate the relationship between 
the merger partners with the use of two cartoons (see Figure 3.1 below) to encourage a 
free  association  of  thoughts  without  giving  too  many  verbal  suggestions.  In  these 
cartoons  being  on  the  top  step  could  be  interpreted  as  meaning  victory  as  well  as 
superiority. The top position could be interpreted to be taken because of chance, because 
of a better training, or, of course, because of being bigger or being the acquiring firm. 
Most of the time the cartoons proved to be a good beginning of the conversation. We 
were particularly interested in the explanations of the interviewees, and specifically in 
those cases in which the employee saw a difference between the relative standings of 
KLM and Air France as a whole, and those of his/her own department and its counterpart 
at Air France. Our aim was to detect creative means that could have been developed in 
these perceptions of the employees and would lead to favoring their own department 
above the same department at Air France, while acknowledging at the same time the 
superior position of Air France in the merger as a whole, which could be taken as an 
indication of ―social creativity‖ (Haslam, 2001). 
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The remaining topics covered in the interviews included: a description of the job of the 
interviewee,  organizational  culture,  social  identity,  a  comparison  of  the  interviewee’s 
department with the comparable AF department, learning experiences, identification and 
commitment, justice and trust. With these topics we tried to lead the interviewees to as 
much  elaboration  concerning  their  perceptions  of  the  acquisition  and  the  integration 
process as possible. We also aimed at reflective thoughts of the employees with respect to 
the organizational culture of KLM, and a comparison with the culture of Air France. This 
created  the  possibility  for  the  Dutch  and  the  French  teams  to  compare  the  two 
organizational cultures of AF and KLM, both in the views of the employees of these 
firms,  as  in  the  views  of  the  other  firm.  Using  interviews  to  complement  the  data 
collected  by  means  of  questionnaires  was  a  well-contemplated  choice  that  will  be 
reflected upon in the next paragraph. 
 
3.5 The use of interviews 
 
If we truly want to understand the meaning of certain choices or relationships we have to 
understand the whole context. In an interview the narratives that surround certain ideas 
can  be  revealed.  Narratives  can  serve  as  a  creating  force  for  an  identity  or  an 
organizational culture and they are constructed for different purposes and do different 
kinds of work. They can give us visions of how the world works and how it should work, 
according to the interviewee. They can reveal certain symbolic codes that are part of the 
organizational culture and they can also show us the codes that are shared or debated, or 
even  challenged  (Loseke,  2007).  Narratives  aid  in  the  sense-making  process  of  our 
identity,  our  social  identity  and  our  culture.  Employees  create  the  organizational 
environment through a sense-making process which is constituted by verbal descriptions 
that  are  communicated  and  negotiated  with  others  (Brown,  Stacey  &  Nandhakumar, 
2008).  Combining  an  etic  (outside  perspective)  and  emic  (inside  perspective)  view 
enables us to go beyond general dimensions. The situation at hand can only be explained 
by way of an ―interpreter‖, in our case an interviewee.  
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In this dissertation the interviews are used as background information, they informed us 
about the topics of our research, and helped us to interpret the results. With the help of 
the interviews it was for instance possible to understand the meaning of certain changes 
over  time  in  the  questionnaire  items,  which  otherwise  would  have  remained  mere 
numerical changes. We could for instance observe that over time, and possibly also as a 
result of the interaction with Air France, KLM employees started to develop a more 
critical view of the organizational culture of their own company. 
 
The interviews combined with the surveys, conducted over a relatively long period of 
time, gave us a rich and elaborate data sample. This is important, as we considered a 
longitudinal research design to be necessary, because our goal was to observe phenomena 
and  their  changes  over  time.  To  explain  this  concept  an  elaboration  on  this  type  of 
research will follow below. 
 
3.6 A longitudinal approach  
 
When observing a concept and its implications it is often more revealing to examine 
changes  over  time.  A  longitudinal  study  observes  a  particular  phenomenon  over  an 
extended period of time (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2007).  
 
Most research on the process of M&As is retrospective (Marks & Mirvis, 2001) and uses 
cross-sectional  data  (Fang,  Fridh  &  Schulzberg,  2004;  Homburg  &  Bucerius,  2006; 
Angwin, 2004). Studies tend to either focus on a certain time period (Hubbard & Purcell, 
2001; Schraeder 2001; Covin et al., 1996; Panchal & Cartwright, 2001) or compare time 
periods (Dackert et al., 2003; Birkinshaw, Bresman & Håkanson, 2000). Schweiger and 
Denisi (1991) therefore stress the importance of the time horizon in research on mergers 
and  acquisitions.  They  administered  a  survey  study  with  four  different  measurement 
points, but within a total time period of only 6 months. A similar study has been done by 
Fugate  et  al.  (2002),  who  compare  four  stages  in  a  merger,  with  measurements 
approximately  3  months  apart  from  each  other.  However,  a  longer  period  might  be 
necessary in describing and explaining post-merger integration processes, as these may   82 
take a much longer period than half a year or a year. The importance of studying this 
phenomenon within a larger time frame is emphasized by some researchers (Vaara, 2003; 
Schmidt & Rűhli, 2002). 
 
Smith Ring and Van de Ven (1994) expand on this issue and advise to conduct research 
on inter-organizational relationships in their natural field settings from the beginning to 
the end. They argue that using such a procedure would make it possible to record both 
formal and informal dimensions of repeated negotiations and commitments. In this case 
study of KLM we did observe repeated negotiations and changes in commitments during 
our research period. This was possible because we witnessed the post-merger process 
from the beginning, and over a long period of time. In the case of a merger an endpoint 
cannot be unambiguously be identified, due to the fact that obtaining full integration first 
of all may also in the future not be the goal, or, if envisaged, might take 10 years or more, 
and finally might be dependent upon the economic environment. What we did observe in 
our study was that the extent, speed, and modalities of integration were not explicitly 
given in the merger and therefore were susceptible to continuous processes of bargaining. 
 
In this dissertation the focus is on two phenomena and their development over time. 
Therefore  a  longitudinal  approach  was  applicable  as  it  provided  the  opportunity  to 
observe and compare time periods. The long duration of the research and the relatively 
many measurement points enabled us to detect possible undulations in phenomena over 
time,  a  possibility  which  in  most  other  case  studies  mentioned  above  remained 
unidentifiable.  This  approach  can  be  seen  as  a  combination  of  the  process  theory 
approach which seeks explanations in terms of the sequence of events and the variance 
theory approach which seeks explanations in terms of relationships between dependent 
and independent variables (Langley, 1999). In this KLM case the effect of an event (the 
acquisition)  on  identification  with  the  new  organization  and  perceived  differences 
between the two organizational cultures is gauged over time.  
 
In summary it can be noted that this case study is a longitudinal study with repeated 
surveys. Most of the respondents filled out the questionnaire only once or twice during   83 
the six rounds of the study. This means that the six rounds should be seen as repeated 
samples  drawn  from  the  same  population,  unlike  in  the  cohort  form  of  longitudinal 
studies, which uses the same sample in every time period (Saunders et al., 2007). The 
interview protocols were approximately the same in every time period but were adjusted 
slightly due to experiences of the interviewers with certain topics and their developments 
over time. In later periods the questions of the perception of the employees of their own 
culture  for  instance  were  less  elaborate  and  we  focused  more  on  their  learning 
experiences in their collaboration with the other company. 
 
In this dissertation the emphasis will be on the survey, therefore the variables and control 
variables used will be explained in the next section. 
 
3.7 Variables used in this study 
 
First the dependent variable, independent variables, and control variables in the empirical 
analysis focusing on culture will be discussed. After that we will discuss the variables 
involved in the study focusing on identification with the merged company. 
 
The study focusing on culture 
 
Dependent variable  
The  dependent  variable  analyzed  in  this  study  was  the  perceived  cultural  difference 
between  KLM  and  Air  France,  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  answers  of  KLM 
employees on a number of items, where they were prompted to indicate the extent to 
which they deemed an item to be adequately descriptive of the culture at KLM, and that 
at Air France. We therefore formed a dependent variable by calculating the sum of the 
absolute differences between the answers on organizational culture items for the ―own‖ 
company and for the ―other‖ company over the 17 items printed below. These items were 
a part of the total survey and were rated on a 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely 
agree) Likert-type scale, for both KLM and AF:   84 
 
1.  At ----, employees are responsible for the results of their work 
2.  At ----, to get work done coordination between colleagues is more important 
than reliance on the hierarchy 
3.  At ----, there is good communication between employees and their managers 
4.  At  ----,  respecting  prescribed  procedures  is  as  important  as  achieving  the 
desired results in one’s job 
5.  At ---- taking initiative is not encouraged 
6.  At ----, a stronger emphasis is placed on controlling costs on identifying new 
opportunities 
7.  At ----, employees often continue to discuss problems, even after a decision 
has been taken by the management 
8.  At ---- , conflicts are frequently ignored instead of openly discussed 
9.  At ----, if you want something done you need to address the right people 
personally 
10.  At ----, people are well informed of what competitors at other airlines do 
11.  ---- has a clear vision of the future, that guides short-term decisions 
12.  At ----, employees tend to keep information to themselves 
13.  At ----, it is important to try to convince everyone with a stake in a given 
issue before a final decision is taken 
14.  At ----, employees are well informed of events happening elsewhere in the 
company 
15.  At ----, there are many rules and procedures 
16.  ---- places a strong emphasis on meeting the needs of internal clients 
17.  ---- places a strong emphasis on meeting the needs of external clients 
 
 
The choice of the items 
Several  researchers  developed  instruments  to  measure  organizational  culture.  Some 
concentrated  the  items  of  their  questionnaires  around  a  few  main  dimensions.  An 
example  of  this  method  is  the  Denison  Organizational  Culture  Survey  (Denison  &   85 
Mishra, 1995; Fey & Denison, 2003). Another example is the Organizational Culture 
Profile (OCP) of O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell (1991), who used an instrument that 
contained 54 value statements that captured individual and organizational values and the 
Perceived  cultural  compatibility  score  (PCC)  of  Veiga,  Lubatkin,  Calori  &  Very        
(2000), who developed an index score in which the what ought to be, what was and what 
is value items were used as weights. These questionnaires could be used, or elaborate 
upon or adapted to the specific research question (Gregory, Harris, Armenakis & Shook, 
2009; Beugelsdijk, Koen & Noorderhaven, 2006; Kalliath, Bluedorn & Strube, 1999). 
 
The advantage of the instruments mentioned above is achieving a high external validity 
but the disadvantage is that if the questions seem irrelevant to the personal experience of 
the respondent this might increase the distance between the researcher and the respondent 
and decrease the response rate. Alderfer and Brown (1972) therefore suggest a form of 
empathic questioning whereby the questions are formed on the events and experiences of 
the respondents at the time of questioning.  
Our study developed a questionnaire following this line of reasoning. It was built on a 
pre-merger study performed for Air  France  and KLM  by  Inter Cultural Management 
Associates (ICM), as specialized management consulting firm. The picture of the cultures 
of  Air  France  and  KLM  and  their  most  important  differences  that  came  out  of  the 
qualitative and quantitative ICM study was recognized by managers and employees, and 
we based our items on these pictures. We also added some additional items on instigation 
of AF and KLM managers. We went through multiple rounds of consultation of Air 
France and KLM managers, adjusting the questions each time.  
The  dependent  variable  was  constructed  on  the  basis  of  the  differences  between  the 
answers of each respondent for culture statements pertaining to KLM and to Air France. 
For instance, if a respondent was of the opinion that the statement:  ―At ----, employees 
are responsible for the results of their work‖ applied very much to KLM, and not at all to 
Air France, this yielded a difference score of 4.  
The dependent variable Perceived Cultural Differences is constructed as the summation 
of  the  absolute  values  of  these  differences  across  17  items,  and  theoretically  varies   86 
between 0 and 68. In practice, we found differences between 0 and 56, with a mean of 
14.55. 
 
It is important to consider the nature of this dependent variable. We see it as a latent 
variable caused by the indicators (i.e., the 17 items). In other words, we do not think that 
it makes sense to assume that there is a single underlying construct causing the values of 
the 17 indicators to covary, but rather, an overall measure of perceived cultural difference 
is nothing else than the summation of perceived cultural differences with regard to a 
number of concrete issues. For instance, there does not seem to be a compelling reason 
why a respondent observing a large difference in terms of responsibility for the results of 
one’s work (item 1), would also see large differences in terms of the communication 
between  managers  and  subordinates  (item  3).  Accordingly,  Perceived  Cultural 
Differences is a formative, rather than a reflective scale (Jarvis, MacKenzie & Podsakoff, 
2003). 
From a measurement perspective, this has important implications. In case of a reflective 
scale (or index) strong correlations between the indicators are expected, and indicators 
that do not covary are excluded from the measure. In the case of a formative scale, in 
contrast, strong inter-item correlations are considered a sign of redundancy. Conventional 
dimensionality and reliability tests are not applicable in this case (Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2006), instead, it is important to check whether each indicator has a distinct 
influence on the overall scale. To check this, we regressed Perceived Cultural Differences 
on  the  17  constituent  items,  and  checked  for  multicollinearity.  The  highest  variance 
inflation factor (VIF) value we found was only 1.5, far below conventional cut-off points. 
Hence we conclude that all 17 items have a distinct influence on the index. Finally, we 
inspected correlations between the 17 items and the index. All correlation coefficients 
were significant (albeit two only at the 10% level), and therefore we decided to retain all 
indicators. 
 
Independent variables  
We use several independent variables to explain (changes in) the dependent variables. 
The first independent variables we used were the rounds of the study, indicating the   87 
passage of time since the start of the post-merger integration process. In our analyses 
dummy  variables  indicating  the  rounds  of  the  study  are  either  used  as  explanatory 
variables, or as control variables. 
 
Table 3.3: Rounds and their time period 
Round  Period 
1  September 2004 – December 2004 
2  April 2005 – June 2005 
3  November 2005 – January 2006  
4  May 2006 – June 2006 
5  November 2006 – December 2006 
6  December 2007 – January 2008  
 
A second set of independent variables were dummy variables indicating the different 
departments represented in our study. The respondents’ membership of these selected 
groups was  seen as  a factor that could  possibly  explain differences  in  the dependent 
variables, because the departments differed in important dimensions (as discussed above). 
 
The third independent variable, interaction intensity, was constructed by creating a high 
and low-interaction group. It was based on the degree of involvement of the employees of 
KLM with the employees of AF. We allocated respondents to either of these two groups 
based on our interviews and discussions  with  the KLM  managers. A  more extensive 
explanation regarding this topic will follow in Chapter Four. 
 
To  analyze  the  last  independent  variable,  nationality  differences,  we  looked  at 
employees with a nationality different from Dutch and French, and who worked for KLM 
either in Holland or in the establishments outside the Netherlands. We then measured the 
cultural distance between their national culture to the French culture (the culture of the 
acquiring firm) using the formula of Kogut  and Singh (1988). The Kogut and Singh 
formula uses Hofstede’s indices to compose an index of national cultural distance. The 
differences  on  each  of  the  four  cultural  dimensions  (power  distance,  uncertainty   88 
avoidance, masculinity/femininity and individualism/collectivism) of a particular country 
to another country are measured and combined into a single metric, correcting for the 
differences in variance in the four dimensions.   
 
 
CDj:   Is the cultural distance for the jth country from the focal country (in this case 
France) 
Iij    stands for the index of the ith cultural dimension and the jth country 
Vi  is the variance of the index of the ith dimension 
u  indicates the focal country 
 
Control variables  
We used three control variables to account for other influences on the cultural differences 
between the two organizations, as perceived by the employees. The first one we used was 
the number of years the respondent had worked for KLM. This might have an influence 
on their perception of their own culture and therefore also on their comparison with the 
Air France culture. The second control we used was gender. Being male or female might 
influence  perceptions  of  culture.  And  the  last  variable  we  used  as  a  control  was  the 
managerial status. Being a manager or not might also influence the perception of the 
cultural differences.  
 
The study focusing on identification 
 
Dependent variable  
The  second  phenomenon  that  we  analyzed  was  identification  with  the  new,  merged 
organization. We measured this by using the first five items from Mael and Ashforth’s 
(1992) 6-item organizational identification scale (cf. Mael, 1989), presented below. These 
items were rated on a 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree) Likert-type scale 
for both KLM and the Air France – KLM combination. Unidimensionality was checked 
by  doing  an  exploratory  factor  analysis.  All  items  loaded  on  a  single  factor.  Scale   89 
reliability was checked by means of Cronbach’s alpha. The scale reliability of .82 is 
excellent.  
 
  When someone criticizes -----, it feels like a personal insult 
  I am very interested in what others think about ----- 
  When I talk about  -----, I usually say ―we‖ rather than ―they‖ 
  When someone praises -----, it feels like a personal compliment 
  ----- successes are my successes 
 
Independent variables  
For the explanation of this dependent variable we also distinguished several independent 
variables. The first independent variable in our analysis was social  competition. Our 
survey contained three items that measured competitive behavior (the first two inversely, 
the third directly): 
 
 
  q46: If the cooperation with Air France has an influence on my work, I will do 
my best to succeed (R) 
  q47:  I  am  open  to  cooperate  with  my  colleagues  from  Air  France  when 
necessary (R) 
  q48:  I’m  not  willing  to  put  myself  out  just  to  help  the  Air  France-KLM 
combination 
 
It  appeared  that  items  46  and  47  significantly  and  positively  correlated,  and  both 
correlated negatively with item 48, but less strongly. The three items were inspected for 
unidimensionality (items 46 and 47 recoded to express lack of cooperation) by means of a 
factor  analysis,  and  all  three  variables  loaded  on  a  single  factor.  Whereas 
unidimensionality was ascertained in this way, a scale consisting of these three items had 
a low alpha reliability of only .62; while a scale consisting only of items 46 and 47 
displayed  a  much  higher  alpha  reliability  of  .74.  Therefore  we  made  a  decision  to   90 
continue with a scale of social competition, social competition, formed by these two 
variables only. 
 
The second independent variable we constructed was social mobility. Actual mobility 
across the boundaries of the two merging firms was minimal as was related by senior 
management at the beginning of our study, and as we also learned during the interviews. 
Moreover, being a respondent in the KLM sample means that an individual has not yet 
practiced any mobility yet (at least not from the acquired to the acquiring firm, the kind 
of mobility we were interested in). We therefore did not seek to measure actual mobility, 
but rather the perception of boundary permeability, or the perceived effects of the merger 
on job opportunities. We used the following questions: 
 
  q44: The Air France – KLM combination offers me the opportunity for further 
development in my job 
  q57: The Air France – KLM combination offers me an opportunity to fulfill 
my aspirations 
 
The two items were strongly correlated (r = .732). We therefore used these two items as a 
proxy  for  social  mobility.  Unidimensionality  was  ascertained  by  means  of  a  factor 
analysis, and the two items could be combined in a scale with high alpha reliability (alpha 
= .85). Hence we constructed a scale social mobility, consisting of these two variables. 
 
The third independent variable we observed was social  creativity.  This could not be 
measured by means of a questionnaire because the dimensions selected or created for 
social comparison can differ for each case. Consequently we used open interviews to 
gauge social creativity in the responses of employees. Interview respondents were asked 
to look at a picture printed (printed in the discussion of the approach followed in the 
interviews), and were asked which picture was the most representative in their experience 
and perception, (1) for the whole airline and (2) for their own department.  
We assumed that social creativity was at work whenever the interviewee indicated that 
the situation regarding the relationship between KLM and Air France was more favorable   91 
for  his  or  her  own  department,  than  in  the  merger  as  a  whole.  For  instance,  the 
interviewee might indicate that whereas Air France dominated at the level of the merger 
as  a  whole,  in  dealing  with  his  or  her  corresponding  department  at  Air  France 
relationships were on an equal footing.  
The advantage of this line of questioning was that this would not lead the respondents to 
a particular dimension of social comparison. Instead our goal was that it would help the 
interviewee to reflect on the issue of intergroup relations in the merger. We assume that 
the described discrepancies between the relationship at the level of the merger and the 
relationship  at  the  level  of  the  department  are  signs  of  social  creativity,  i.e.,  the 
interviewee ―invents‖ a dimension on which his or her own department can relatively 
favorably compare with Air France. However, we should acknowledge that in some cases 
such a discrepancy can actually be an adequate description of the situation. 
 
Control variables  
For control variables we considered the same factors already described above as possibly 
influencing identification with the new organization. Hence we looked at departmental 
affiliation, managerial status, amount of working years, gender and rounds of the study. 
 
After having operationalized the concepts mentioned above into measurable variables we 
conducted several tests which will be elaborated upon in the following section. 
 
3.8 Discriminant validity and common method bias 
 
If both the dependent and the independent variables in a study have been measured with 
the  same  instrument,  the  results  are  vulnerable  to  common  method  bias  (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie,  Lee  &  Podsakoff,  2003),  although  this  concern  may  not  as  serious  as 
previously assumed (Doty & Glick, 2009). In this study the problem of common method 
bias is believed to have played only a minor role, even though most of the data have been 
collected with a single questionnaire. 
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In the analyses with Perceived Cultural Differences as the dependent variable, most of the 
independent variables have been measured with the same instrument, but these tended to 
be  non-perceptual,  hence  leaving  less  opportunity  for  bias.  This  is  true  for  the 
independent and control variables Department Membership, number of Years worked for 
KLM, Gender, and Managerial status. All these variables are based on simple factual 
questions. One additional variable, Interaction Intensity, reflects our assessment of the 
level of interaction intensity between KLM and Air France at the departmental level, and 
is  based  on  other  data  than  the  survey,  as  explained  in  Chapter  Four.  The  final 
independent variable, National Differences, is based on the indices of national cultures 
composed by Hofstede (1980). 
 
Hence, there is no reason to heed for common-method bias in the analyses with Perceived 
Cultural Differences as the dependent variable, but there may be some concerns in the 
case of the second dependent variable, Identification with Air France-KLM. As related 
above, this variable is based on five items in the questionnaire. Two of the independent 
variables, Social Competition and Social Mobility, are also entirely questionnaire-based 
(the  third  independent  variable,  Social  Creativity,  was  interview-based  as  explained 
above). Therefore we  focused our efforts  on an analysis of discriminant  validity and 
presence of common method bias on the constructs of Identification with Air France-
KLM, Social Competition, and Social Mobility. 
 
We used confirmatory factor analysis to evaluate discriminant validity of the dependent 
variable  Identification  with  AF-KLM  and  the  two  perceptual  independent  variables 
Social Competition and Social Mobility. The confirmatory factor analysis was carried out 
with the maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.54. Each item was restricted to 
load on its specified construct, with the three constructs being allowed to correlate freely. 
All of the items loaded significantly on their latent variable, demonstrating convergent 
validity (confirming our findings from exploratory factor analyses reported above). We 
assessed discriminant validity by comparing a model in which the latent variables were 
allowed to correlate freely with a model in which all latent variables were restricted to 
correlate perfectly. The difference in chi-square between the two models (2507.29, df=1)   93 
was highly significant (p < .001), demonstrating discriminant validity (Byrne, 1998). As 
both dependent and independent variables in the study focusing on Identification with 
AF-KLM were perception-based and measured with the same instrument a pairwise test 
of  the  perceptual  reflective  scales  Identification  with  Air  France-KLM,  Social 
Competition, and Social Mobility was performed. For each of the 3 pairs of constructs a 
model in which the two latent variables were allowed to correlate freely was compared 
with a model in which the latent variables were restricted to correlate perfectly. In all 
cases the chi-square statistic of the second model was significantly higher than that of the 
first model, again demonstrating discriminant validity.  
 
Following  Lindell and Whitney (2001), we furthermore checked for common-method 
bias by introducing a marker variable. A marker variable should be measured by the same 
instrument as the scales used in the analysis, but should be theoretically unrelated to the 
variables of interest. We selected Professional Identification as our marker variable, as 
we did not use this variable in our analyses, there seemed to be no theoretical reason to 
assume a relationship with any of our variables of interest, and the marker variable was 
measured with the same instrument as our variables of interest. We checked the partial 
correlations  between  Identification  with  AF-KLM,  Social  Competition,  and  Social 
Mobility, controlling for Professional Identification, and found that all the correlations 
between the three constructs remained significant. Based on these checks, we conclude 
that common-method variance does not play a role in our findings. 
 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
 
The above description outlined the methods that have been used for this dissertation. It 
also tried to achieve to give more insight in the case at hand and the events that led to this 
merger. The next chapters will elaborate on the results of the research concentrating on 
the topics organizational culture and identification with the new superordinate firm.   94 





Failures  of  acquisitions  and  mergers  are  often  ascribed  to  incompatibility  of  cultures 
(Abrahamson  &  Fombrun,  1994;  Cartwright  &  Cooper,  1993).  Consequently,  many 
researchers  analyse  M&As  from  a  cultural  perspective  (Larsson  &  Lubatkin,  2001; 
Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988; Very, Lubatkin & Calori, 1996; Elsass & Veiga 1994; 
Weber, Shenkar & Raveh, 1996; Weber, 1996; Cartwright & Cooper, 1993). 
The  cultural  perspective  is  particularly  interesting  for  this  study  of  the  international 
merger between two airlines, in which cultural differences both at the organizational and 
at  the  national  level  are  to  be  expected.  Both  airlines  are  characterized  by  a  strong 
organizational culture, in the sense that this culture is clearly acknowledged and shared 
by the vast majority of the employees of the organizations. In KLM it manifests itself in 
apparent  symbols  like  the  particular  light  blue  color  of  the  airplanes,  uniforms,  and 
identity cards. These ID cards seem to be very important for the employees because they 
give them a sense of belonging to the organization. One of the managers of KLM even 
called them ―sacred‖. The KLM headquarters building in Amstelveen is evident in its 
coloring of the furniture and carpeting which is (of course) in the same blue color as the 
aeroplanes. The corridors in the building are called ―wings‖, which is meant to make an 
association with the wings of an aeroplane.  
In Chapter Two a number of propositions have been formulated with regard to the effect 
of a merger on perceived differences in organizational cultures. In this chapter we will 
analyze  our  data  from  KLM  and  test  hypotheses  based  on  these  propositions  in  the 
context of the Air France-KLM merger. We use data both from the survey and from 
interviews. These data and the methods of data collection have been described in Chapter 
Three. We will first briefly revisit the discussion of organizational and national culture, 
and formulate the hypotheses. Subsequently we will test the hypotheses on our data.   95 
4.2 Organizational culture 
 
In this study the cultures of two organizations have been observed during a period of 
integration after an acquisition. Important questions pertain to how these cultures will 
change during the integration process. Will the cultures be perceived to become gradually 
more alike, or will they continue to be recognizably different, even after a number of 
years? Does the transformation of cultures take place gradually or in clearly visible steps? 
Do different subcultures (here defined as departments) differ in their perception of the 
culture  changes  during  the  integration  process?  These  questions  have  been  discussed 
theoretically in Chapter Two, and will be empirically analysed in this chapter. 
 
Organizational  culture,  as  described  in  Chapter  Two,  can  be  seen  from  two  main 
perspectives. The pragmatic view regards organizational culture as a phenomenon that 
can be measured, and tends to focus on elements that can be influenced and used by 
managers.  The  symbolic  or  anthropological  view,  in  contrast,  defines  culture  as  (the 
outcome of) an ongoing process of interpretation by employees, through which process 
cultural phenomena within the organization are given symbolic meanings. Researchers 
that analysed an organizational culture using the pragmatic approach developed either 
typologies or dimensions, and using these, were able to distinguish one organizational 
culture from another.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, we chose to combine both perspectives in order to focus 
on managerially relevant dimensions and gauge the perceptions of employees at the same 
time.  Our  measurement  instrument  allows  us  to  test  hypotheses  pertaining  to  the 
perspectives of the members of the acquired company on both their own organizational 
culture  as  well  as  the  culture  of  the  acquiring  company.  On  the  basis  of  these  two 
perceptions, the perceived cultural difference between the own and the other organization 
can  be  constructed.  Based  on  the  reasoning  developed  in  Chapter  Two,  we  expect 
perceived differences to decline during the integration process, but not immediately. First 
the interaction with employees from the other firm will bring to the light differences in 
ways  of working,  etc., that  were not  immediately visible,  and thus  lead to  increased   96 
perceptions  of  cultural  difference,  compared  to  the  initial  expectations.  However,  we 
expect that after an initial increase the perceived cultural differences will subsequently 
become  smaller.  The  argumentation  that  underlines  this  expectation  is  that  when 
employees gain experience in working together, a mutual adaption process will start that 
will lead to a different perception of the culture of the other company, meaning that by 
adjusting to the other company the differences will gradually seem to become smaller. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   The perceived cultural differences between the firms involved in a merger 
will in the post-merger period first increase, and then decrease. 
 
 
4.3 Organizational subcultures 
 
In most if not all of the larger organizations it will be possible to distinguish subcultures. 
As described in Chapter Two subcultures represent culturally meaningful organizational 
units, and a researcher can decide a priori what is to be considered a meaningful unit. A 
subculture can be seen as a separate culture, meaning that the individuals in their coping 
with experiences engage in sense-making and act in terms of meanings (Gregory, 1983) 
separately from the other subcultures. Subcultures can result in serious conflicts because 
basic  assumptions  differ  (Wilkins,  1983).  One  can  assume  that  when  the  general 
organizational  culture  is  relatively  strong  it  will  also  be  more  homogenous  across 
subcultures,  and  conflicts  between  the  subcultures  will  be  less  strong.  
In this case the chosen meaningful units are departments of KLM, and as argued above 
KLM can be seen as an organization with a strong culture. The departments that were 
observed  using  questionnaires  and  interviews  were:  Engineering  and  maintenance, 
Check-in,  Cabin  Crew,  Cockpit  Crew,  Head  Office,  Cargo  and  six  European 
establishments outside the Netherlands. Assuming that the employees  of the different 
departments will have different perceptions of both their own cultures and of the merger 
and the merger process the following hypothesis is formed:   97 
 
Hypothesis 2:   The perceived cultural differences between the firms involved in a merger 
will differ between departments. 
 
It is not reasonable to presuppose that the integration process will develop at the same 
pace and following the same stages for all departments. It is therefore assumed that in this 
company the integration process will be in different stages in different departments. We 
assume  that  because  different  departments  are  involved  in  the  integration  process  in 
different ways the intensity of interaction with the other company will also differ between 
departments, and these differences will influence the perceptions of cultural differences. 
The  expectation  is  that  the  intensity  of  the  interaction  process  in  the  post-merger 
integration  with  the  other  company  will  change  the  perceptions  of  both  the  other 
company’s culture and the own culture. We expect that the departments that have more 
interaction with the other company will early in the integration process perceive larger 
differences  sooner than the departments  that have less interaction, but  over time this 
perception will change and perceived differences will become smaller. We expect that 
perceptions of employees in the departments with less interaction will not change a lot 
during  the  integration  process  until  the  period  that  there  will  be  more  interaction. 
Accordingly the following hypothesis has been formed: 
 
Hypothesis 3:   In  high  interaction  groups  the  perceived  cultural  differences  will  first 
increase  and  later  decrease;  in  low  interaction  groups  the  perceived 
cultural differences will not change. 
 
This hypothesis is a refinement of Hypothesis 1, which predicted a general pattern of 
change over time.   98 
4.4 National culture 
 
Organizational culture is substantially influenced by the culture of the environment, in 
particular the national culture (Hofstede, 2001). In Chapter Two the relationship between 
culture at the level of the organization and at the societal level has been discussed, and 
the conclusion was that this relationship is not as clear as it appears to be at first sight. It 
would  seem  evident  that  the  culture  of  the  environment  of  the  organization,  or  the 
national culture, is more deeply rooted in the awareness and perception of humans than 
organizational culture, and therefore exerting a stronger effect on behavior.  
From the point of view of Hofstede, who refers to culture as ―the collective programming 
of  the  mind  which  distinguishes  the  members  of  one  human  group  from  another‖ 
(Hofstede, 1994: 5), this would indeed seem to be obvious. If this is the case substantial 
differences between the national cultures of firms engaged in a merger or acquisition 
could  be  a  cause  of  conflicts.  These  differences  can  pertain  to  either  behaviour  or 
perception or both. Our research focuses on the perceptions of the employees, and thus on 
the perceived differences between the cultures of the two merging firms as perceived by 
the  employees  themselves.  However,  given  the  reasoning  above,  it  is  likely  that  the 
perceived  differences  in  organizational  cultures  are  also  influenced  by  differences  in 
national cultures. Since we have employees from various nationalities in our sample, we 
can analyze this effect. 
 
The establishments outside the Netherlands form an interesting representation of several 
nationalities, as the custom of the KLM is to hire local residents for most of the functions 
at the outside establishments except for the general manager and for some other higher 
management functions. Also within the Netherlands we find employees from a number of 
different  countries.  On  the  basis  of  the  discussion  above,  it  can  be  expected  that 
employees that have a different nationality than that of the home countries of both the 
acquiring and acquired company (i.e., not Dutch and not French), may have different 
perceptions of both the organizational cultures of the two companies, and of the cultural 
distance between these two. The assumption in this case is that non-Dutch employees 
already adapted to the organizational culture of KLM will (because of the links between   99 
national and organizational culture) perceive the cultural difference between KLM and 
AF to be smaller if their own national culture is more similar to the national culture of 
AF. This results in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  If the distance between the national culture of an acquired-firm employee 
and  the  home  country  culture  of  the  acquiring  firm  is  smaller,  the 




4.5 Empirical analysis 
 
The questionnaire survey described in Chapter Three mostly served as our reference to 
test our hypotheses 1 through 4. For the 4
th hypothesis we also used a measure of national 
cultural  distance,  using  the  formula  of  Kogut  and  Singh  (1988)  and  the  data  from 
Hofstede  (2001).  The  results  of  the  interviews  were  used  to  illustrate  some  of  the 
findings, thereby strengthening the confidence that the conclusions are robust. 
 
Dependent variable 
We measured the perceived cultural differences by calculating the absolute difference 
between the perceptions of a respondent’s ―own‖ organizational culture and his or her 
perception of the ―other‖ organizational culture. This was measured with the sum of the 
absolute differences on 17 items regarding organizational culture. These 17 items have 
been described in more detail in Chapter Three. The items were rated on a 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely agree) Likert-type scale, for both KLM and AF. 
At the end of the chapter we will also look at the perceived differences on each of the 17 
items  measuring  organizational  culture  perceptions,  in  order  to  see  what  the  most 
important perceived differences are.   100 
Independent variables 
The independent variables in our analyses were: 
 
The rounds  
The study included six rounds of measurement. The first round took place in September 
2004 till December 2004, the second round was conducted from April 2005 till June 
2005, the third round took place in November 2005 until January 2006, the fourth round 
occurred in May 2006 until June 2006, the fifth round was conducted in November 2006 
until December 2006 and the sixth round took place in December 2007 until January 
2008. Looking at the development over these six rounds allows us to gauge developments 
over time. For some of our analyses this is a main focus of interest, for other analyses it is 




The groups distinguished in the study were chosen from existing departments of KLM: 
Engineering and Maintenance, Check-in, Pilots, Cabin Crew, Headquarters, Cargo and 
establishments outside the Netherlands. 
 
Interaction intensity 
Interaction intensity, the extent to which employees of a given department of the acquired 
firm are involved in intensive interactions with employees from the acquiring firm, was 
construed by categorizing the departments into a high interaction and a low interaction 
group. This was done on the basis of discussions with KLM managers and analysis of the 
interviews.  The  low-interaction  group  consisted  of  departments  that  had  hardly  any 
communication with either the headquarters of AF or any of the other departments of AF. 
The first department that was included in this group was Cabin Crew. Employees from 
this  department  had  little  interaction  with  other  departments  (other  than  the  Cockpit 
Crew) or with the headquarters of KLM. When commenting on KLM headquarters, cabin 
crew members often described this as being more business-like than before, this indicates 
a feeling of distance. This distance was even further to AF because there was no contact   101 
with employees of this company during the observation period. During our study the 
uniforms of the two companies remained different, as the identities of the two brands 
were purposefully kept separate. This may also have led to a feeling of distance towards 
the acquiring firm. Contacts with AF crews occur occasionally (e.g., at airports or in 
hotels), but are not stimulated in any way, and are not explicitly work-related. 
The second group that was included in the low-interaction group was the Cockpit Crew. 
For this group the same observations as for the Cabin Crew can be made. KLM Cockpit 
Crew had no interaction with AF employees in general or AF Cockpit Crew, except for a 
very  small  group  that  flew  together  on  a  French  Airbus  (this  was  meant  as  an 
experimental  exchange  program  and  training).  The  few  pilots  that  had  a  part-time 
managerial job at KLM also had hardly any contact with AF during our study period. 
The third department that was included in the low-interaction group was Engineering and 
Maintenance.  During  the  6  rounds  of  our  study  their  contact  was  minimal,  some 
exchange groups did exist but the number of people that participated was very small and 
the amount of time that was spend together with the AF engineering and maintenance 
group (AF Industries) was also very limited. The policy of the merging firms during the 
years of our study was to concentrate activities in both hubs on the basis of expertise with 
reference to the different types of aeroplanes (in particular Boeing and Airbus). 
The last department that was included in the low-interaction group was Ground Personnel 
and Check-in Personnel. This group consisted of all personnel in service jobs working on 
the  ground  at  Schiphol.  During  our  study  their  jobs  went  on  as  usual  with  the  only 
difference  that  they  also  handled  the  check-in  passengers  for  AF  but  this  was  not 
experienced as a noticeable difference. Overall the KLM group of Ground Personnel and 
Check-in had no contact during the 6 rounds of our study with either the AF headquarters 
or the AF ground personnel.  
 
The high-interaction group was formed of departments that had much interaction with 
their Air France counterparts. The first group that we place in this category consists of all 
the departments of the headquarter office included in our study. These groups interacted 
extensively with AF, and the intensity of interactions also tended to increase during our 
study. This interaction consisted of daily or almost daily e-mail and phone contacts, as   102 
well as visits, the frequency of which varied from once a month to one or more visits a 
week. The HQ departments that we focused on were Pricing and Revenue Management, 
Network,  Information  Services,  Corporate  Communication,  Corporate  Control,  and 
HRM. 
The second department that we included in our high-interaction group was Cargo. This 
department was not included in the first round of our study, but several employees of 
KLM  convinced  us  of  the  importance  of  this  department  because  this  department 
integrated stronger and quicker than the rest of the companies. And the top of the Cargo 
business, consisting of both AF and KLM managers, worked together as a group in the 
Joint Cargo House. The general manager was the former head of KLM Cargo. During the 
five rounds of observation of this joint group we noticed an extremely high interaction 
between AF and KLM employees, consisting of at least weekly visits and phone and e-
mail contacts on average twice or more daily. On top of that there was more than one 
combined group meeting each month. 
The last category that we put in the high-interaction group was formed by the employees 
from  establishments  outside  the  Netherlands.  We  included  in  our  study  six  such 
establishments:  London, Frankfurt, Milano, Stockholm,  Zurich  and Madrid.  All  these 
establishments evolved to complete or nearly-complete integration during the six rounds 
of our study. During the first few rounds this meant that initially two IT systems were 
used next to each other, while in the later rounds the AF systems gradually took the lead. 
It also meant that AF employees and KLM employees were gradually located in one 
building. In this group of six establishments we observed during our visits the process of 
integration  through  initial  apprehension  and  misunderstandings  towards  increasing 
mutual understanding. 
 
National cultural distance 
The national cultural distance variable was obtained by creating groups of employees 
with  a  different  nationality  then  either  Dutch  or  French,  working  for  KLM  in  the 
Netherlands as well as in the establishments. For these groups of employees the national 
cultural distance to the French national culture was calculated using Kogut and Singh’s 
(1988) formula.   103 
 
 Kogut  and  Singh  (1988)  used  Hofstede’s  indices  to  compose  an  index  of  national 
cultural distance, based on the differences on each of the four cultural dimensions (power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity and individualism) of a particular 




CDj:   Is the cultural distance for the jth country from the focal country (e.g., United 
States) 
Iij    stands for the index of the ith cultural dimension and the jth country 
Vi  is the variance of the index of the ith dimension 
u  indicates the focal country 
 
Using a measure of national cultural distance based on this formula avoids the problem of 
retrospective rationalization because the national culture scores are derived from a source 




For  testing  the  different  hypotheses,  the  following  methods  of  analysis  have  been 
employed.  
 
For hypothesis  1, we conducted an independent T-test to compare the scores on the 
perceived cultural difference of the successive rounds of data collection. Every round was 
compared  with  one  of  the  other  rounds  with  respect  to  their  scores  on  the  variable 
perceived cultural difference, pooling the data from all departments.  
Furthermore we used a linear regression to test for the independent variables (rounds) and 
control variables. Perceptions of cultural differences may be influenced by factors at the   104 
level  of individual employees,  such as  managerial rank, number of  years worked for 
KLM, and gender. Therefore we controlled for these factors in our multivariate analysis.  
 
For hypothesis 2 we conducted two one-way ANOVA tests to analyse the differences 
between departments. First we analysed the differences between the departments in the 
Netherlands  only.  The  assumption  of  homogeneity  was  violated  (Levene’s  test  .011) 
suggesting that the variance in scores was not the same for each group. This was solved 
by using t-tests as a more global measure. 
The second one-way ANOVA test was used to compare the differences in perception of 
the employees from the six establishments outside the Netherlands. The assumption of 
homogeneity was not violated (Levene’s test = .476). For comparisons of both ANOVA 
tests we used the Tukey HSD test. Finally a T-test was done to compare the differences in 
perception between the departments in the Netherlands and the establishments abroad. 
 
For  hypothesis  3  we  observed  the  influence  of  the  intensity  of  interaction  between 
departments  of  KLM  and  AF.  In  order  to  do  so  we  divided  the  departments  in  two 
groups: one with departments with a relatively intensive interaction with AF, the other 
with departments that interacted only very little with AF. This information was obtained 
during the interviews with the employees and meetings with the general managers in the 
respective departments, as described above.   
We then conducted a one-way ANOVA test to compare the differences of perceptions of 
the high-interaction group between the six rounds, which was followed by a one way 
ANOVA  test  for  the  low-interaction  group.  (Levene’s  test  of  homogeneity  was  not 
violated in both tests) Furthermore we used a T-test to compare the differences between 
the high and the low interaction groups in every round. 
 
For hypothesis 4 we selected several nationalities with a relatively high frequency in our 
data. This group was formed from the employees that worked at KLM in Holland as well 
as at the establishments outside the Netherlands. Samples with a frequency above 10 
were chosen for comparison, which resulted in the following list of nationalities, with 
their cultural distance ( CDj) score in comparison with France.   105 
Cultural distance towards France:  
 
CD Sweden and France is:    3,14 + 0      + 4,95 + 6,49 =  14,59  : 4 = 3.65 
CD Spain and France is:    0,28 + 0,74 + 0,003 + 0    =    1,02  : 4 = 0,25  
CD Italy and France is:    0,74 + 0,05 + 2,50 + 0,24 =    3,53  : 4 = 0,88 
CD U.K. and France is:    2,50 + 0,60 + 1,81 + 5,20 =  10,11  : 4 = 2,53 
CD Swiss and France is:    3,66 + 0,02 + 2,50 + 1,57 =    7,75  : 4 = 1,94 
CD Germany and France is:    2,50 + 0,03 + 1,81 + 0,88 =    5,22  : 4 = 1,30 
CD Norway and France is:    3,15 + 0,007 + 4,20 + 2,59 =  9,95  : 4 = 2,49 
CD Belgium and France is:    0,02 + 0,03 + 0.41 + 0,13 =    0,59  : 4 = 0,15 
 
We used these measurements to create two groups, one with large cultural distance to 
France and one with a small cultural distance to France. We used the median score as a 
difference index between the two groups and therefore allocated every nationality with a 
CDj  score above and equal to 1,94 to the large-distance group, and the others to the 




Perceived cultural differences over time 
 
Our findings with regard to hypothesis 1 are shown in Table 4.1 and 4.2.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the results of the T-tests comparing the six rounds in our study. The 
results  indicate  that  there  was  indeed  an  increase  from  round  1  to  round  2  but  not 
significant. After round 2 the perceived differences gradually decreased, resulting in a 
significant difference between round 2 and 6 and round 3 and 6. The results show that the 
hypothesized  transformation  of  the  perception  of  cultural  differences  did  occur:  an 
increase from round 1 to round 2, and subsequent decreases from round 2 through 6. The 
increase from round 1 to round 2 was too small to be statistically significant, as was the 
subsequent decrease from round to round. But looking at the decrease over a number of 
rounds (2 to 6 or 3 to 6) we do find a significant change.   106 
 
Table 4.1: Results of T-test comparing rounds 
Rounds  M  SD  N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  14.44  6.95  263           
2  15.11  6.66  448  -1.26         
3  14.98  7.15  506  -1.02    .28       
4  14.62  7.04  486    -.34  1.09    .80     
5  14.33  7.66  344    -.19  1.50  1.25    .56   
6  13.54  7.21  402    1.6  3.27***  3.00***  2.24  1.43 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows us the results of the regression analysis. Model 1, with only the control 
variables, explains only a very small portion of the variance (R-square is .020). In Model 
2 the hypothesized variables (rounds 2 through 6, round 1 being the reference) are added. 
Not unexpectedly (given the results of the T-Tests described above) the coefficients for 
the individual rounds failed to reach significance.   107 
Table 4.2: Results of multiple regression analysis for control variables  
  Model 1  Model 2 
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   -.048 
 




    .090*** 
 
   .093*** 
 
     
Hypothesized 
Variables     
 
Round 2     
   .023 
 
Round 3     
   .030 
 
Round 4     
   .000 
 
Round 5     
  -.015 
 
Round 6     
  -.059† 
 
     
R-squared      .020     .026 
Adjusted R-squared      .019     .023 
Model F  15.737***   7.703*** 
F-change     2.844* 
Dependent variable is perceived cultural differences 
Standardized coefficients are shown 
†  p<.10 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 




From the above results we can conclude that our data suggest that the expected tendency 
of perceptions of cultural differences to increase initially, and then gradually decrease 
over  time,  does  indeed  exist  in  the  merger  studied.  However,  although  the  changes   108 
between perceived cultural difference at its maximum (rounds 2 and 3) and minimum 
(round 6) are significant, the shifts from round to round are too small to be significant. 
Hence we cannot confirm Hypothesis 1. Pooling all departments together, perceptions of 
cultural differences cannot be said to increase initially, to decrease later. We will now 
turn to an analysis of the differences between the various departments. 
 
Perceived cultural differences across departments 
 
As described above, for testing Hypothesis 2 (perceptions of cultural differences differ 
between  the  departments)  we  performed  one-way  ANOVA  tests.  This  resulted  in 
significant  differences  between  the  departments  (F(5,1866)  =  12.2;    p  =  .000).  The 
assumption  of  homogeneity  was  violated  (Levene’s  test  .011),  suggesting  that  the 
variance in scores was not the same for each group. We therefore repeated the test with 
independent T-tests and compared each test with the Levene’s tests results, if Levene’s 
tests resulted in a value above .05 we described the T-test value with equal variances 
assumed and if the Levene’s tests resulted in a value equal or below .05 we described the 
t-value with equal variances not assumed. Our findings with regard to hypothesis 2 are 
shown in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.  
 
Table 4.3(1) and 4.3(2) show the comparisons of the cultural differences between KLM 
and AF, as perceived in the departments in the Netherlands. The results show a clear 
difference between Cabin Crew and most of the other departments. Also between the 
remaining departments there are several significant differences.   109 
Table 4.3 (1): Descriptive statistics and differences in perceived cultural differences 
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Dependent variable is perceived cultural differences 
Cells: Mean difference between the departments 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
Table 4.3 (2): Descriptive statistics and differences in perceived cultural differences 
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Dependent variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001   110 
Levene’s  test  was  under  the  value  .05  when  comparing  Cabin  with  Engineering  and 
Maintenance, Ground personnel, Cockpit crew and Cargo. The test was also under the 
value of .05 when comparing Ground personnel with Headquarters. 
 
We also  conducted a one way ANOVA test  to  compare the differences  in  perceived 
cultural differences between the six establishments outside the Netherlands. This test also 
resulted in a significant difference between the establishments (F(5,472) = 2.8;  p = .018). 
The assumption of homogeneity was not violated (Levene’s test .476). For comparisons 
of both ANOVA tests we used the Tukey HSD test. Table 4.4 shows us the results of this 
analysis. 
The  only  establishment  that  differed  significantly  was  Milano,  in  the  sense  that  the 
employees perceived the differences between AF and KLM as significantly smaller than 
the employees of establishments in London and Stockholm did.  
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Dependent variable is perceived cultural differences 
Cells: Mean difference between the departments 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
Finally, we compared the departments in the Netherlands with the establishments abroad. 
This test did not show a significant difference between the two groups.  The departments 
in  the  Netherlands  showed  a  mean  difference  of  14.44  ( SD  =  6.90),  and  the   111 
establishments a slightly higher mean difference of 14.94 (SD = 7.68).The magnitude of 
the difference in means, however, was insignificant. 
 






























Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
From the above results we can conclude that the second hypothesis can be confirmed in 
the  sense  that  some  departments  differ  significantly  from  others  with  regard  to  the 
perceptions  of  cultural  difference  between  the  merger  partners.  The  foreign 
establishments  did  not  differ  significantly  as  a  group  from  the  departments  in  the 
Netherlands taken together as a group, but did show a significant differences within the 
group.We will now turn to an analysis of the changes in perceived cultural difference 
over time for different groups of departments. 
 
Changes  in  cultural  differences  perceptions  over  time  and  across  groups  of 
departments 
 
Our findings with regard to hypothesis 3 are shown in Table 4.6, Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and 
Figure 4.1. 
Table 4.6 shows the perceived  cultural  difference from round to  round for the high-
interaction departments. The results show that there was indeed a rise in the perception of   112 
differences  and  in  later  rounds  overall  a  fall  in  perception  of  differences  but  the 
differences between the rounds were not significant (F(5,1312) = 1.20; p = .31). 
 
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics and multiple comparisons between the rounds of the 
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Dependent variable is perceived cultural differences 
Cells: Mean difference between the rounds 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
Table  4.7  shows  the  perceived  cultural  differences  from  round  to  round  for  the  low 
interaction  group.  Here,  too,  we  see  initially  an  increase  of  the  perceived  cultural 
differences, and later a decrease. However, here the difference between the highest point 
(Round 3) and the lowest point (Round 5) is significant (F(5,1049) = 3.01; p = ,011).   113 
 
 
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics and multiple comparisons between the rounds of the low 
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Dependent variable is perceived cultural differences 
MD = Mean Difference 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 





The Graph below shows the differences between the groups during the 6 rounds. 
   114 






The  above  results  show  the  differences  between  the  two  groups  and  their  different 
development  over  the  period  of  the  study.  It  becomes  clear  that  the  development 
predicted for the high-interaction group is actually more visible for the low-interaction 
group,  and  furthermore  that  the  high-interaction  group  perceived  larger  cultural 
differences.  To  be  able  to  indicate  the  differences  between  the  groups  a  T-test  was 
conducted; Table 4.8 shows the results. Significant differences between the two groups 
were  found  in  all  rounds  except  round  3.  The  high-interaction  group  perceived  the 
cultural  differences  to  be  significantly  larger  than  the  low-interaction  group,  during 
almost every round.    115 
Table 4.8: Results of t-test comparing high and 
low interaction groups  
Rounds  M  SD  N  T – value  
1  high 
 













2  high 
 













3  high 
 













4  high 
 













5  high 
 













6  high 
 













Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
Looking at the results from the ANOVA tests and the T-test, as well as the chart, we can 
conclude that during the integration period differences in perception do indeed occur. We 
can  also  conclude  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  between  the  high  and  low-
interaction groups but the differences are opposite to what we hypothesized. The low-
interaction group, for which we expected no clear pattern of changes in perceived cultural 
differences,  manifested  increasing  perceived  differences  in  the  first  rounds  and 
decreasing  perceived  differences  in  the  later  rounds.  In  contrast  the  high-interaction 
group did not show a significant development in its perceived differences over the time of 
our study.  
Furthermore the overall differences between the groups were high and consistent. The 
high-interaction group perceived the differences between the firms as constantly larger 
than the low-interaction group. We will return to these findings in the Conclusion section. 
   116 
The perception of the cultural differences might also be influenced by the nationalities of 
the respondents, in the sense that employees with a national culture more equal to the 
nationality of the home country of the acquiring firm would perceive smaller differences 
between the cultures of the two firms. In the next section we will test this hypothesis. 
 
The  influence  of  national  cultural  distance  on  perceived  organizational  cultural 
differences 
 
Table 4.9 shows our findings with regard to Hypothesis 4. We formed a high and low 
national cultural distance group using the formula of Kogut and Singh, as explained in 
the  methods  section,  and  predicted  that  the  group  with  the  smaller  national  cultural 
distance would perceive smaller differences between the organizational cultures of KLM 
and AF.  
 
Table 4.9: Results of t-test comparing high and low national 
cultural distance groups 
 
































Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
The  result  shows  a  clear  difference,  hence  the  fourth  hypothesis  can  be  confirmed, 
meaning that if the national cultural distance of an employee towards the home country 
culture of the acquiring firm is smaller, the perceived cultural differences between the 
acquiring and acquired organization will also be smaller. 
   117 
4.8  Analysis  with  respect  to  the  separate  questions  on  cultural 
differences 
 
In order to get a more detailed perspective on the perceptions of the employees we also 
analyzed the questions measuring the perceived organizational cultures separately. All 
seventeen questions differed significantly with regard to perceptions of the ―own‖ culture 
and the ―other‖ culture. We then selected the questions with the highest difference (in 
mean scores) between KLM and AF for further inspection, and observed the development 
during the study period by means of a T-test (for a discussion of the various items, see 
Chapter Three). 
 
Table 4.10: Results of t-test comparing rounds: ―employees responsible for results‖ 
Rounds    M  SD    N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  -.52  .93  263           
2  -.40  1.01  448  -1.60         
3  -.59  .92  506  .95      3.02**       
4  -.56  .93  486  .51      2.50*    -.52     
5  -.52  .91  344  .39      2.18*    -.59  -.11   
6  -.52  .90  402  -.04      1.80  -1.14  -.63  -.49 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
Apparently  the  perception  differed  only  in  the  second  round  compared  to  the  other 
rounds. In this round the KLM employees perceived the difference between their own 
firm and AF in the extent to which employees are held responsible for the results of their 
work to be smaller than in the other rounds. However, overall in every round the KLM 
employees were convinced that they are more held responsible for their work than their 
AF colleagues.   118 
Table 4.11:  Results of t-test comparing rounds: ―coordination more important than  
   hierarchy‖ 
Rounds  M  SD  N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  -1.14  1.20  263           
2  -1.06  1.27  448   -.76         
3  -1.16  1.23  506     .30       1.26       
4  -1.14  1.24  486     .07         .98  -.27     
5  -1.24  1.23  344   1.09       2.03*   .93  1.17   
6  -1.12  1.23  402   -.16         .67  -.54  -.27  -.38 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
With  respect  to  this  question  the  employees  were  persistent  in  their  views  that  the 
hierarchy in the AF company was more salient. 
 
Table 4.12: Results of t-test comparing rounds: ―taking initiative is NOT encouraged‖ 
Rounds  M  SD  N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  .46  1.22  263           
2  .44  1.30  448      .18         
3  .48  1.37  506     -.27     -.51       
4  .68  1.31  486   -2.25*   -2.79**    -2.29*     
5  .67  1.31  344   -2.00*   -2.43    -1.95        .12   
6  .48  1.33  402     -.27     -.51      -.02      2.17*  1.87 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
 
Round 4 differs significantly in the sense that the perception of the difference was larger 
than  in  the  other  rounds.  Overall  the  perception  was  that  taking  initiative  is  more 
appreciated at KLM than at AF.   119 
Table 4.13: Results of t-test comparing rounds: ―controlling costs is more important than 
  identifying new opportunities‖ 
Rounds  M  SD  N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  -.73  1.18  263           
2  -.68  1.25  448  -.51         
3  -.45  1.37  506  -2.94**  -2.70**       
4  -.42  1.40  486  -3.17**  -2.96**      -.31     
5  -.27  1.24  344  -4.28***  -4.35***    -1.87  -1.55   
6  -.46  1.33  402  -4.74***  -4.78***    -2.06*  -1.71  .02 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
The  KLM  employees  perceived  in  all  the  rounds  themselves  as  more  driven  by 
controlling costs but during the first rounds they estimated the difference between KLM 
and AF considerably higher.  
 
Table 4.14: Results of t-test comparing rounds: ―often discussions‖ 
Rounds  M  SD  N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  -1.19  1.27  263           
2  -.96  1.42  448    -2.14*         
3  -1.07  1.27  506    -1.21   1.26       
4  -.98  1.44  486    -1.98*     .19    -1.07     
5  -.99  1.50  344    -1.71     .33      -.77  .16   
6  -.82  1.35  402    -3.46**  -1.42    -2.79**    -1.62  -1.62 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
At KLM the employees see themselves as more prone to discussions than their colleagues 
at AF, but in the last round the perceived difference between the two companies became 
significantly smaller.   120 
Table 4.15: Results of t-test comparing rounds: ―convincing everyone before the final 
decision is made‖ 
 
Rounds  M  SD  N  Round 1   Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
1  -.64  1.20  263           
2  -.31  1.32  448    -3.23**         
3  -.47  1.23  506    -1.76  1.91       
4  -.38  1.22  486    -2.74**    .80  -1.17     
5  -.34  1.33  344    -2.80**    .30  -1.46  -.43   
6  -.39  1.26  402    -2.53    .82  -1.02    .08  .47 
Test variable is perceived cultural differences 
T-values are shown 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
During the 6 rounds the KLM employees perceived the necessity of convincing everyone 
prior to the final decision as more applicable to KLM than to AF, however the difference 





To observe the influence of an M&A on the organizational cultures of the two merging 
firms we focused on the perceptions of the employees of the acquired organization. We 
hypothesized  changes  in  perception  during  the  integration  period.  These  changes  did 
occur, in the sense that the perceived differences between the two organizations first 
increased and then decreased. However, the shifts from round to round were too small to 
be significant. This result could be ascribed to the fact that the two organizations largely 
continued to operate independently (with the exception of the establishments abroad), and 
most  employees  remained  at  a  relatively  large  geographical  distance  from  their 
colleagues in the other organization. Evidently this will reduce interactions, resulting in a 
slower change of perceptions of cultural differences.  
Furthermore we predicted that the perceptions of cultural differences would differ across 
the departments of the acquired organization. We did in fact observe several significant   121 
differences  between  departments,  in  particular  the  department  Cabin  Crew  differed 
significantly from most of the other departments: they saw smaller differences between 
the cultures of KLM and Air France than their colleagues at other departments. But there 
were many significant differences between the other departments as well. It is interesting 
to note that the three departments where employees wear uniforms (Cabin Crew, Cockpit 
Crew, and Ground Personnel and Check-in) see the smallest cultural differences. At the 
same  time  these  categories  of  personnel  have  very  few  interactions  with  their 
counterparts of Air France. An explanation could be that they identify strongly with their 
profession  (of  which  the  uniform  is  a  symbol),  and  hence  assume  that  their  AF 
counterparts are not very different from themselves. As they have little interaction with 
AF colleagues, there is no opportunity for them to verify this assumption. We will return 
to the interpretation of our findings in Chapter Six. 
With regard to the establishments outside Holland a significant difference was  found 
between the Milano outpost and the offices in Stockholm and London, in the sense that 
the Milano employees perceived a smaller difference between the cultures of AF and 
KLM. This finding could possibly be ascribed to the smaller national cultural distance to 
the acquiring firm.  
To test the hypothesis that national cultural distance to the acquiring firm could have an 
influence on the perception of the differences of the cultures we compared two groups 
using the Kogut and Singh formula of cultural distance to distinguish between employees 
from  countries  with  a large national  cultural  distance to France  and employees from 
countries with a small cultural distance to France. The group with a national culture that 
is  more  similar  to  that  of  the  home  country  of  the  acquiring  firm,  perceived  the 
differences in organizational culture between their own acquired firm and the acquiring 
firm also to be smaller.  
To  analyze  the  influence  of  the  intensity  of  interaction  between  employees  from  the 
acquired  and  the  acquiring  firm  we  compared  a  high-interaction  group  with  a  low-
interaction  group.  However,  we  found  a  difference  that  is  opposite  of  what  we 
hypothesized.  The  low-interaction  group  showed  the  pattern  of  changes  in  perceived 
cultural difference over time, first increase, and subsequently decrease, that was predicted 
for the high-interaction group. Furthermore the perceived differences were consistently   122 
higher for the high-interaction group. This could mean that the high-interaction group 
started with a more realistic perception of the differences and consequently did not have 
to change as much as would be expected. Although the first round of our study did start 
early in merger it is possible that employees from high-interaction groups had already 
acquired significant experiences with the acquiring firm.  
We can conclude that changes  in  perception did  occur  and the perceived differences 
became gradually smaller but the link with the intensity of interaction with the acquiring 
firm was different than hypothesized.  We will return to the interpretation of our findings 
in Chapter Six. 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, the social identity perspective focuses on the identity of 
individuals derived from their membership of a group. Studying this social identity and 
the work-related behavior that is connected to it will give us a better understanding of the 
responses of employees to the merger studied in this dissertation. 
In  this  study  of  two  merging  airlines,  the  identity  process  is  particularly  interesting 
because  airlines  tend  to  operate  in  an  extremely  visible  manner,  and  therefore  the 
employees of the organizations are frequently confronted with their work-identity, even 
outside their work environment. Vaara, Kleymann & Seristö (2004: 11) argue in this 
respect that airlines can be linked with ―nationalism‖ as an ideology because airlines are 
―strongly associated with the national heritage of the country and served as national flag 
carriers‖.  Intuitively  this  suggests  that  an  airline  will  be  a  stronger  source  of  social 
identity than most other companies. And the results of our study will indeed show that in 
this case the identification with the company is strong. 
Building  on  social  identity  theory  we  develop  hypotheses  based  on  the  general 
propositions derived in Chapter Two. Data from the survey and interviews, discussed in 
Chapter Three, were analyzed to test these hypotheses. We will first briefly highlight the 
aspects of social identity theory most pertinent to this study, and formulate hypotheses. 
These hypotheses are subsequently tested using data from the merger we studied. 
 
5.2 Social identity theory 
 
The  main  assumption  of  the  social  identity  theory  is  that  people  tend  to  think  of 
themselves in terms of their membership of a group. This means that individuals define   124 
themselves and are also defined by others as  members of a group (Tajfel  &  Turner, 
1986). There is a growing interest in this theory in the context of work relations, which 
can be explained by developments in the workplace. It has become more difficult to 
define  and  assess  individual  work  performance  and  therefore  motivational  processes 
towards  a  more  collective  achievement  goal  have  emerged.  This  shift  and  the 
consequences  that  it  may  have  for  more  personal  goals  is  an  interesting  subject  for 
research from a social-identity perspective (Ellemers, De Gilder & Haslam, 2004). 
The perception of social categories and the assigning of prototypical characteristics to 
those  categories  is  a  social  process.  These  characteristics  are  abstracted  from  the 
members of the categories and function as a cognitive segmentation and ordering of the 
social  environment.  This  enables  an  individual  to  locate  himself  in  his  social 
environment. It will ultimately lead to oneness with or belongingness to a social category, 
thereby perceiving the fate of the group as one’s own (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). 
The group that a person belongs to is perceived as the in-group and a comparative other 
group is perceived as the out-group. The perception of the out-group depends on the 
belief system. If one believes in social mobility (a general assumption that the society is 
flexible and boundaries between groups are permeable) one’s behavior will tend to be 
more uniform to that of the relevant out-group members, while if one assumes that the 
society  is  markedly  stratified  and  thus  that  moving  between  groups  is  difficult  or 
impossible, one tends to treat the members of the out-group stereotypically (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). This has been discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.  
Research of Ellemers, Wilke & Van Knippenberg (1993) and Haslam (2001) has focused 
on the influence of perceiving oneself as being in a position of higher or lower status 
relative to a salient out-group. According to the social identity theory belonging to a 
high-status  group  is  desirable  because  it  enhances  one’s  self-image.  Empirical 
investigations have shown in this respect that members of a high-status group identify 
more with their group than members of a low-status group (Ellemers et al., 1993). Most 
of the studies in the field of social identity theory have been laboratory experiments (see, 
e.g.,  Ellemers  et  al.,  1993;  Hornsey  &  Hogg,  2002;  Haslam,  2001).  In  these  studies 
several different reactions to a perceived inferior situation from members of the lower   125 
status group have been found. In this study some of these reactions are explored in a 
realistic, non-experimental setting.  
 
This study explores the behavior of the employees of KLM, which is an organization that 
has been acquired by another firm.  
The assumption in this dissertation is that the members of the acquired firm perceive 
themselves as the lower status group. Several studies have taken the social identity theory 
as the basis of their argument and expanded the in- and out-group perspective into a study 
of the dominant and dominated organization. The assumption in these studies was that the 
employees  of  a  premerger  lower-status  company  will  continue  to  see  themselves  as 
belonging to a lower status group (Amiot, Terry & Callan, 2007; Giessner, Tendayi Viki, 
Otten, Terry & Täuber, 2006; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, Monden & de Lima, 
2002; Terry, Carey & Callan, 2001), and belonging to an acquired and previously lower 
status firm, as in our case, is an even more clear case (Dackert, Jackson, Brenner &  
Johansson, 2003). This means that two processes can influence the perceptions of relative 
status of firms involved in an M&A. The first one is the perception of being a smaller 
―player‖ in the market before the merger took place. The KLM employees did have this 
notion as is illustrated with some interview fragments from the first round: 
 
Table 5.1: Illustrations of ―being a smaller player in the market‖ 
1.  “They are larger than we are” 
2.  “Within the Netherlands we can say “We are KLM” and they can say “We are AF” in France but 
they can also say “We are AF” outside France and we cannot do that because we are so small” 
3.  “I think they have more power, what they can do. They’re bigger of course” 
4.  “AF is “the big boy” and KLM is “the little boy” 
5.  “They can do more in the same amount of time. They not only have more people but they also 
have more means” 
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The second process that influences the perception of being an employee of the lower 
status firm is the distinction between acquiring and acquired firm, which can also be 
illustrated with some interview fragments from the first round: 
 
Table 5.2: Illustrations of ―being the acquired company‖ 
1.  “It is not “working together”, we have been bought” 
2.  “Sometimes you have the feeling that you are fighting with “the big mother” 
3.  “I do feel that we are “the smaller part” in maintenance, so we will have to wait and see how 
the work will be divided in the future” 
4.  “Because AF is so big, and when two companies merge it always causes fright for the staff” 
5.  “We are in a merger, meaning the player that sets all the rules is AF” 
 
Prior research, discussed in Chapter Two, has indicated that the perception of being a 
member of the lower status group may lead to different reactions. When people belong to 
a low-status group they develop one of the following three strategies to improve their 
social identity: 
  By engaging in individual mobility. This means that they will disengage from 
their group and seek membership of the higher status group. 
  By  developing  social  creativity,  This  is  a  response  consisting  in  making 
intergroup comparisons on dimensions  different from  those that determine the 
status. 
  By engaging in social competition, meaning that they try to reverse the status 
ranking (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Haslam, 2001; Asforth & Mael, 1989).  
 
These possible reactions form the basis of hypotheses to be tested with data from the 
questionnaires and interviews of our study. More specifically, we will investigate the 
effect of these three strategies on the identification with the superordinate entity, Air 
France – KLM. 
   127 
5.3 Identification with the superordinate entity and social competition 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, our interest in social identity in the context of the Air 
France  –  KLM  combination  lies  in  the  expected  effects  on  identification  with  the 
postmerger entity. Organizational identification has been demonstrated to have positive 
effects  on  a  multitude  of  organizational  outcomes  (Ashforth  &  Mael,  1989;  Dutton, 
Dukerich & Harquail, 1994; Haslam, 2004; Haslam, Postmes & Ellemers, 2003; Elsbach, 
1999; Bartels, Douwes, De Jong & Pruyn, 2006). However, a merger or acquisition can 
threaten employees’ identification with the (pre-merger) organization, and consequently 
loyalty, commitment, satisfaction with the merger and willingness to cooperate in the 
M&A may suffer (Ullrich & Van Dick, 2007; Fischer, Greitemeyer, Omay & Frey 2007).  
The tendency of group members to engage in negative in-group – out-group behavior has 
often been a basis for research. Why do people want to believe that their own group 
achieves  higher  goals  than  other  groups?  Why  do  members  want  to  believe  that  the 
knowledge within their group is more substantial than that in other groups? Research 
indicates that some of the answers can be sought in the perception of the status of the 
group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg 2002; Amiot et al., 2007; Hornsey & 
Hogg 2000; Giessner et al., 2006; Fischer et al. 2007). If members perceive themselves as 
being in a lower-status group they will try to upgrade their group as a whole. One of the 
means to achieve this is to compete with the other group. 
In this case study of the acquisition of KLM the assumption is that the acquired firm 
members will perceive themselves as being members of a lower status group. We build 
on  the  theory  that  a  negative  or  lower  status  social  identity  (Tajfel  &  Turner,  1986; 
Ouwerkerk, de Gilder & de Vries, 2000) will promote action to enhance the position of 
the group. If however this behavior takes the form of social competition, it is likely to 
have detrimental effects on the identification with the superordinate identity (Gaertner,  
Dovidio & Bachman, 1996; Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008). This leads us to the 
following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1:  When  the  employees  of  the  lower  status  firm  engage  more  in  social 




5.4 Identification with the superordinate entity and social mobility 
 
The premise that social mobility is possible influences the perception of the members of a 
lower  status  group.  If  employees  assume  that  the  boundaries  between  their  ―old‖ 
organization and the new organization are flexible and permeable, this will lead to less 
stereotypical perceptions of the other group, and smaller perceived differences between 
the groups.  
In this study of the acquisition of an airline, we draw on the social identity theory which 
results in stating with respect to social mobility that perceiving the boundaries between 
the  ―old‖  firm  and  the  merger  partner  as  more  permeable  will  lead  to  a  higher 
identification with the new, combined organization. If employees of the acquired firm 
perceive a move to the (higher status) acquiring firm to be possible, this will also enable 
them to identify more strongly with the new entity that encompasses both firms. This 
argument, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  When employees of the lower status firm see more opportunities for social 




5.5  Identification  with  the  superordinate  entity  and  creative 
rationalization 
 
When  members  of  a  lower  status  group  believe  that  the  group  boundaries  are 
impermeable they might resort to social creativity. Social creativity was discussed in   129 
Chapter  Two  as  a  response  through  which  members  of  a  low  status  group  regain  a 
positive  image  by  emphasizing  those  dimensions  on  which  their  in-group  positively 
distinguishes itself from the out-group. There are different forms of social creativity: (a) 
looking for a new dimension on which to compare the out-group with the in-group; (b) 
changing the values that are attributed to certain characteristics of the other group; (c) 
comparing the in-group with totally different groups than the out-group (Haslam, 2001). 
Social creativity responses are difficult to gauge empirically, as the dimensions selected 
or created for social comparison can differ from case to case. 
In  this  study  of  KLM  employees  social  creativity  was  explored  by  comparing 
respondents’  status  ordering  at  the  level  of  the  two  merging  companies  with  status 
orderings at the level of the department in which the respondent works. The idea is that if 
a respondent presents a more positive status ordering for the own department than for the 
merging firms as a whole, it would be a sign of social creativity. It is difficult to deny that 
KLM is the smaller firm, or that it is acquired by Air France, however the status ordering 
at the level of the two companies as a whole may still vary between respondents. For 
instance,  some  employees  may  more  strongly  believe  the  rhetorics  of  fairness  and 
equality employed by top management in the context of the combination. This in itself 
cannot be taken as a sign of social creativity. However, if a respondent admits superior 
status of Air France at the level of the combination, but denies this at the level of his or 
her own department, we will take this as an indication that social creativity is at work. 
Apparently, when comparing his or her own department with that in Air France such a 
respondent employs different dimensions, changes the values that are attributed to certain 
dimensions, or refers to a different reference group in order to upgrade the status of the 
own department. 
As with the other social identity responses, we are interested in the relationship between 
social creativity and the extent to which an employee identifies with the new, merged 
organization. Social creativity, in contrast to social competition, does not lead to a denial 
of the differences. It merely leads to a shift of the focus. Social creativity enables the 
employee to see the groups as different, but without feeling inferior. This concept is in 
theory described as in-group favoritism meaning a bias in perception in favor of the in-  130 
group (Terry et al., 2001). Therefore we expect that this will make it more difficult for 
the respondent to identify with the new organization, leading to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  When the employees of the lower status firm engage in social creativity to 
compare themselves relatively favorably with the “other” firm they will 
identify less with the new, superordinate organization. 
 
 
5.6 Empirical analysis 
 
The data used for our analyses in this chapter stem from the questionnaire survey and the 
interviews  described  in  Chapter  Three,  therefore  in  this  section  the  construction  of 
variables for the testing of hypotheses 1 through 3 will be briefly discussed. 
 
Dependent variable 
We measured identification with the new, merged firm using the first five items from 
Mael and Ashforth’s (1992) 6-item organizational identification scale (cf. Mael, 1989). 




The independent variables in our analysis are social competition, social mobility and 
social creativity. Our survey contained three items measuring competitive behavior (the 
first two inversely, the third directly). As is explained in chapter three we decided to 
continue with the scale of social competition formed by two variables. 
 
The  second  independent  variable  of  interest  here  is  social  mobility.  Actual  mobility 
across  the  boundaries  of  the  two  merging  firms  is  minimal,  and  as  we  surveyed 
employees of KLM, the fact that they were in our sample indicated that they had not 
displayed social mobility. Hence, direct measurement of social mobility is difficult, and   131 
probably also pointless, because of the very low incidence. However, our questionnaire 
did contain two items measuring individual perceptions of boundary permeability or at 
least the perceived effect of the merger on job opportunities (see chapter three). 
 
 
The third independent variable, social creativity, for the reasons discussed above, could 
not be measured by means of a questionnaire. Instead we used open interviews to elicit 
social creativity in the responses of employees. Interview respondents were asked to look 
at a picture with two rows of each three cartoons, and decide which cartoon in each row 
was most representative for the relationship between (a) KLM and Air France, and (b) 
their own department and their counterpart department at Air France (see Figure 5.1). 
The rationale behind using these pictures was that these would not lead the respondents to 
a particular dimension of social comparison. It would only prompt the interviewee to 
reflect on the issue of intergroup relations in the merger, based on which he or she could 



















department   132 
 
We coded the answers as 1 = AF is dominant, 2 = both are equal and 3 = KLM is 
dominant. Several respondents used an in-between answer and those we labeled as 2,5 or 
1,5. (1,5 means the respondent combines in one row the pictures indicating that AF is 
dominant  with  the  picture  indicating  equality;  2,5  means  a  combination  of  KLM  is 
dominant and equality). Social creativity was measured by subtracting the score for the 
airlines  row  from  the  result  on  the  row  for  the  own  department.  Using  this  line  of 
reasoning a positive figure would mean social creativity: although Air France as a whole 
is seen as dominant, this is less the case for the respondent’s own department, suggesting 
that  different  (creative)  dimensions  are  used  for  this  comparison.  To  gauge  the 
relationship between social creativity, thus measured, and identification with the new, 




Identification with the new combination may also be influenced by other factors than 
social  competition,  social  mobility  (and  social  creativity).  Therefore  we  introduced 
several control variables in our analysis. First of all, identification may be influenced by 
occupation. Therefore we constructed indicator variables for 6 occupational categories 
(staff at headquarters being the reference group). Another factor of influence may be 
managerial status. Managers may identify stronger with the newly formed group than 
personnel with no managerial status. We constructed an indicator variable with the value 
1  if  the  respondent  was  a  manager  (at  any  hierarchical  level),  and  0  otherwise.  We 
furthermore controlled for the number of years respondent had worked for the company, 
gender,  and  the  timing  of  the  questionnaire  (round  2,  3,  4  or  5  (round  1  being  the 
reference group). Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
used in our analysis for testing hypotheses 1 and 2.   133 
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15 .Cockpit Crew 
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*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
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5.7 Methods and findings (1): Social competition and social mobility 
 
 
We used linear regression to test our first two hypotheses. In the first step we entered 
only the control variables. The results of the regression analysis show that the control 
variables explain only a small proportion of the variance (R-square is .041) (see Table 
5.2).  The  membership  of  a  particular  occupational  group  has  a  strong  effect  on 
identification  with  the  combination.  Ground  personnel  at  Schiphol  expressed 
relatively  low  levels  of  identification  with  the  merged  firm,  and  personnel  at 
outstations and Cargo relatively strong identification. Also managerial status and the 
number  of  year’s  respondents  have  worked  for  the  (old)  company  affects  the 
identification with  the  merged firm both  positively.  The  coefficient of the  gender 
variable  has  a  negative  sign,  indicating  that  female  respondents  express  lower 
identification with the combination than their male colleagues. The indicators for the 
various rounds  of data  collection show no significant  coefficients,  suggesting that 
there are little or no shifts in identification with the combination over time. 
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Table 5.4: Results of multiple regression analysis for control variables 6 rounds 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Model 4 




    .006 
 
    .003 
 
   -.012 
 
   -.006 
Round 3      .051      .056†      .025      .031 
Round 4      .017      .024      .002      .007 
Round 5      .047      .059*      .034      .041 




    .008 
 
    .016 
 
    .049* 
 




   -.019 
 
   -.025 
 
    .002 
 






    .076*** 
 
 
    .056** 
 
 
    .049* 
 
 






    .127*** 
 
 
    .136*** 
 
 
    .147*** 
 
 
    .145*** 
Ground personnel     -.076**     -.026     -.028     -.006 




   -.021 
 
    .013 
 
    .003 
 
    .003 
Cabin Crew     -.013      .064**      .033      .076** 
Cockpit Crew     -.080**      .052*     -.040†     -.028 
 
 
       
Hypothesized 
Variables 
       
 
Social competition 
   
   -.262*** 
   
   -.184*** 
 
Social mobility 
     
     .285*** 
 
     .224*** 




  2287 
 
    2280 
 
    2256 
 




  .041 
 
     .104 
 
     .117 
 






  .035 
 
 
     .098 
 
 
     .111 
 
 












Dependent variable is identification with AF/KLM  
Standardized coefficients are shown 
†  p<.10 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
***  p<.001 
 
   137 
In the second model the variable social competition was entered, reflecting the effect 
of social competition. As predicted, this variable has a significant negative effect on 
identification with the combination. The increase in the F-statistic from model 1 to 
model 2 is highly significant. In model 3 we entered the variable for social mobility. 
As hypothesized, social mobility has  a significant  positive effect  on identification 
with  the  superordinate  entity.  The  explained  variance  again  increases  strongly, 
reflected in a highly significant increase in the F-statistic. In the final step (model 4), 
we entered the social competition and social mobility variables simultaneously. This 
variable  shows  the  hypothesized  positive  effect  on  identification  with  the 
combination. Inspection of tolerance and VIF statistics shows that multicollinearity is 
no issue in this analysis. 
 
5.8 Methods and findings (2): Social creativity 
 
 
For the testing of hypothesis 3 we combined data from the survey (identification with 
the group) with data from the interviews (social creativity).  
Looking first at our social creativity data, we have responses from 246 respondents. In 
128 cases Air France is seen as dominant at the level of the airlines, but this is true 
only in 35 cases if we look at the own department. This is a clear indication that social 
creativity is being practiced. The question is, however, whether social creativity is 
related to identification with the post-merger organization. 
In a first analysis, we related the average level of social creativity in a department 
(interview data) with the average level of identification with the Air France – KLM 
group (survey data). At this level of analysis we can distinguish between only 17 
departments. Hence we have 17 cases.  The comparison was made by means of a 
correlation using Spearman Rank Order as a non-parametric alternative to Pearson 
Product Moment correlation because of the small sample size, and because a normal 
distribution of  the variables could  not  be assumed. The Spearman  rho correlation 
coefficient between average social creativity and average identification with the group 
is negative but insignificant (rho = -.303, p = .237)   138 
Although the above results show no relationship between creativity and identification 
there was a significant difference in means between the several departments regarding 
to their social creativity responses F(16,228)=2.95 p=.000 (see Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.5: Means of social creativity responses 
  N  Mean  Std, Deviation 
Cargo  21  .9524  .7567 
HQ information Services  14  .9286  .6157 
Cabin Crew  18  .9167  .7326 
HQ Pricing and Revenue  10  .9000  .3944 
Stockholm  19  .8684  .7235 
Zurich  13  .8077  .7228 
Ground Services  18  .7222  .9271 
Cockpit Crew  13  .6923  .6934 
London  13  .6538  .5158 
HQ  HRM  11  .4091  .5839 
Engineering & Maintenance  28  .3036  .8426 
Frankfurt  10  .3000  .7149 
HQ Network  10  .3000  .5869 
Madrid  11  .2727  .7863 
HQ Corporate Control  13  .2629  .8321 
Milano  13  .2308  .6650 
HQ Communication  10  -.3000  1.0594 
       
Total  245  .5778  .7906 
 
 
From  the  above  results  one  can  conclude  that  the  establishment  Stockholm  most 
clearly favors its own department and that only the department Communication at the 
headquarters of KLM sees Air France as being more in the lead with regard to their 
own  function,  than  in  the  merger  as  a  whole.  The  department  Cargo  also  has  a 
strikingly high result indicating a more dominant perception of KLM. Cargo as well 
as Stockholm are departments in which an ex-KLM manager is in charge. Zurich is a 
KLM department and functions as a subsidiary of Geneva. Therefore the perception   139 
of dominance might represent more a realistic event than a creative solution to the 
feeling of inferiority. Cabin Crew, Information services and Pricing and Revenue also 
perceive their department as more dominant than KLM in the merger as a whole. For 
Cabin  Crew  this  could  be  due  to  the  fact  that  this  department  has  hardly  been 
influenced by the merger with AF, and for Information Services it could be because 
this department is a relatively more separate department in the sense that outsourcing 
was a common practice in this department which might have resulted in a different 
kind of identity, probably a more professional identity. The relatively high mean of 
Pricing and Revenue can not be explained as easily. It could be influenced by a more 
competitive  attitude  of  the  relatively  young  and  highly  educated  employees. 
Conversely, the outpost Madrid and the corporate communication department may be 
realistic in  perceiving Air  France to  be more dominant  in their realm than in  the 
merger as a whole. In Madrid an ex-Air France manager is in the lead, while the 
corporate communication function at KLM has been downgraded in particular with 
regard to the external and financial communication.  
These observations suggest that at least in some cases the actual dominance of the 
firm in a certain region or department was measured by our operationalization for 
social creativity, while in other departments the perception of dominance (influenced 
by social creativity) was measured.  
Taken all together our analyses show that the expected negative relationship does 
seem  to  exist  but  is  not  significant.  However,  we  should  not  have  too  much 
confidence in the measure developed to capture social creativity. We will return to 
these points in the next section.   140 
5.9 Conclusions 
 
We hypothesized effects on the identification with the merged firm of three types of 
social identity responses to a merger: social competition, social mobility, and social 
creativity, and tested these hypotheses on data from the Air France-KLM merger. In 
this  section we will discuss  our findings,  and  where possible illustrate these with 
interview fragments. 
Both  social  competition  and social  mobility were found to  have the hypothesized 
effect on identification with the merger. In the case of social competition this effect is 
negative, in the case of social mobility positive. This is not so difficult to understand, 
as the two strategies seem to be opposites. The social competition strategy emphasizes 
the  identity  of  the  ―old‖  group,  that  is  perceived  to  be  competing  with  the  new, 
ostensively higher-status group. The social mobility strategy implies the willingness 
to give up the ―old‖ identity if the higher status group can be joined, ―if you can’t beat 






A few interview fragments can illustrate the above findings; perceived career options 
and competition related to expressions of identification. They are displayed in the 
overview table of the next page.   141 
Table 5.6: Illustrations of career options, competition and identification 
  Respondent A  Respondent B  Respondent C 
Career 
options 
“No  I  still  think  it’s 
uncertain.  I  have  become 
more  suspicious  than  last 
year.  I  observe  a  slow 
integration  of  all  kinds  of 
things  and  I  see  a  large 
difference  in  culture 
between  the  French  and 
the Dutch. I cannot make a 
clear estimation as to what 
this means for the division 
of jobs”. 
“Yes  I  absolutely  see 
opportunities,  precisely 
because  it’s  not  a  thick 
management  layer. 
Climbing  up  the  ladder 
means  that  it  becomes 
thinner  and  thinner.  But 
now  it  is  a  totally  new 
game!” 
 
“No  I  don’t  see 
opportunities.  The 
advantage  of  a  merger  is 
that  you  need  less 
overhead  and  I  am  in  a 
management  level.  So  I 
think  I  will  have  more 
competition.” 
 
Competition  “We  have  daily  flights  to 
Tokyo.  It  took  us  25  years 
to  obtain  these  rights. 
Getting  these  rights  isn’t 
something that the French 
understand very well. They 
have a much larger country. 
They  have  Paris.  They  can 
ask  things  and  we  cannot 
offer  things.”(Note  the 
“we” and “they” utterances 
of this respondent) 
   
Identification  “No  I  am  still  not  an  AF-
KLMer  although  it  is 
changing a bit” 
 
“No  I  don’t  have  a  “blue 
feeling” or anything. There 
are people with feelings like 
that but it is a dying breed.” 
 
“I am very proud of KLM. I 
always doubted if I had the 
“blue  feeling”  but  after  9 
years maybe I have. I have 
more kindred feelings with 
KLM  than  with  AF  at  this 
moment.” 
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The findings with regard to the social creativity strategy are broadly in conformity  
with our hypothesis, but not significant. The (weak) negative relationship between 
social creativity and identification with the group suggests a certain extent of in-group 
favoritism (Terry et al., 2001).  
 
Some illustrative quotes from respondents with regard to creativity related to their 
expressions of identification are illustrated in the overview table below. 
 
Table 5.7: Social creativity and identification 
  Respondent D  Respondent E  Respondent F 
Creativity  “If  you  look  at  how  controllers 
function  at  KLM….they  (the 
controllers  of  KLM)  are  much 
more  supportive  than 
accountants. A managing director 
would  much  sooner  accept  a 
controller  here  as  a  business 
partner who really participates in 
the  thinking  process  and  within 
AF  a  controller  is  doing  more 
clerical  work  and  accounting 
records.  They  (meaning  AF)  can 
learn a lot from us and they do 
acknowledge that………..  
My  observation  is  that  a 
controller  receives  less 
acknowledgment at AF……… 
We (controllers of KLM) want to 
know  where  it  goes  wrong  so 
that we can correct it in time. We 
are more business analysts.” 
“.......This  refers  to  the 
fact  that  we  have  a 
revenue  system  that  is 
acknowledged  all  over 
the world as one of the 
most  advanced  revenue 
management systems for 
airline  businesses,  so 
that  helps  and  it  is  also 
reasonable  to  establish 
the  fact  that  we  have 
certain  elements  in  our 
revenue  management 
system that they (AF) are 
not able to handle yet.” 
 
“The only difference that I  see 
(between AF and KLM) and that 
is  also  by  experience  in 
communicating with AF, is that 
we in the area of IT support in 
salary  administration  are  really 
running  a  few  years  ahead  of 
AF.” 
 
Identification  “I feel myself better at KLM (than 
at AF). It is not such a “calculating 
culture”. I would estimate KLM as 
better  than  AF………………  I  feel 
myself  to  be  more  of  a  KLMer 
than a controller.” 
“  I  feel  myself  more  a 
KLMer  than  a 
mathematician…………..Y
es I have been proud of 
KLM all my life.” 
 
“Yes I am proud to work at KLM 
but  I  don’t  have  a  very  “blue 
feeling”………I  am  proud  to  be 
Dutch and to work for a Dutch 
company that can worldwide be 
seen  as  having  all  the  (Dutch) 
characteristics…..and  that  is 
KLM.”   143 
5.10 Concluding remarks 
 
The negative relationship between social creativity and identification with the super-
ordinate identity makes sense, for if one truly believes one’s department to be superior 
to that of the merger partner in some dimension (less relevant than the most obvious 
dimension), this can cause a disidentification with the superordinate group, which 
could  in  a  worse  case  scenario  result  in  a  complete  cognitive  separation  from  it 
(Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001). According to Van Knippenberg (2000) this lack of 
identification  can  have  a  negative  influence  on  work  motivation  and  task 
performance, in as far as this is related to the superordinate firm.  
However, our operationalization of social creativity may fall short, and that may be 
the reason why we do not find a statistically significant negative effect. We have 
mechanically  calculated  social  creativity  as  the  extent  to  which  an  interviewee 
indicated to see less dominance of Air France in his or her own department, than in 
the merger as a whole. This procedure conflates realistic assessments of relationships 
within the merger with creative use of dimensions to construct a perception of not 
being  dominated  or  being  of  lower  status.  A  better  operationalization  of  social 
creativity should look at the explanations given for the difference in the perception of 
relationships at the level of the airline and at the level of the own department. Only if 
these explanations go against more down-to-earth observations of power relations the 
conclusion that social creativity is present may be drawn. 
 
Overall,  our  findings  suggest  that  the  manner  in  which  employees  respond  to  a 
situation  in  which  their  group  is  absorbed  by  a  higher-status  group  is  of  utmost 
importance  for  identification  with  the  superordinate  entity.  Together,  social 
competition and social mobility explain a substantial proportion of the variance in 
identification with the group. At the same time, their effects are opposite. This means 
that it is important for the management of merging firms to try to steer employees 
towards social mobility, rather than social competition responses. We will return to 
this managerial implication in the final chapter of this dissertation.   144 





In the last decades the ability to acquire internationally has become an imperative 
skill.  This  need  has  also  expanded  towards  the  airline  industry.  Consolidation  is 
necessary  and  therefore  many  airline  organizations  can  not  avoid  being  either  an 
acquirer or an acquired company. As mentioned in the first chapter the analysis of this 
study has concentrated on the integration process of such an acquisition.  
 
In the design of the study on which this dissertation is based a number of choices have 
been made. Firstly the analysis has been limited to the acquired company. The second 
choice was that the perceptions of the respondents have been the main object of study. 
The third characteristic was that the research has been administered over an extensive 
period  of  time  using  several  moments  in  time  during  that  period  as  point  of 
measurement.  
 
In  the  next  section  these  characteristics  of  the  research  will  be  discussed. 
Subsequently the theoretical background will be summarized followed by the results. 
In  the  last  section  of  this  concluding  chapter  managerial  implications  will  be 
formulated and suggestions will be made for future research.  
 
6.2 Characteristics of the study 
 
Focus on the acquired company 
 
As has been mentioned in Chapter Two, the acquired company is usually assumed to 
be dominated by the acquirer (Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, Monden & de 
Lima, 2002; Terry, Carey & Callan, 2001), and although ―the merger syndrome‖ can 
be ascribed to employees of both companies (Marks & Mirvis, 1997: 22) an M&A 
often  is  a  more  stressful  event  for  employees  of  the  acquired  company  (Covin, 
Sightler, Kolenko & Tudor, 1996; Buono &  Nurick 1992). When we observe the   145 
identification with the pre-merger firm and compare this with the identification with 
the super-ordinate firm, observations on the side of the dominated firm often reveal a 
more painful process (Jetten, O’Brien A., & Trindall, 2002; Terry et al., 2001; Covin 
et al., 1996).  
 
The  perceived  loss  of  autonomy  or  the  uncertainty  of  the  future  position  of  the 
employee can result in an experience of stress. This may lead to a higher level of 
dissatisfaction (Covin et al., 1996). It can also be stressful to experience the fear of 
loosing the former culture (Buono, Bowditch & Lewis, 1985; Marks & Mirvis, 2001; 
Linde & Schalk, 2006; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). The dominated firm can 
fear  the  arrogance  of  the  dominator  (Hogan  &  Overmeyer-Day,  1994)  and  the 
employees can develop several forms of resistance behavior like: defensive retreat 
resulting in a strategy of noncompliance, aggressive hostility, anxiety, creating rumor 
mills, low trust in the organization and increased intensity to leave the organization 
(Marks & Mirvis 2001; Schweiger & DeNisi, 1991). 
 
In  summary  although  both  companies  can  have  several  similar  reactions  to  the 
acquisition, the reactions of the employees of the target firm tend to be stronger and 
therefore the focus of this dissertation was on the acquired firm: the Dutch airline 
KLM. 
 
Perception of the employees as point of reference 
 
There are several options to measure the changes within an organization during a 
certain time period.  One of them is observing the performance of the company by 
looking at the financial outputs like return on investment, return on assets, stock price 
fluctuation or changes in market shares. Another option is to observe and measure 
more  subjective  experiences  of  the  employees  like  job  satisfaction,  turnover  or 
commitment (Hogan & Overmeyer-Day, 1994) (see Chapter One). The option that 
was chosen for this dissertation is measuring the perception of the employees.  
Measuring perceptions is different from looking at objectively observable phenomena. 
For instance, the mobility of workers across organizational boundaries as perceived 
by  employees  may  be  different  from  the  actual  mobility  as  reflected  in,  e.g.,  the 
personnel  administration. The perceptions  of the employees  however are likely to   146 
influence their behavior even when they are not in accordance with the facts. As was 
mentioned in Chapter Three it meant for the researchers to make an a priori choice in 




Most  studies  on  M&A  processes  tend  to  either  focus  on  a  certain  time  period 
(Hubbard  &  Purcell,  2001;  Schraeder,  2001;  Covin  et  al.,  1996;  Panchal  & 
Cartwright, 2001) or compare time periods (Dackert, Jackson, Brenner & Johansson, 
2003;  Birkinshaw,  Bresman  &  Håkanson,  2000).  Schweiger  and  Denisi  (1991) 
however  stress  the  importance  of  the  time  horizon  in  research  on  mergers  and 
acquisitions. A longer period might be necessary in describing and explaining post-
merger integration processes, as these usually take a much longer period than half a 
year or a year. 
In this dissertation the focus was on the two phenomena, culture and identification, 
and we observed their development over time. Hence, as was mentioned in Chapter 
Three, we followed a longitudinal approach giving us the possibility to gauge changes 
over time and compare time periods. 
 
6.3 Theoretical background 
 
In this study, an airline company has been observed during an extensive time of the 
post-merger  integration  period.  For  this  dissertation  two  phenomena  have  been 
analyzed,  culture  and  identity,  from  the  perspective  of  the  following  problem 
statement: 
 
How do organizational culture and identity factors influence employee responses 
in the post-merger integration processes? 
 
Regarding culture, the organizational cultures of both companies have been the main 
focus,  and  in  Chapter  Four  some  questions  pertaining  to  how  these  cultures  will 
change  during  the  integration  process  have  been  explored.  Will  the  cultures  be 
perceived to become gradually more alike, or will they continue to be recognizably   147 
different, even after a number of years? Do different subcultures (here defined as 
departments) differ in their perception of the culture changes during the integration 
process?  
 
Organizational culture, as described in Chapter Two, has been approached from two 
main  perspectives:  the  pragmatic  view,  which  regards  organizational  culture  as  a 
phenomenon that can be measured, and the symbolic or anthropological view, which 
defines  culture  as  (the  outcome  of)  an  ongoing  process  of  interpretation  by 
employees,  thereby  giving  meaning  to  their  own  perception  and  their  mental 
representation of the perception of the other employees.   
 
We have chosen to combine both perspectives in order to focus on dimensions that are 
managerially relevant and to be able to analyze the perceptions of employees at the 
same  time.  We  formulated  hypotheses  with  regard  to  the  perspectives  of  the 
employees on their own organizational culture and the organizational culture of the 
acquiring firm and mainly looked at the differences between the two. In doing this we 
focused  first  on  the  acquired  organization  as  a  whole,  and  subsequently  on  the 
separate departments.  
 
As the merger studied was of an international nature differences between national 
cultures  could  not  be  ignored,  and  a  hypothesis  with  regard  to  the  influence  of 
differences in national cultures on the perception of organizational cultural differences 
has been formalized and tested.  
 
The second phenomenon that has been studied was the identification of the employees 
with the new, super-ordinate entity of the merged firm. The identity process that has 
been observed in this dissertation is specifically interesting because airlines tend to 
operate in a very publicly visible manner, as a consequence of which the employees 
of the organizations are frequently confronted with their work-identity outside their 
work environment.  
Building on social identity theory we formed hypotheses and subsequently data from 
the survey and interviews, discussed in Chapter Three, were analyzed to test these 
hypotheses.   148 
The  social  identity  theory,  as  was  explained  in  Chapter  Two,  is  based  on  the 
assumption that people define themselves to some extent in terms of their membership 
of  a  group  (Tajfel  &  Turner,  1986).  This  ultimately  leads  to  oneness  with  or 
belongingness to a social category, thereby perceiving the fate of the group as one’s 
own (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). An in-group is the group that a person belongs to and 
uses as point of reference and a comparative other group is seen as the out-group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  
Ellemers,Wilke and Van Knippenberg (1993) and Haslam (2001) concentrated on the 
influence of the status  of the in-group and argued that belonging to a high-status 
group is desirable because it enhances a positive self image. Therefore people tend to 
identify more with a high-status group than with a low-status group. In several mainly 
laboratory experiments a number of reactions were found that members of a low-
status group exhibited in order to compensate their feeling of inferiority relating to the 
high-status comparable group. In the reactions of lower-status group members the 
following strategies to improve social identity can be distinguished (as discussed in 
Chapter Two): 
 
  They can perceive more individual mobility in the new super-ordinate firm, 
thereby disengaging from their own group.  
  By  developing  social  creativity,  which  consists  of  making  different 
comparisons with the higher status group and thereby enhancing the value of 
their lower status group.  
  By engaging in social competition, meaning that they will not accept their 
current status and engage themselves in proving their worthiness. (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Haslam, 2001; Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  
 
In  this  study  of  the  occurrence  and  effects  of  these  reactions  were  explored  in  a 
realistic, non-experimental setting.    149 
6.4 Results and interpretations 
 
To observe the perception of the organizational cultures of the two companies we 
mainly  looked  at  the  perceived  differences  between  the  cultures  and  aimed  our 
research at finding possible changes during the post-merger period. On the basis of 
the literature on organizational culture issues in postmerger integration we formed the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:   The  perceived  cultural  differences  between  the  firms  involved  in  a 
merger  will  in  the  post-merger  period  first  increase,  and  then 
decrease. 
 
Hypothesis 2:   The  perceived  cultural  differences  between  the  firms  involved  in  a 
merger will differ between departments. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  In high-interaction groups the perceived cultural differences will first 
increase and later decrease; in low-interaction groups the perceived 
cultural differences will not change. 
 
The first hypothesis was based on the expectation that changes in perception would 
occur in the postmerger period. The expectation was that the employees would in the 
first period under influence of the confrontation with the acquiring firm tend to see 
larger differences in organizational culture. The first contacts with the acquiring firm 
are usually frightening and tend to cause an exaggerated perception of differences. 
Our second expectation was that this would gradually but significantly change during 
the subsequent years: as experiences with the acquiring firm accumulate perceived 
differences will become smaller. Our predictions came true: the perceived differences 
between the two organizations first increased and then decreased, but the shifts from 
round to round were too small to be statistically significant. These relatively small 
changes could be the result of the fact that the two companies continued to operate 
relatively  independently;  the  geographical  distance  between  the  head  offices  may 
have had an influence on this process as well. It is unavoidable that a larger distance 
will result in a reduction in the interactions between employees. It is worth noting   150 
however that the perceived cultural differences were at their maximum in rounds two 
and three and at their minimum in round 6 of our repeated survey.  
 
Our  second  hypothesis  predicted  significant  differences  between  the  several 
departments within KLM regarding employee perceptions of cultural differences, and 
we did in fact observe a number of significant differences between the departments. 
Cabin Crew, for instance, differed significantly from most of the other departments in 
the sense that they perceived the differences between the two organizational cultures 
to be smaller. In fact all the departments where the employees wear uniforms (Cabin 
Crew,  Cockpit  Crew,  Check-in  Staff)  perceived  the  differences  between  the 
organizations to be smaller than their non-uniformed colleagues. At the same time this 
group has hardly any interaction with their counterparts at Air France.  
The  findings  for  these  three  categories  of  personnel  may  be  due  to  a  feeling  of 
oneness between all the uniformed employees, as the uniform symbolizes being an 
airline employee, regardless of the color of the uniform. It can also be argued that for 
these  categories  of  employees  the  counterpart  group  formed  no  threat  at  all.  The 
Cabin and Cockpit Crew members have the additional experience of working with 
groups  consisting of different  individuals  on  almost every work shift,  which may 
create a feeling of belongingness almost solely based on exterior characteristics like 
wearing a uniform. This feeling might very well be easily translated to uniforms of 
other airlines, too.  
Apart from the departments of KLM in Holland, the establishments outside Holland 
showed  a  significant  difference  between  the  Milano  outpost  and  the  offices  in 
Stockholm  and  London.  The  Milano  employees  perceived  a  smaller  difference 
between the cultures of AF and KLM. The smaller national cultural distance between 
Italy and France could be a factor explaining this difference. The tests of effects of 
differences in national culture confirmed this argument (see below in the discussion of 
hypothesis 4). 
 
The third hypothesis predicted an influence on changes in perceptions of the cultural 
differences of the intensity of interaction between the employees of the acquired firm 
and their counterparts in the acquiring firm. The findings were remarkably different 
from what we expected. The low-interaction group for which we expected no changes 
in perceptions of the differences between the organizations did in fact change their   151 
perceptions significantly. This group revealed the pattern that we predicted for the 
high-interaction group. The high-interaction group, contrary to our expectations, did 
not show any significant changes. On top of these findings regarding changes over 
time the absolute differences between the high and low interaction groups were also 
consistent,  but  in  a  different  direction  than  expected:  the  high-interaction  group 
perceived the differences between the firms consistently to be larger than the low-
interaction  group.  This  could  mean  that  the  high-interaction  group  had  already 
acquired  a  more  realistic  perception  of  the  differences  between  the  organizations 
before the first round of our survey, meaning that no change in their perception was 
necessary. This explanation was certainly the case for the Cargo department because 
we only involved them in the second round after several employees advised us to 
include them because they, of all the departments, were in the most advanced stage of 
integration.  
 
The above results mean that we can not easily conclude that the process of interaction 
will result in the end in a diminishing of perceived differences. The differences did 
become a bit smaller for the employees that interacted strongly with the acquiring 
firm but not in a substantial manner. This could mean that it takes a longer time to 
alter perceptions of cultural differences than we anticipated. It could also mean that 
within the chosen high-interaction group some departments differ from others in their 
perception  as  well  as  in  their  amount  and  manner  of  interaction,  with  possibly 
counteracting  effects  on  their  perceptions.  This  doesn’t  however  give  enough 
explanation  for  the  fluctuating  perceptions  of  the  employees  that  had  hardly  any 
contact at all with the acquiring organization. This fluctuation could be caused by 
hearsay. A rumor mill can have a stronger effect apparently than the actual experience 
with new colleagues. On top of that the actual perceptions of the differences were 
smaller for this group than the high interaction group and this could be explained by a 
smaller  or  lack  of  experience  of  stress.  This  group  could  have  felt  less  threat  of 
existence or autonomy than the high interaction group. 
 
Taking into account  differences  in  national  culture was  unavoidable because both 
companies differed in nationality. It was however not the main topic of research for 
this thesis. We formed one hypothesis with regard to this subject: 
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Hypothesis 4:   If  the  distance  between  the  national  culture  of  an  acquired-firm 
employee  and  the  home  country  culture  of  the  acquiring  firm  is 
smaller,  the  perceived  differences  between  the  two  organizational 
cultures will also be smaller. 
 
Our expectation was that the national cultural distance between the employees and the 
acquiring  firm  would  have  an  influence  on  perceptions  of  organizational  cultural 
differences. At KLM several nationalities were represented among the employees in 
the Netherlands as well as at the establishments outside the Netherlands. Using the 
Kogut en Singh (1988) formula for cultural distance, we compared two groups and 
did find a significant difference. The group that had a national culture that was more 
similar to French culture perceived the differences between the two firms also to be 
smaller.  This  finding  confirms  that  national  cultural  distance  and  differences  in 
organizational culture are related (Hofstede, 1994).        
 
To observe the identification process of the employees with the new organization we 
analyzed the responses (mentioned above) that according to the social identity theory 
are the most likely and translated them to the KLM case. In order to do so we formed 
three hypotheses: 
 
 Hypothesis 5: When the employees of the lower status firm engage more in social 
competition  behaviour,  they  will  identify  less  with  the  new,  super-
ordinate organization. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  When employees of the lower status firm see more opportunities for 
social mobility in the new firm they will identify more with the new, 
super-ordinate organization. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  When the employees of the lower status firm engage in social creativity 
to compare themselves relatively favorably with the “other” firm they 
will identify less with the new, super-ordinate organization. 
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Hypothesis 1 and 2 were confirmed. Social competition had a negative effect on the 
identification  with  the  new  firm  and  social  mobility  had  a  positive  effect  on 
identification with the new organization. The effect of social competition provides us 
with evidence that employees still experienced a feeling of belonging to the old group, 
resulting in competitive behavior towards the other, higher-status group. So far this 
reaction has mostly been studied in laboratory settings (Ellemers et al, 1993; Haslam, 
2001).  Our  study  shows  in  an  empirical  field  setting  that  social  competition  will 
impede identification with the new, merged firm. 
Seeing new possibilities in the new situation is a form of disengaging from the old 
firm,  and  in  this  empirical  field  setting  we  found  evidence  of  this  behavior. 
Experiencing or even expecting the possibility of social mobility in the new firm will 
lead to more identification with the super-ordinate organization. Again the laboratory 
findings of Ellemers et al. (1993) and Haslam (2001) were confirmed in our study.  
 
The third hypothesis was not that easily confirmed. In our study there appeared to be 
no relationship between social creativity and identification. A reason for this lack of 
findings could be that the measurement of social creativity was inadequate. We hoped 
to prompt responses by showing a picture and meant in doing so to eliminate the 
possibility of introducing any bias. Creativity after all should come solely out of the 
mind of the interviewees themselves. However, we were not able to systematically 
distinguish between perceptions of status orderings that reflected social creativity, and 
status  orderings  that  were  based  on  realistic  assessments  of  relative  strength, 
performance, influence, or skills. 
In  our  interviews  we  did  notice  several  forms  of  social  creativity  wherein  the 
respondents in some way upgraded their position by emphasizing their superior ability 
in particular fields in comparison with their higher-status counterpart departments at 
AF, but this was not clearly connected significantly to either a stronger or a weaker 
identification with the super-ordinate firm.  
A possible explanation for this result is that the social creativity response can be 
associated with two opposite effects: it could either help in accepting the other firm 
(―they are superior but we are also good in some other field‖) and thereby causing 
more identification with the new firm, or contest the overall status ordering (―we are 
too good to accept their superiority‖), which could be an impediment to identification. 
The laboratory research so far is not clear in this respect either (Tajfel & Turner,   154 
1989;  Ellemers  et  al.,  1993;  Haslam,  2001).  If  social  creativity  responses  can  be 
associated with these two opposite effects, it begs the question which factors cause the 
balance to shift in the direction of more, rather than less identification with the super-
ordinate entity. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the amount of threat to either the existence of the 
department or autonomy of the function of the employee will serve as a moderating 
effect on this process, in the sense that less threat will lead to a creativity expression 
that will lead to more identification with the super-ordinate firm. For instance the 
employees of the IT department were threatened by loosing jobs or having to give up 
their own IT systems. Examples of their creativity mostly expressed themselves in 
promoting  the  system  that  was  threatened  to  be  eliminated.  Another  possible 
moderator could be the trust in the objectives of the superiors: if employees accept the 
decisions of their superior management they may more easily apply their creativity to 
a positive direction.  
 
Another  question  we  can  ask  ourselves  is  whether  our  picture  clearly  enough 
symbolized status differences. We observed that some respondents did not interpret 
the pictures to indicate status differences or superiority of one of the firms. They 
sometimes interpret them as symbolizing differences in size, or being the acquirer 
versus the acquired firm, i.e., objective facts rather than perceived status differences. 
So probably because we tried to avoid introducing any bias in the responses, we also 
could not prevent to elicit diffuse and therefore multi-interpretable answers.   
But  taking  this  possibility  of  alternative  interpretations  into  account  we  can  still 
conclude  that  there  are  visible  differences  between  respondents  from  different 
departments.  The  establishment  Stockholm,  for  instance,  clearly  favors  its  own 
department and in the Netherlands the only department that perceives Air France to be 
more in the lead with regard to their own function is Corporate Communication. The 
departments  Cabin  Crew,  Information  Services  and  Pricing  &  Revenue  clearly 
perceive KLM as being ―on top‖. Because of the multi-interpretable characteristic that 
is  mentioned  above,  we  can  conclude  that  in  some  cases  actual  dominance  or 
superiority was measured, while in other cases unrealistic subjective perceptions of 
dominance were measured, suggesting some form of creativity. 
The negative relationship with identification that we hypothesized did not come out 
however.   155 
 
The above results lead us to some thoughts regarding factors that positively contribute 
to post-merger integration. These ideas will be discussed in the next section. 
 
6.5 Managerial implications 
 
We found during our research period an overall decline of the perceived differences 
between the cultures of the two firms. These findings suggest a slow process and in 
that respect the chosen gradual form of the integration of Air France and KLM can be 
seen as a good choice. 
 
Although  it  seems  logical  that  different  departments  will  experience  a  merger 
differently, it is important for managers to acknowledge this fact, and take it into 
account in their integration-related decisions. It is almost impossible, and probably 
counter-productive, to  integrate every part of two large organizations  in  the same 
manner.  Acknowledging  the  separate  identities  of  departments  will  lead  to  a 
simultaneous process of high and low integration between the merged firms; which 
means that a single overall integration policy is not an option. 
 
A particularly interesting and managerially relevant finding is that employees in low-
integration departments can show stronger changes in their perceptions of the cultural 
differences between merging companies than their colleagues from high-integration 
departments.  This  means  that  while  it  is  likely  that  most,  if  not  all  managerial 
attention will be focused on the high-integration departments, communication with 
low-integration departments during the postmerger period is very important in order 
to prevent possible rumor mills. 
 
Our study also found evidence of the influence of national culture on the perceptions 
of employees. This finding underlines the argument in Chapter Two that it is difficult 
to estimate the depth of the influence of national culture on organizational culture, but 
that the influence itself is indisputable. Consequently it will be difficult for employees 
and managers to separate the two factors. In any case it is important to focus attention 
also  on  national  culture  because  it  definitely  determines  at  least  a  part  of  the   156 
perceptions  of  employees.  National  cultural  differences  should  therefore  be  made 
explicit and their consequences subject of discussions in international M&As.  
 
Identifying with a new firm is always difficult and it should be noted that this process 
may take a long time. Engaging in competition with the other firm will not enhance 
this  process  in  any  way  as  this  study  has  shown.  One  could  argue  that  a  certain 
amount  of  ―healthy‖  competition  can  stimulate  employees  to  give  the  best  of 
themselves, but in a merger it would be safer to strive towards developing a new sense 
of shared identity.  
 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the perception that mobility between the two 
merged  companies  is  possible,  leads  to  more  identification  with  the  new  super-
ordinate organization. Providing information about the possibilities of mobility, or 
even actively promoting and accommodating such mobility could therefore be a wise 
procedure  if  increased  identification  with  the  new  organization  is  deemed  to  be 
important.  
 
The role of creativity in relation to identification with the merged firm is less clear, 
and seems to depend on moderating factors, such as the extent to which employees 
feel threatened by the merger and the trust in the managerial decisions. To completely 
erase  a feeling of threat seems  an impossible task, but  the level  of threat  can be 
lowered  by  creating  an  environment  of  open  communication.  Making  decisions 
explicit can at least remove some of the uncertainty. Bad news is often better than no 
news. 
 
The emphasis of this dissertation has been on the analysis of quantitative data. The 
interviews  and  observations  have  served  to  help  interpret  and  to  illustrate  these 
findings. Using both these forms of measurement does not mean that this study is not 
characterized by a number of limitations. These limitations will be discussed in the 
next section followed by suggestions for future research.   157 
6.6 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
In order to fully understand the processes that are involved in the integration period of 
international mergers, more study is necessary. This particular study had a number of 
limitations, each of which points at future research challenges. 
 
The  first  limitation  is  that  our  study  involved  a  single  case.  Even  though  it  is 
concentrated on a large organization, showing a considerable number of factors that 
act and counteract in a postmerger integration process, it is still just one case which 
limits the possibility to generalize. It is however possible to develop certain notions 
that  are  applicable  in  comparable  situations  as  we  have  done  in  this  concluding 
chapter. Future research could  look at a larger number of cases, or conduct more 
extensive studies of single cases that differ in relevant dimensions. 
 
The second limitation is that this dissertation focused on the acquired side of the 
merger, meaning that only one of the merging firms was analyzed. The arguments for 
doing so were discussed above in more detail. It enabled us to observe the behaviors 
that  were  expected  on  the  basis  of  the  social  identity  theory  perspective.  Future 
research could compare the reactions of both the acquired and the acquiring firms. 
 
The third limitation is that we restricted our study to a limited number of variables. 
Our  questionnaire  was  extensive  and  so  were  our  data  from  the  interviews. 
Nevertheless  in  this  dissertation  we  have  chosen  to  concentrate  on  two  particular 
perspectives in order to maintain focus. Future research can elaborate on this case as 
well as other M&As, looking at a number of alternative variables. 
 
The fourth limitation is that we used a certain time frame as our object of study. Three 
and a half years seems to be a long period a priori but at the end of our study we 
noticed  several  occurrences  that  could  be  valuable  to  continue  to  observe.  Future 
research could analyze an even larger time frame than has been done in this study. 
Particular in a case like Air France-KLM, where we have discovered a very slow pace 
of transformation, it would be interesting to look at the results of the acquisition after 
more than four years.   158 
All  in  all  this  study  has  revealed  a  complex  interplay  of  factors  influencing  the 
dynamics of perceptions of cultural differences and identification during postmerger 
integration. We hope that in future studies we will be able to continue to unravel the 
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        Summary 
 
Despite the continuing propensity to expand organizations by means of mergers and 
acquisitions the actual success of this strategy seems to be questionable. Insight in the 
factors  leading  to  success  or  failure  of  M&As  might  therefore  be  helpful,  and  in 
particular insights in postmerger processes. To answer to this need several researchers 
have  studied  the  postmerger  integration  process.  In  this  field  the  focus  on  how 
employees  perceive  postmerger  processes,  and  the  effects  of  these  perceptions  is 
relatively  recent.  But  some  researchers  acknowledge  that  the  experiences  of  all 
members  of  an  organization  going  through  a  transformational  change  process  are 
important. 
This study focuses on culture and social identity during postmerger integration.  
 
The  more  abstract  concept  of  culture  is  explored  on  the  basis  of  employee 
perceptions. During a merger the characteristics of the two organizational cultures that 
are fusing will become more visible to the members. Hence we explored the changes 
in  perceived  cultural  differences  during  the  postmerger  integration  process.  We 
collected data from an acquisition between two airlines: Air France and KLM. In the 
design of this study we have chosen to concentrate on the acquired company (KLM). 
The research has been done over an extensive period of time, using the longitudinal 
approach. 
 
A number of propositions have been formulated with regard to the effect of a merger 
on perceived differences in organizational cultures. The assumption was that changes 
would occur over time and that different forms of integration would result in different 
changes in perception. Besides the above focus on shifts in organizational culture 
perceptions we also examined the influence of national culture on the perception of 
organizational  cultural  differences.  We  used  data  both  from  a  survey  and  from 
interviews. National culture is described by using the results from the most prominent 
international studies. The formulated hypotheses were tested on our data and gave 
some clearly confirmatory and some mixed results. 
 
Furthermore we examined in this study the meaning and significance of the social 
identity of the employees of an organization during the acquisition. Compared with   178 
culture, social identity is a less abstract and more directly experienced concept. We 
were interested in  factors influencing  identification with  the merged firm. This  is 
important, because organizational identification has been shown to be associated with 
a number of positive organizational outcomes. Based on social identity theory, we 
formulated hypotheses pertaining to the effects on identification with a merged firm 
of three types of responses from acquired-firm employees. Social competition and 
social  creativity  were  argued  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  identification  with  the 
merged firm, while social mobility was argued to have a positive effect. The data 
from KLM employees after the acquisition by Air France generally confirmed our 
hypotheses.  The  results  show  that  in  particular  the  identity  responses  social 
competition and social mobility have an important influence on identification with the 
merged firm. The effect of social creativity was less clear, but this may be at least 
partly due to problems in operationalizing this rather elusive concept. 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters.  In chapter one the problem statement is 
formulated  as  well  as  the  research  questions.  This  chapter  gives  the  reader  an 
overview  of  the  extensive  research  on  mergers  and  acquisitions.  It  discusses  the 
different motivations for M&As, the developmental processes of M&As, and various 
aspects of post-M&A integration processes, like the speed of the integration and the 
distinction between task and human integration, and the distinction between different 
in the process.  
 
Chapter  two  offers  insight  in  the  concepts  that  have  a  central  position  in  this 
dissertation. Identity and social identity are explored by discussing the social identity 
theory, from its foundation to recent outcomes of laboratory research. This overview 
shows that field research applying social identity theory to postmerger processes is 
virtually nonexistent so far. 
Organizational culture can be seen from several perspectives and these are explored 
and categorized. Because the merger studied is between organizations of different 
nationality,  the  major  studies  of  differences  between  national  cultures  are  also 
discussed. Chapter two concludes with a theoretical exploration of the relationship of 
the two concepts: organizational culture and social identity. 
   179 
Chapter three presents the methodology of the empirical study. It explains the case 
and several developments that led to this merger, as well as the research process. In 
addition  it  discusses  the  sample  as  well  as  the  variables  used  in  this  empirical 
research.  
 
Chapter four presents the empirical results with regard to the concept culture. On the 
basis of four hypotheses it explores changes in the perception of cultural differences 
of  the  members  of  the  organization.  The  results  show  that  over  time  perceived 
differences  in  organizational  cultures  first  increase  and  subsequently  decrease,  as 
predicted, but the changes are too small to reach significance. Furthermore the results 
show that employees of different departments have significantly different perceptions 
of  cultural  differences.  Finally,  national  cultural  differences  are  shown  to  have  a 
positive influence on perceived differences of the organizational cultures. 
 
Chapter five explores the identification process and in particular the strategies that 
employees use in order to compensate lower status feelings. In line with predictions 
based  on  social  identity  theory  employees  who  perceive  mobility  opportunities 
identify  more  with  the  superordinate  organization,  and  employees  who  engage  in 
social  competition  actions  identify  less  with  the  new  organization.  However,  the 
effect of social creativity, as a means of members of a lower-status organization to 
upgrade  their  status  feelings  were  inconclusive.  The  reason  is  most  probably  the 
imperfection of the measure of social creativity employed in the study. 
 
Chapter six summarizes all the conclusions of this study and in addition formulates 
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